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THE LAW(?) OF THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION
Martin S. Lederman*
Shortly after John Wilkes Booth assassinated Abraham Lincoln on
April 14, 1865, President Andrew Johnson directed that Booth’s alleged
coconspirators be tried in a makeshift military tribunal, rather than in
the Article III court that was open for business just a few blocks from
Ford’s Theatre. Johnson’s decision implicated a fundamental constitutional question that was heatedly debated throughout the Civil War:
When, if ever, may the federal government circumvent Article III’s
requirements of a criminal trial by jury with an independent, tenureprotected presiding judge by trying individuals other than members of
the armed forces in a wartime military tribunal?
That question is significant in the United States’ current armed
conflicts against nonstate terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda
because Congress has authorized military commissions to try such
nonstate enemy forces for domestic-law, war-related offenses. The government and some judges have looked to the Lincoln assassination
commission—in the words of one jurist, “the highest-profile and most
important U.S. military commission precedent in American history”—
as a leading precedent in support of such military jurisdiction, one that
purportedly helped to establish a political branch practice that should
inform constitutional understandings.
As this Article demonstrates, however, such respect for the Lincoln
assassination trial as a canonical constitutional precedent would itself
be historically anomalous. During and immediately after the Civil War,
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all three branches engaged repeatedly with the question of the permissible scope of military justice and whether certain wartime exigencies
might justify circumvention of Article III’s guarantees, but the question
resisted resolution; indeed, it was the rare constitutional problem that
flummoxed even Lincoln. At war’s end, the President and many of his
congressional allies appeared to be on the verge of repudiating the
system of military tribunals that Lincoln himself had superintended.
His assassination, however, prompted his successor to convene the most
controversial military trial of them all, a highly unorthodox proceeding
that not only revived the heated debate over the constitutional question
but also precipitated one of the only instances in the nation’s history in
which the Executive actually disregarded a judicial order—a presidential suspension of habeas to prevent the Article III courts from adjudicating a challenge to their own displacement. The Article unearths this
fascinating but rarely examined chapter in the history of constitutional
war powers.
The Article then carefully examines the place of the Lincoln trial
in the nation’s constitutional discourse over the past century and a half
and demonstrates that, far from being viewed as a canonical precedent,
it has been virtually unthinkable for anyone to rely upon the assassination commission as venerated legal authority. This historical recovery
is significant for the ongoing constitutional litigation challenging such
military trials. More broadly, this historical survey might also inform
current academic and judicial debates about whether and under what
circumstances political branch practice, especially high-profile precedents,
ought to inform, or “liquidate,” the meaning or proper application of the
Constitution and when, if ever, asserted exigencies of war might justify
deviations from the constitutional norm.
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PROLOGUE
“[T]he cause of such mighty changes in the world’s history as
we may perhaps never realize.”1
The most notorious and consequential crime in American history
happened just eight blocks from where I sit, in the heart of the nation’s
capital.
An attempt on the President’s life was hardly unforeseeable.
Abraham Lincoln had been living in the shadow of such threats for more
than four years, ever since the final leg of his train journey from Illinois
to Washington in February 1861 was scheduled for the dead of night so
as to avoid assassins thought to be lying in wait in Baltimore.2 Even so,
the assassination in Ford’s Theatre, on Good Friday 1865, stunned the
nation, both because of its timing and its circumstance.
General Grant had taken Richmond a fortnight earlier, and it had
been only five days since General Lee had surrendered on behalf of the
Army of Northern Virginia at the McLean residence in Appomattox
Court House. Finally, thankfully, the elusive peace was at hand. Lincoln
himself, the previous month, set the tone for the imminent recon1. Letter from Edward Curtis to His Mother (Apr. 22, 1865), in Edward Curtis, The
Post-Mortem in the Case of President Lincoln, Louisville Courier-J., Apr. 19, 1903, § 5, at 4.
2. See William Hanchett, The Lincoln Murder Conspiracies 21–30 (1983); see also
William A. Tidwell et al., Come Retribution: The Confederate Secret Service and the
Assassination of Lincoln 226–32 (1988) (recounting threats to Lincoln during his travel to
Washington in 1861). There was good reason to fear such threats in proximity to the
nation’s capital. Lincoln received less than three percent of the vote in Maryland in 1860,
see The Tribune Almanac and Political Register 1861, at 49 (New York, J.F. Cleveland
compiler, 1861), and less than one percent of the vote in present-day Virginia, see id. at
50–51 (showing that Lincoln received 1,929 total votes in Virginia, over 1,200 of which
were from counties in what is now West Virginia).
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ciliation: In a succinct, solemn inaugural address, marked by a surprising
equanimity, the President recognized that the warring sides were bound
together by a shared fate according to God’s unknowable design.
Without invoking a word of triumph, let alone retribution, he famously
declared that the time had come to “bind up the nation’s wounds,”
“[w]ith malice toward none; with charity for all.”3 Lincoln thereby began
to mark the path to repair and reconciliation in the wake of the acute
enmity that had torn the nation apart.
And so it was that on Thursday evening, April 13, just before the
start of the Easter weekend, the District of Columbia was in a state of
almost mystical reverie and wonder:
The very heavens seemed to have come down, and the stars
twinkled in a sort of faded way, as if the solar system was out of
order, and earth had become the great luminary. Everybody
illuminated. Every flag was flung out, windows were gay with
many devices, and gorgeous lanterns danced on their ropes
along the walls in a fantastic way, as if the fairies were holding
holiday inside.4
How incongruous it was, then, that the devastating blow should be
drawn the next day, at that very moment of collective relief following
years of dread and unimaginable bloodshed—just as it appeared that the
nation was emerging from the abyss. “Where, half an hour before, the
faces of wayfarers [on the streets of Washington] had reflected joy over
thoughts of Appomattox, the fall of Richmond and the surrender of
Johnston, now all was blanched horror . . . .”5

3. President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, Cong. Globe, 39th
Cong., Special Senate Sess. 1424–25 (1865); see also Garry Wills, Lincoln’s Greatest
Speech, Atlantic (Sept. 1999), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/09/
lincolns-greatest-speech/306551/ [http://perma.cc/ZC3E-J4DH] (“[Lincoln] asked others
to recognize in the intractability of events the disposing hand of a God with darker, more
compelling purposes than any man or group of men could foresee. This lesson, learned
from the war, he meant to apply to the equally intractable problems of the peace.”).
4. The Grand Display Last Night, Wash. Evening Star, Apr. 14, 1865, at 1 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). At the War Department, an elaborate fixture of gas jets
contributed to the otherworldly nature of the evening: “[H]igh over all, as if suspended by
unseen hands from above, in letters of softly subdued light, hung the sweet and healing
word, ‘PEACE.’” Frank Abial Flower, Edwin McMasters Stanton: The Autocrat of Rebellion,
Emancipation, and Reconstruction 274 (1905).
5. Curtis, supra note 1.
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What made the murder even more shocking was that the blow
arrived not from what remained of the Confederate Army, in a theater of
war, but instead under the most banal of circumstances, in a theater of a
much more ordinary kind, and at the hand of a common actor, not yet
twenty-seven years of age. While no one was paying him any mind, John
Wilkes Booth crept from behind the President, brandishing a tiny pistol
to terrifying effect—the fatal shot timed to coincide with the audience’s
predictable reaction to the play's surest laugh-line.6

The derringer that John Wilkes Booth used to kill Abraham Lincoln
(Source: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division,
photograph by Carol M. Highsmith, LC-DIG-highsm-04710).

Few could have imagined, on that peaceful spring evening, that a “little
black mass no bigger than the end of [a] finger—dull, motionless and
harmless [might be] the cause of such mighty changes in the world’s
history as we may perhaps never realize.”7
6. See Tom Taylor, Our American Cousin act 3, sc. 2, at 37 (1858) (“Well, I guess I
know enough to turn you inside out, old gal—you sockdologizing old man-trap.”); John
Rudy, Sockdologizing: Finally Laughing at the Lincoln Assassination, Interpreting the Civil
War (May 14, 2013), http://www.civilwarconnect.com/2013/05/sockdologizing.html [http://
perma.cc/QNU5-8CLR] (explaining that the laughs came at the expense of the buffoonish
character hurling the insult); see also Sarah Vowell, Assassination Vacation 46 (2005) (“It
is a comfort of sorts to know that the bullet hit Lincoln mid-guffaw. Considering how the war
had weighed on him, at least his last conscious moment was a hoot.”).
7. Letter from Edward Curtis to His Mother, supra note 1. The quotation is from a
remarkable passage penned by a twenty-six-year-old Army surgeon who assisted in the
President’s autopsy at the White House the next morning. In a letter to his mother a week
after the autopsy, Edward Curtis described the scene:
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As dramatic and consequential as the assassination may have been,
however, it was also—both in form and as a matter of law—a standardissue homicide, of the sort the criminal justice system routinely handled.
In the ordinary course, then, those suspected of the crime would have

The room . . . contained but little furniture: a large heavily-curtained
bed, a sofa or two, bureau, wardrobe and chairs comprised all there was.
Seated around the room were several general officers and some civilians,
silent or conversing in whispers, and to one side, stretched upon a rough
framework of boards and covered only with sheets and towels, lay, cold
and immovable, what but a few hours before was the soul of a great
nation. The Surgeon General was walking up and down the room when I
arrived, and detailed to me the history of the case. He said that the
President showed most wonderful tenacity of life, and, had not his
wound been necessarily mortal, might have survived an injury to which
most men would succumb.
. . . Dr. Woodward and I proceeded to open the head and remove
the brain down to the track of the ball. The latter had entered a little to
the left of the median line at the back of the head, had passed almost
directly forward through the center of the brain and lodged. Not finding
it readily, we proceeded to remove the entire brain: when, as I was lifting
the latter from the cavity of the skull, suddenly the bullet dropped out
through my fingers and fell, breaking the solemn silence of the room
with its clatter, into an empty basin that was standing beneath. There it
lay upon the white china, a little black mass no bigger than the end of
my finger—dull, motionless and harmless, yet the cause of such mighty
changes in the world’s history as we may perhaps never realize.
Our examination over, I proposed to the Surgeon General to weigh
the brain, since the comparative weight of the brains of men
distinguished for intellect is a matter of great scientific interest. . . .
. . . [W]hile the embalmers were working over the body, silently, in
one corner of the room, I prepared the brain for weighing. As I looked
at the mass of soft gray and white substance that I was carefully washing,
it was impossible to realize that it was that mere clay upon whose
workings but the day before rested the hopes of the nation. I felt more
profoundly impressed than ever with the mystery of that unknown
something which may be named ‘vital spark’ as well as anything else,
whose absence or presence makes all the immeasurable difference
between an inert mass of matter owning obedience to no laws but those
governing the physical and chemical forces of the universe, and, on the
other hand, a living brain by whose silent, subtle machinery a world may
be ruled.
Id. Writing in 1903, Curtis added this understated observation from his examination of
Lincoln’s brain:
The weighing of the brain . . . gave approximate results only, since
there had been some loss of brain substance, in consequence of the
wound, during the hours of life after the shooting. But the figures, such
as they were, seemed to show that the brain weight was not above the
ordinary for a man of Mr. Lincoln’s size.
Curtis, supra note 1.
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been tried before a local jury, for violations of criminal law offenses,8 in a
building less than five blocks from Ford’s Theatre: the magisterial Old
City Hall at 5th and E Streets NW, which housed the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia, a federal court established pursuant to Article
III of the Constitution. Such a federal criminal trial for an attack on a
President would not have been unprecedented. Thirty years earlier, Old
City Hall had been the site of the trial of Richard Lawrence, who had
attempted to assassinate President Andrew Jackson as he emerged from
the Capitol Rotunda.9 In the days immediately following Lincoln’s tragic
death, there was every reason to assume that the same courthouse would
once again host such a trial, before pro-Union Article III judges of the
D.C. Supreme Court whom President Lincoln himself had handpicked
when that court was established to replace the old Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia.10
Yet instead of seeking criminal court indictments against those
thought to be responsible for Lincoln’s killing, the nascent Johnson
Administration turned its sights two miles southward, to a thin peninsula
bisecting the Potomac River (into what are today separately designated as
the Anacostia and Potomac Rivers). At the tip of that peninsula,
Greenleaf Point, lay the old, underutilized United States Arsenal, which
had once been a federal penitentiary.11 The Administration chose that
imposing, nondescript building as the site of a most extraordinary,
unorthodox adjudicatory proceeding, one that raised fundamental
8. In particular, they might have been charged with abetting “wilful murder” in a
“district . . . under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,” an offense
established by the first Congress. See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against
the United States, ch. 9, § 3, 1 Stat. 112, 113 (1790).
9. See United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887, 887 (C.C.D.C. 1835) (No. 15,577).
10. See infra note 360 (discussing the 1863 statute that replaced the D.C. Circuit
Court and the local criminal court with the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia, to
which Lincoln immediately appointed four pro-Union judges).
11. See Michael W. Kauffman, American Brutus: John Wilkes Booth and the Lincoln
Conspiracies 331 (2004) [hereinafter Kauffman, American Brutus]; Edward Steers, Jr.,
Blood on the Moon: The Assassination of Abraham Lincoln 214 (2001) [hereinafter
Steers, Blood on the Moon]; Mike Kauffman, Fort Lesley McNair and the Lincoln
Conspirators, 80 Lincoln Herald 176, 176–80 (1978) [hereinafter Kauffman, Fort Lesley
McNair]. See generally John Elliott, The Washington D.C. Arsenal Penitentiary, Part 1:
The Pre-Trial Period (1831–1862), A Little Touch of History ( July 2, 2009), http://
awesometalks.wordpress.com/2009/08/02/the-washington-d-c-arsenal-penitentiary-part-1of-3/ [http://perma.cc/ZM3W-CXYL] (discussing the history of the Washington Arsenal
Penitentiary). In 1862, Lincoln had ordered that the Arsenal be transferred to the War
Department for the warehousing of military supplies; virtually all of its prisoners were sent
elsewhere. Kauffman, Fort Lesley McNair, supra, at 177–78; see also Kauffman, American
Brutus, supra, at 463 n.6; Steers, Blood on the Moon, supra, at 214. Today, Greenleaf
Point is the site of Army post Fort McNair, which hosts the National Defense University.
Fort McNair History, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, http://www.jbmhh.army.mil/
web/jbmhh/AboutJBMHH/FortMcNairHistory.html [http://perma.cc/TT3W-MD77] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2017).
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constitutional questions concerning the proper balance between civil
and military authorities.
There would be no trial of the assassin himself, for John Wilkes
Booth was already dead—killed in a standoff with the Union Army at
Garrett’s Farm in Virginia, twelve days after he murdered the President.12
The next day, April 27, 1865, Booth’s body was brought to the Arsenal in
the dead of night and ignominiously buried beneath a storage room,13
where it would remain until transferred to the Booth family plot in
Baltimore four years later.14 Nor could the government try John Surratt,
probably Booth’s most trusted confidant in the plot, for Surratt had fled
to Canada, and from there to England and then Italy, where he served
with the papal Zouaves.15 Within two weeks of the crime, however, eight
other suspected confederates of Booth and Surratt were arrested and
placed in military custody—some in the Old Capitol Prison in the District
of Columbia (at First and A Streets NE), others on two ironclad ships, the
U.S.S. Montauk and the U.S.S. Saugus, anchored in the Washington Navy
Yard in the District.16 On April 30, the Army transferred the alleged
accomplices to an area of the Arsenal penitentiary that had been closed
for years, where they were detained in squalid conditions, most of them
forced to wear stifling canvas hoods.17
The next day, May 1, 1865, President Johnson signed an order
authorizing trial of the alleged accomplices in a makeshift military commission.18 Commission proceedings commenced on May 9, less than four
weeks after the shooting,19 and trial began in earnest on May 12, after the

12. See Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11, at 309–20.
13. See id. at 322–25, 463 n.6; Steers, Blood on the Moon, supra note 11, at 256–57.
14. See Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11, at 391; Steers, Blood on the
Moon, supra note 11, at 257–59.
15. See Elizabeth D. Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers: Justice, Revenge, and Reunion
After the Civil War 187–89 (2004) [hereinafter Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers]. Surratt was
later apprehended in Egypt and returned to the United States, where he was tried before a
federal civilian jury in the D.C. Supreme Court in 1867. See infra section III.F.2.a.
16. See Roy Z. Chamlee, Jr., Lincoln’s Assassins: A Complete Account of Their
Capture, Trial, and Punishment 147, 167 (1990); Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note
11, at 329–31; Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 39, 48, 59; Steers, Blood on
the Moon, supra note 11, at 209.
17. See Chamlee, supra note 16, at 194–97; see also John Elliott, The Washington
D.C. Arsenal Penitentiary, Part 2: The Trial and Execution Period (1865–1869), A Little
Touch of History (Aug. 4, 2009), http://awesometalks.wordpress.com/2009/08/04/thewashington-d-c-arsenal-penitentiary-part-2-of-3/ [http://perma.cc/JH5K-578U] [hereinafter
Elliott, The Washington D.C. Arsenal Penitentiary, Part 2].
18. The Assassination of President Lincoln and the Trial of the Conspirators 17
(Cincinnati, Benn Pitman compiler, 1865) [hereinafter Pitman]. In section II.B of this
Article, I describe the Cabinet debates and the one-sentence legal opinion of the Attorney
General that paved the path for Johnson’s decision. See infra section II.B.
19. Pitman, supra note 18, at 18.
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accused were afforded an opportunity to secure counsel.20 The eight
individuals who appeared before the military commission were a motley
collection of secondary figures, with a variety of actual or alleged connections to the crime:
• Lewis Powell (alias Paine or Payne) brutally attacked Secretary
of State William Henry Seward at the same hour that Booth
shot Lincoln.21
• George Atzerodt was assigned by Booth to kill Vice President
Johnson, but for reasons that remain unknown—probably
some combination of fear, conscience, and alcohol—he did
not make an attempt on Johnson’s life.22
• David Herold was Booth’s aide, with whom he rendezvoused
in his flight from the capital; Herold surrendered to the
Army troops at Garrett’s Farm, where Booth was killed, on
April 26.23
• Samuel Arnold and Michael O’Laughlen had furtively
plotted with Booth several months earlier to kidnap (not
kill) the President and take Lincoln to Richmond, where
the President was to be used as leverage to secure a prisoner
exchange.24 The plotters abandoned that absurd idea some
weeks later, and Arnold and (most likely) O’Laughlen had
nothing more to do with the events of April 14.25
• Edman Spangler, a stagehand at Ford’s Theatre, held Booth’s
horse in an alley while the actor was inside the theater,
without knowledge of what Booth was up to.26

20. Id.
21. See Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11, at 350–52; Leonard, Lincoln’s
Avengers, supra note 15, at 5–7, 39–42, 115–18; Betty Ownsbey, Lewis Thornton Powell,
Alias Lewis Payne, in The Trial: The Assassination of President Lincoln and the Trial of
the Conspirators, at lxxii–lxxvii (Edward Steers Jr. ed., 2003) [hereinafter The Trial].
22. See Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 45–48, 114–15; William H.
Rehnquist, All the Laws but One 155–56 (1998); Edward Steers Jr., George Atzerodt, in
The Trial, supra note 21, at lxvi–lxxi.
23. See Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 36–39, 113–14; Rehnquist,
supra note 22, at 157–58.
24. See Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 48–51; Rehnquist, supra note
22, at 160–61.
25. See Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 53, 122–24; Percy E. Martin,
Samuel Arnold and Michael O’Laughlen, in The Trial, supra note 21, at lxxxviii–xcvi.
26. See Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 54–59, 124–25; Rehnquist,
supra note 22, at 158–60; Betty J. Ownsbey, Edman Spangler, in The Trial, supra note 21,
at xlvii–li. There was one piece of evidence suggesting that Spangler abetted Booth’s flight
from justice: A carpenter at the theater, who had briefly chased after Booth, testified that
Spangler implored him not to reveal which way the culprit had fled. See Pitman, supra
note 18, at 97 (testimony of Jacob Ritterspaugh).
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Mary Surratt, John’s mother, owned a boardinghouse on H
Street in Washington where the conspirators met and
plotted (and where the Wok ‘n’ Roll restaurant now sits), as
well as a tavern in Surrattsville (now Clinton), Maryland,
where Booth and Herold stopped on their flight from
Washington. Surratt likely knew that something nefarious
was afoot, although to this day it is uncertain whether she
was aware of the details.27
Finally, Samuel Mudd was a Charles County, Maryland,
physician, former slave owner, and staunch Confederate
supporter, who had had several previous, suspicious dealings
with Booth and Surratt. Booth and Herold stopped at
Mudd’s farm on the night of their escape, where Mudd set
Booth’s broken leg and offered the two men food and
shelter for the night. He also showed them a little-known
swamp route that would lead them to the Potomac so that
they could cross into Virginia. (It is vigorously disputed, to
this day, whether and to what extent Mudd knew what
Booth had done earlier on Friday evening.)28

27. See Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 42–45, 108–09, 118–22;
Rehnquist, supra note 22, at 162–65; Laurie Verge, Mary Elizabeth Surratt, in The Trial,
supra note 21, at lii–lix.
28. See Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 59–63, 111–12, 125–28;
Rehnquist, supra note 22, at 166–67; Edward Steers Jr., Samuel Alexander Mudd, in The
Trial, supra note 21, at lxxix–lxxxvii.
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The building on H Street, between 6th and 7th Streets NW,
that once was the Surratt boardinghouse where Booth and
his confederates plotted (Source: Library of Congress,
Prints & Photographs Division, LC-DIG-cwpbh-03432).

The tribunal that stood in judgment of these eight individuals bore
little resemblance to the D.C. Supreme Court two miles to the north. It
was a makeshift court, convened in an ersatz courtroom, measuring
approximately forty feet by twenty-seven feet, on the third floor of the
Arsenal.29 Most importantly, the entity that would resolve the fate of the
accused was entirely the creation of, and was administered by, the War
Department. There was no judge. A panel of nine military officers, most
of whom had no legal training, served as “members” of the commission.30 They were detailed to the court by another military officer,
29. See Kauffman, Fort Lesley McNair, supra note 11, at 180. Today, most of the old
Penitentiary is long gone, but the portion in which the trial was convened remains, as a
smaller building known as Grant Hall. The trial courtroom has recently been recreated on
the third floor and is open to public viewing four times a year. See Pub. Affairs Office, U.S.
Army Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, JBM-HH Announces Quarterly Grant Hall Public
Open House, U.S. Army (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.army.mil/article/146900/jbm_hh_
announces_quarterly_grant_hall_public_open_house [http://perma.cc/SS2M-MW57].
30. War Dep’t, Special Orders, No. 211 (May 6, 1865), reprinted in Pitman, supra
note 18, at 17. One member was an attorney: Major General Lew Wallace, who would later
become Governor of the New Mexico territory and then the U.S. Minister to the Ottoman
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Assistant Adjutant-General W.A. Nichols, who presumably acted with
input from, and probably at the direction of, the Secretary of War Edwin
Stanton and/or the esteemed Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt.31
Secretary Stanton himself helped draft the single, elaborate charge
against the defendants.32 Judge Advocate General Holt also drafted and
preferred the charge,33 prosecuted the case, and effectively controlled
the trial, assisted by two Assistant Judge Advocates, Representative John
Bingham and Brevet Colonel Henry Burnett.34 The commission itself
nominally decided legal questions that arose at trial, following
confidential deliberations in which the members were advised by none
other than Holt, Bingham, and Burnett—that is, by the prosecutors
themselves.35 This was, in other words, an executive proceeding, through
and through—indeed, one in which military officers played all the
governmental roles and in which there was scant separation between the
prosecution and the finders of fact. Holt “had great latitude for shaping
events in the courtroom to suit his own vision of justice, which was hardly
distinguishable at this point from revenge.”36

Empire. See Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11, at 369. He is most famous for
having written the historical adventure story Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ in 1880.
31. See Pitman, supra note 18, at 17; see also Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra
note 15, at 67–68.
32. See 93 Papers of Joseph Holt 264–68 (Library of Congress) (draft of charges in
Stanton’s handwriting).
33. See id. at 257–59, 263, 269–70 (drafts of charges in Holt’s handwriting and later
drafts with his handwritten insertions); see also Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note
15, at 70–71; infra note 404 (quoting from the charge).
34. See Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11, at 338. Burnett had been the
chief prosecutor of the military commission trial of “copperheads” Lambdin Milligan and
others in Indiana, see The Milligan Case 35, 251 (Samuel Klaus ed., 1929), a proceeding
that will play a prominent role in our story. See infra Part III. Bingham went on to become
the principal author of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Gerard N. Magliocca,
American Founding Son: John Bingham and the Invention of the Fourteenth Amendment
1–2 (2013), and chief prosecutor in the impeachment trial of President Johnson after the
President attempted to remove Stanton as Secretary of War in violation of the Tenure in
Office Act, see Proceedings in the Trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States, Before the United States Senate, on Articles of Impeachment 3 (Washington, D.C.,
F. & J. Rives & Geo. A. Bailey 1868) (describing Bingham as “chairman of the managers”);
id. at 786 (commencement of Bingham’s closing argument).
35. See Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11, at 340, 368–69; Leonard, Lincoln’s
Avengers, supra note 15, at 71.
36. Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 79.
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The military commission and prosecutors for the Lincoln assassination trial. Left to right: Lt. Col. David R. Clendenin, Col. C.H.
Tompkins, Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Harris, Brig. Gen. Albion P.
Howe, Brig. Gen. James Ekin, Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace, Maj. Gen.
David Hunter (President of the Commission), Maj. Gen. August V.
Kautz, Brig. Gen. Robert S. Foster, Rep. John A. Bingham, Brig.
Gen. Henry L. Burnett, and Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt
(Source: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Civil
War Photographs, LC-DIG-ppmsca-35257).

On June 30, after more than seven weeks of trial and testimony of
more than 300 witnesses, the commission found all eight defendants
guilty of at least some involvement in the events of April 14.37 The
commission recommended that three of the defendants—Arnold,
O’Laughlen, and Mudd—be sentenced to life imprisonment at hard
labor; that Spangler serve a term of six years at hard labor; and that the
other four be executed.38
One week later, after President Johnson approved the verdicts, four
of the defendants—Powell, Atzerodt, Herold, and Surratt—were hanged
on a gallows built just outside the Arsenal courthouse.39 Today, a
desultory tennis court occupies the site of the hanging; a stock “places of
interest” marker is the only reminder of the drama that occurred there.40

37. See Pitman, supra note 18, at 247–49.
38. Id. at 248–49.
39. See Chamlee, supra note 16, at 470–74; Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note
11, at 373–74.
40. See The Historical Marker Database, Lincoln Assassination Trial, http://
www.hmdb.org/marker.asp?marker=29740 [http://perma.cc/2DuM-Gk8k] (last updated
Jan, 11, 2017).
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INTRODUCTION
The Lincoln assassination has spawned a veritable library of writings
over the past 150 years.41 Indeed, an actual Lincoln assassination library,
the James O. Hall Research Center, sits a few miles from the scene of the
crime,42 adjacent to the Surratt House Museum in Clinton, Maryland—
what Sarah Vowell has aptly dubbed the “Vatican of the Lincoln assassination subculture.”43 As with most great crimes, this one has engendered countless theses, controversies, and conspiracy theories, sustaining
what one might fairly call “Lincoln assassination studies.” The majority of
accounts have been written by amateur sleuths and obsessives who have
devoted a remarkable part of their lives, and their energies, to the
subject. Having spent some time poring over the materials at the
museum and paid my nominal dues, I, too, am now a card-carrying
member of the Surratt Society,44 which collects much of its revenue by
hosting regular, twelve-hour-long John Wilkes Booth Escape Route
tours.45 Every month, I receive “The Surratt Courier,” a newsletter chockfull of new discoveries, revelations, artifacts, and fighting words.46
Of course, just as the assassination literature itself is only a sliver of
the much larger corpus of Lincoln scholarship, so, too, only a small
percentage of the assassination literature concerns the trial of the
conspirators. Even so, that relatively modest slice amounts to several
heavily weighted shelves of books and other materials. Most of those
sources offer detailed accounts (with varying degrees of accuracy) of the
41. The most comprehensive modern accounts include Chamlee, supra note 16;
Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11; Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15,
chs. 1–4; Steers, Blood on the Moon, supra note 11; Thomas Reed Turner, Beware the
People Weeping: Public Opinion and the Assassination of Abraham Lincoln (1982); and
John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History 287–96 (2012).
Older treatments include George S. Bryan, The Great American Myth (1940), and Osborn
H. Oldroyd, The Assassination of Abraham Lincoln (1901). A popular account that first
transfixed me, as a boy, on the Lincoln assassination was Jim Bishop, The Day Lincoln Was
Shot (1955). Lincoln assassination writings have become so voluminous that a historiography of sorts has even sprouted up. See, e.g., Hanchett, supra note 2.
42. See James O. Hall Research Center, Surratt House Museum, http://
www.surrattmuseum.org/hall-research-center [http://perma.cc/X26E-83HQ] (last visited
Nov. 2, 2017).
43. Vowell, supra note 6, at 54. Mary Surratt, one of the commission defendants,
owned a tavern in Clinton—then known as Surrattsville—and it was there that Booth and
his accomplice, David Herold, first stopped for sustenance and munitions as they fled
Washington on the night of April 14. See Rehnquist, supra note 22, at 162–66.
44. See Join the Surratt Society, Surratt House Museum, http://www.surrattmuseum.org/
surratt-society [http://perma.cc/ZHP5-ZFQ4] (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
45. See John Wilkes Booth Escape Route Tour, Surratt House Museum, http://
www.surrattmuseum.org/booth-escape-tour [http://perma.cc/JSU5-F28J] (last visited Oct.
6, 2017).
46. See Surratt Courier, Surratt House Museum, http://www.surrattmuseum.org/
surratt-courier [http://perma.cc/Q7ES-X9R5] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
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trial itself. Many overflow with seemingly endless debates about the guilt
or innocence of the defendants—especially of Samuel Mudd, the Charles
County, Maryland, physician and slave owner who set Booth’s broken leg
and allowed Booth and Herold to sleep at his house several hours after
the assassination, and of Mary Surratt, the owner of the boardinghouse
where the conspirators plotted.47
Other accounts of the trial focus on the many significant shortcomings of the military proceedings, including:
• That the defendants were detained in horrifying conditions,
first on the ironclad ships and then at the Arsenal—
especially the requirements that most of them spend virtually
all their waking hours, day after day, wearing heavy canvas
hoods that made breathing and sight quite difficult, and
that some of them be chained in excruciating iron ankle
and wrist restraints.48
• That at the outset of trial the defendants were paraded before
the commission “with black linen masks covering all their
faces except tip of nose & mouth, heavily chained & each
led staggering & clanking in, by his keeper. It was a horrid
sight.”49
• That the charges against the defendants were of extraordinary
breadth and vagueness—Chief Justice Rehnquist would
later describe them as, “To put it mildly, . . . ambitious.”50
• That the accused were not offered counsel until after they
were arraigned before the commission, and for some only
the day before testimony began, with no time to prepare for

47. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s chapter on the evidence against each of the defendants
is about as fair and balanced a summary account as one could hope for. See Rehnquist,
supra note 22, at 155–69. Rehnquist concluded that although all the defendants were
likely guilty of something, such as conspiring to commit other offenses or being an
accessory to Booth after the fact, few of them, other than Powell and Herold, had clearly
conspired to murder the President or other officials, which was the principal basis for the
charge before the commission. Id.
48. See, e.g., Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11, at 329–31.
49. Diary Entry of Cyrus B. Comstock (May 9, 1865), in The Diary of Cyrus B.
Comstock 317, 317 (Merlin E. Sumner ed., 1987) [hereinafter The Diary of Cyrus B.
Comstock]; see also Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11, at 354; 2 August V. Kautz,
Memoirs, 1861–65, at 20, in August V. Kautz Papers, Library of Congress, box 4
[hereinafter Kautz, Memoirs] (“The mystery and apparent severity with which they were
brought into the court room partook so much of what my imagination pictured the
Inquisition to have been, that I was quite impressed with its impropriety in this age.”);
Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 69.
50. Rehnquist, supra note 22, at 147. The charge is described in further detail infra
note 404.
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trial or challenge the inclusion of the members of the
commission (some of whom had possible conflicts).51
That prosecutor Holt chose to convene the proceedings in
secret (a decision he promptly reversed when it became a
public embarrassment).52
That at least one of the commission members, Thomas
Harris, who would later write a volume accusing the Catholic
Church of responsibility for the assassination,53 tried (unsuccessfully) to deny Mary Surratt the services of the esteemed
Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson, a former Attorney
General, as her counsel, by accusing Johnson of disloyalty to
the Union.54
That the prosecution unduly influenced the commission
members, particularly on matters of law.55

51. See Chamlee, supra note 16, at 219–23, 236–39; Kauffman, American Brutus,
supra note 11, at 339–41.
52. See, e.g., Chamlee, supra note 16, at 234–36, 241; Kauffman, American Brutus,
supra note 11, at 344; Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 71.
53. Thomas Harris, Rome’s Responsibility for the Assassination of Abraham Lincoln
(Pittsburgh, Williams Publ’g Co. 1897).
54. Pitman, supra note 18, at 22; see also, e.g., Chamlee, supra note 16, at 247–52;
Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 77–79; Kautz, Memoirs, supra note 49, at
21 (noting the “absurdity” of Harris’s objection). Johnson was deeply offended by the
accusation, see id., and chose not to participate in the trial extensively thereafter, except
for an important jurisdictional argument in June, see infra notes 417–424 and accompanying text.
55. See Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 71, 79. Judge Advocate Holt
and his Assistant Judge Advocates actually sat in on the commission’s deliberations
concerning verdicts after the close of evidence. See Pitman, supra note 18, at 247. Many
years later, William Doster, counsel to Paine and Atzerodt, summarized the disadvantages
confronting the defendants:
There were minor circumstances against the defense. The prosecution had had a month assisted by the whole war power of the
Government, its railroads, telegraphs, detectives, and military bureau to
get its evidence into shape. The prisoners did not receive their charges
until the day the trial opened and then they could only communicate
sitting in chains, with a soldier on each side, a great crowd surrounding
them, and whisper through the bars of the dock to their counsel[.] Had
counsel been closeted with the prisoners for weeks, with the charges in
their hands and the war power of the Government at their disposal, the
odds might have been more even.
Counsel were not independent. In all military courts they are only
tolerated. Here they were surrounded by bayonets and seated in a
penitentiary. Every paper they read abused them. The judges could not
be challenged. They were not peers, but high military officers. The
names of witnesses were not given the prisoners. Tendencies, not facts,
were admitted. The court, not knowing anything about the rules of
evidence, ruled out practically everything the judge advocates objected
to and admitted everything the counsel objected to.
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That a substantial portion of the trial was devoted to
testimony about alleged plots against the President by
Confederate agents in Canada—what one of the defense
counsel called a “wild jungle of testimony.”56
That the three principal witnesses who testified about
supposed connections between the Canadian operation and
Booth were revealed to be perjurers at best, if not outright
charlatans.57
That the prosecution produced almost no evidence that the
eight accused themselves were even aware of any connection between Booth and the unindicted coconspirators in
Canada.58
That the prosecution failed to produce Booth’s diary—a
document that (according to some) might have helped
support the defense allegations that the conspiracy, if any,
was merely to kidnap Lincoln and that Booth had decided
to kill Lincoln only at the eleventh hour, without the
knowledge of at least half of the defendants.59

William E. Doster, Lincoln and Episodes of the Civil War 260 (1915).
56. Pitman, supra note 18, at 265 (argument of Thomas Ewing, Jr.); see also Joshua
E. Kastenberg, Law in War, War as Law: Brigadier General Joseph Holt and the Judge
Advocate General’s Department in the Civil War and Early Reconstruction, 1861–1865, at
364, 370 (2011) [hereinafter Kastenberg, Law in War, War as Law] (collecting other
contemporary criticisms of the prosecution’s misbegotten efforts to prove a vast
conspiracy); Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11, at 342–44 (describing how Holt
became convinced the assassination was part of a Confederate plot); Leonard, Lincoln’s
Avengers, supra note 15, at 82–86 (describing the prosecution’s strategy to present
witnesses who would help prove a conspiracy); Rehnquist, supra note 22, at 148
(characterizing much of the testimony as “wide-ranging and quite immaterial”); Witt,
supra note 41, at 294–95 (claiming that the military commission “placed virtually no
constraints on the scope of the conspiracy theory” proposed by Holt and that a civilian
court likely would have required Holt to “stick closer to the defendants in the dock”).
57. See Hanchett, supra note 2, at 71–81 (describing the testimony of Conover,
Montgomery, and Merritt); Kastenberg, Law in War, War as Law, supra note 56, at 366–68
(same); Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11, at 363–64 (same); Leonard, Lincoln’s
Avengers, supra note 15, at 83–86 (describing Conover’s controversial testimony); Witt,
supra note 41, at 295 (same).
58. See Rehnquist, supra note 22, at 148–54; see also Kauffman, American Brutus,
supra note 11, at 333 (concerning Atzerodt’s ignorance of any such plot).
59. See Hanchett, supra note 2, at 83–84; Kastenberg, Law in War, War as Law, supra
note 56, at 368. When the diary came to light in the 1867 trial of John Surratt, Samuel
Mudd concluded that it tended to exonerate him and was angered that Stanton had not
disclosed it at the 1865 trial. See Letter from Samuel Mudd to Frances Mudd (June 3,
1867), in The Life of Dr. Samuel A. Mudd 238, 238–39 (Nettie Mudd ed., 1906).
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•

That the evidentiary rulings were, by most accounts, imbalanced in the prosecution’s favor.60
• That—as in all military tribunals during the war—a finding
of guilt required only a majority vote of the panel, and that
the reviewing authority (in this case, the President, who
convened the commission) retained the ultimate authority
over the judgments and sentences, without the prospect of
any review by a federal court61 (other than perhaps on
habeas—but, as we shall see in the case of Mary Surratt,62
President Johnson cut off that prospect of review, too).
• That, after the trial, Holt might have deliberately failed to
present President Johnson with a petition signed by five of
the nine commission members, asking the President to
commute Mary Surratt’s sentence to life in prison.63
Many of these problems and irregularities were the direct result of
Johnson’s decision to convene a military commission. It is hard to
imagine most of them occurring, at least not to the same degree, if the
conspirators had been tried before a civilian jury in the D.C. Supreme
Court, with an Article III judge presiding.
Nevertheless, this Article does not focus upon, or attempt to
adjudicate disputes concerning, this familiar array of controversies
attending the Lincoln commission, for several reasons. For one thing,
there’s not much more to add: Those issues have been dissected and
debated, in sometimes excruciating detail, for several generations.64
Moreover, there is a rough consensus about the inadequacies of the
Lincoln commission itself. To be sure, many disputes among the selfappointed Lincoln assassination “experts” continue to fester on particular points of contention, especially with regard to the culpability of
Mudd and Surratt. Yet even those who defend the verdicts typically
60. See Chamlee, supra note 16, at 305; Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11,
at 355–56.
61. See, e.g., Stephen V. Benét, A Treatise on Military Law and the Practice of CourtsMartial 128, 159–60 (New York, D. Van Nostrand, 4th ed. 1864); William Winthrop,
Military Law and Precedents 172, 377, 447 (2d ed. 1920) [hereinafter Winthrop, Military
Law and Precedents].
62. See infra section II.B.5 (discussing Mary Surratt’s habeas petition).
63. See infra notes 459–460 and accompanying text. This particular controversy
lingered for decades and understandably became something of an obsession for Holt, who
was determined to defend his reputation by demonstrating that he had, in fact, shared the
recommendation for leniency with the President. See, e.g., Chamlee, supra note 16, at
548–53; Hanchett, supra note 2, at 94–100, 110–14.
64. Perhaps the most balanced—and certainly the most thorough and detailed—
contemporary account is in Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 67–135.
Leonard’s book has the additional virtue of situating the Lincoln trial in its broader
contemporary context, including the ways in which it augured the coming struggles over
how the Union would reconstruct, and reconcile with, the vanquished Southern states.
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concede that the commission proceedings were shot through with
structural, procedural, and evidentiary flaws. In the century and a half
since it was convened, virtually no one, no matter how sympathetic to
Johnson, Stanton, and Holt, has looked to the Lincoln assassination
commission as a model of procedural justice. Few, if any, trials in
American history better illustrate the quip often attributed to Clemenceau:
“La justice militaire est a la justice ce que la musique militaire est à la
musique.” (“Military Justice is to justice what military music is to
music.”65) As Justice Robert Jackson would later write, reflecting the
consensus view, “The performance of this Military Commission was
hardly an edifying example of the judicial process.”66
More importantly, most of the particular, case-specific problems in
the Lincoln assassination trial are unlikely to recur in the future, even in
deeply contested military criminal tribunals such as the current military
commissions at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. In recent decades,
Congress has substantially reformed and “civilianized” the systems of
military justice in order to conform them much more closely to the
processes of civilian courts.67 There is, of course, continuing debate
about whether these reforms are sufficient; modern courts-martial and
(especially) military commissions certainly remain deeply controversial.
Not even their harshest critics, however, think it is likely we will ever
again see anything resembling the Lincoln assassination commission.
This Article’s principal subject, then, is not the particular irregularities and flaws of the Lincoln assassination trial itself, troubling though
they may have been. Instead, the Article is about the Lincoln trial, and
related aspects of the assassination and the War Department’s system of
military commissions, as law—the extent to which these singular
historical events might, or might not, serve as legal precedents for subsequent generations or, in some cases, aberrant examples of constitutional
error that might serve as object lessons for future actors in all three
branches of the federal government.
* * *
The fundamental constitutional question at the heart of the assassination trial was a constant source of contestation throughout the Civil
War and into Reconstruction, has been the subject of debate and analysis
65. See, e.g., Fred Gardner, The Unlawful Concert 111 (1970) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
66. Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 Buff. L. Rev. 103,
111 (1951).
67. See Martin S. Lederman, Of Spies, Saboteurs, and Enemy Accomplices: History’s
Lessons for the Constitutionality of Wartime Military Tribunals, 105 Geo. L.J. 1529, 1550
(2017) [hereinafter Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals] (discussing Congress’s
passage of the Military Justice Act of 1968 as an effort to “‘civilianize’ court-martial
procedures”). Moreover, in the unlikely event Congress were to renege on these modern
reforms, the Supreme Court would likely insist upon them as a matter of due process.
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in many of the nation’s other major wars, and has not yet been fully
resolved: When, if ever, is it constitutional for the federal government to
try persons other than members of the U.S. armed forces in a wartime
military tribunal?
Article III of the Constitution provides two guarantees with respect
to federal criminal trials: (1) A civilian jury will adjudicate guilt of “all
crimes”68 (a protection so important to the Framers that they repeated it
in the Sixth Amendment69); and (2) an independent judge—someone
not in any way subservient to the political branches—will oversee the
proceedings and render rulings of law.70 As Chief Justice Roberts has
recently explained with respect to the latter feature of Article III:
By appointing judges to serve without term limits, and restricting the ability of the other branches to remove judges or
diminish their salaries, the Framers sought to ensure that each
judicial decision would be rendered, not with an eye toward
currying favor with Congress or the Executive, but rather with
the “[c]lear heads . . . and honest hearts” deemed “essential to
good judges.”71
The concerns about disregarding these two Article III guarantees are
especially acute when it comes to military tribunals, because even
“conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense
of justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have,” nevertheless
military tribunals “have not been and probably never can be constituted
in such way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the
Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal
courts.”72 Military judges, for instance, not only lack lifetime salary and
tenure protections; they are also assigned to judicial duty by other
executive officers, and commanding officers can remove or reassign
them at will.73 What is more, the future prospects for promotion and
68. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
69. See id. amend. VI; see also Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67,
at 1545–46 (describing the “unconditional . . . constitutional language” requiring a civilian
jury as “one of the most fundamental of constitutional guarantees”).
70. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; see also Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra
note 67, at 1546–48 (discussing how the Supreme Court presumes the language of Article
III requires a judge free from possible coercion or influence from other branches).
71. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011) (quoting James Wilson, Of
Government, in 1 The Works of James Wilson 343, 363 (James DeWitt Andrews ed.,
Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896)); see also The Federalist No. 78, at 465–66 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The standard of good behavior for the
continuance in office of the judicial magistracy . . . is the best expedient . . . to secure a
steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws . . . . ‘[T]here is no liberty, if the
power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’” (quoting 1
Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws 179 (Edinburgh, A. Donaldson 4th ed. 1768))).
72. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
73. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1550.
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reassignment of both military judges and military panel “members” are
in the hands of their superior officers; and, because promotion to a
higher rank is appointment to a new office, which requires Senate
consent, such officers have reason and incentive to avoid antagonizing or
disappointing the legislative branch, as well.74
Despite these concerns, the Supreme Court has recognized three
distinct contexts in which the Constitution permits criminal trials in
military courts75: (i) for the court-martial of individuals within, or in
some cases employed by, the United States armed forces themselves;76
(ii) when the military is occupying a foreign territory and therefore no
civilian courts are available;77 and, most significantly, (iii) when the trial
is for offenses against the international law of war.78
The question at issue in the Lincoln assassination trial—a question
that was intensely debated throughout the Civil War and that has
engendered significant confusion and disagreement in several other wars,
as well—is whether there is, or ought to be, a fourth military exception,
for the military adjudication of domestic-law offenses in wartime.
As I explain at greater length elsewhere, this Article III question has
become increasingly important in the United States’ current armed
conflicts against nonstate armed terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda
and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).79 Such nonstate
enemies regularly engage in conduct—such as targeting U.S. forces,
providing material assistance to terrorism, or conspiring to commit lawof-war offenses—that violates U.S. law but that international law neither
prohibits nor privileges against prosecution.80 And Congress has recently
authorized military commissions to try alien enemy belligerents for many
such domestic-law offenses, such as material support for terrorism and
conspiracy.81 Therefore, as a matter of statute, many terrorism-related
74. See id. at 1550–53.
75. See generally id. at 1561–66, 1583–89; Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and
Article III, 103 Geo. L.J. 933 (2015).
76. See Toth, 350 U.S. at 14; Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 83–84 (1858);
see also Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1561–65.
77. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1565–67; infra note
154.
78. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1583–89 (discussing
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).
79. See id. at 1534–35.
80. See id. at 1534–35 & n.11.
81. In the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948–950 (2012), Congress
authorized military commissions to try “alien unprivileged enemy belligerents,” id. § 948b,
for an array of domestic-law offenses, including knowingly and intentionally aiding an
enemy in breach of an allegiance or duty to the United States (which usually constitutes
treason, as well), id. § 950t(26); soliciting or advising another to commit a substantive
offense triable by military commission, id. § 950t(30); conspiring to commit an offense
triable by military commission, id. § 950t(29); providing material support or resources
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activities now constitute offenses that can be tried either by a military
tribunal or in an Article III court. Moreover, as to some defendants—
those detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base—a military
commission is currently the only possible venue, because Congress has
precluded the President from trying them in ordinary Article III courts.82
Not surprisingly, then, the Article III question—whether military
commissions may adjudicate domestic-law offenses in wartime—has
recently been litigated, for the first time in many decades.83 A military
commission at Guantánamo convicted Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al
Bahlul of several war-related offenses under the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 that are not violations of the international law of war, such as
providing material support to terrorism.84 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned all but one of
those convictions on other constitutional grounds,85 leaving only a single
remaining conviction for an inchoate conspiracy.
The United States conceded that such a conspiracy is not a violation
of the international law of war.86 The government nevertheless argued
that it was constitutional for Congress to authorize a military tribunal to
try al Bahlul for such a domestic-law offense, even though the case could
(if Congress allowed it) be tried in an Article III court.87 And in the
appellate court’s recent en banc decision, four judges agreed.88
intending that they be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, an act of terrorism, id.
§ 950t(25); and providing material support or resources to an international terrorist
organization engaged in hostilities against the United States, id. This final “material
support” provision is a potentially capacious offense the government has used to try
numerous persons in Article III courts.
82. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No.
114-92, § 1031, 129 Stat. 726, 968 (2015) (“No amounts . . . may be used . . . to transfer,
release, or assist in the transfer or release to or within the United States . . . any other
detainee who . . . is or was held on or after January 20, 2009, at United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba . . . .”).
83. See Al Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017).
84. See Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 5–8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
85. See id. at 18–31.
86. See Brief for the United States in Opposition at 26 n.6, Al Bahlul, 138 S. Ct. 313
(2017) (No. 16-1307), 2017 WL 3948468 (“[T]he government has for years acknowledged
that standalone inchoate conspiracy has not attained international recognition at this time
as an offense under customary international law.”).
87. See id. at 19–22.
88. See Al Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 759 (Henderson, J., concurring) (incorporating by
reference her dissenting opinion in the panel proceeding, Al Bahlul v. United States, 792
F.3d 1, 27–72 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., dissenting), rev’d en banc, 840 F.3d 757,
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313); id. at 759–74 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Brown &
Griffith, JJ.). Four other judges concluded that Article III bars such a prosecution. See id.
at 800 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (stating that if he were to reach the merits, he “would be
inclined to agree with the dissent”); id. at 809–26, 835–37 (Rogers, Tatel & Pillard, JJ.,

346

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:323

The Article III question has recently taken on even greater
significance in light of the recent presidential election. During the 2016
presidential campaign, then–Republican candidate Donald Trump
expressed disdain for Article III trials of terrorist suspects and signaled
that he intends to try even more detainees, including even U.S. citizens,
in military commissions. 89 Although the current version of the Military
Commissions Act90 does not authorize the trial of U.S. citizens by military
commission,91 now-President Trump and the Republican Congress might
well seek to amend that statute. In any event, another longstanding
provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice already authorizes the
trial in military tribunals—with a potential penalty of death—of U.S.
persons who attempt to aid the enemy in certain ways or to correspond
with the enemy.92 As recently as 1943, the government convicted a U.S.
citizen in a military tribunal for violation of an earlier iteration of that
statutory offense.93
dissenting). The remaining three judges on the court of appeals either did not reach the
merits question or were recused. Judge Millett concluded that the conviction could be
affirmed because it was not “plain error.” Id. at 788–95 (Millett, J., concurring). Chief
Judge Garland and Judge Srinivasan did not participate in the decision. See id. at 757 n.*,
758 n.**.
89. See Donald Trump, Speech in Youngstown, Ohio (Aug. 15, 2016), in U.S.
Presidential Candidates on ISIS, Extremism, Wilson Ctr. (Aug. 16, 2016), http://
www.wilsoncenter.org/article/us-presidential-candidates-isis-extremism [http://perma.cc/
LE9M-L4K4] (“Foreign combatants will be tried in military commissions.”); see also
Patricia Mazzei, Trump: Americans Could Be Tried in Guantánamo, Miami Herald (Aug.
11, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election/donald-trump/
article95144337.html [http://perma.cc/TV88-W378] (“I know that they want to try them
in our regular court systems, and I don’t like that at all . . . . I would say they could be tried
[in military commissions], that would be fine.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Trump)).
90. Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2574 (2009) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 948–950 (2012)).
91. See 10 U.S.C. § 948c (limiting the personal jurisdiction of military commissions
to offenses committed by “alien unprivileged enemy belligerent[s]”).
92. Section 904 of Title 10 provides:
Any person who—
(1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, ammunition,
supplies, money, or other things; or
(2) without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects or gives
intelligence to, or communicates or corresponds with or holds any
intercourse with the enemy, either directly or indirectly;
shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military
commission may direct.
Id. § 904; see also Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1604–33,
1671–73.
93. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1673 (explaining
that the Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin declined to opine on whether the aiding-theenemy convictions in that case were constitutional).
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Such a military prosecution would appear to conflict directly with
the terms of Article III (“all Crimes”)94 and the Sixth Amendment (“all
criminal prosecutions”).95 As the Court stated in the landmark Milligan
case, these are “provisions . . . too plain and direct, to leave room for
misconstruction or doubt of their true meaning”96—they are “expressed
in such plain English words, that it would seem the ingenuity of man
could not evade them.”97 Thus, as Judge Kavanaugh conceded in his
recent opinion for three judges in Al Bahlul, “Based solely on the text of
Article III, Bahlul might have a point.”98 Nevertheless, the government
has insisted—and, in Al Bahlul, Judge Kavanaugh and some of his
colleagues agreed—that history resolves the constitutional question in
favor of the authority to adjudicate such charges without the judge and
jury guarantees of Article III.
The government and Judge Kavanaugh have relied on two distinct
kinds of historical antecedents. First, the government invokes precedents
from the Revolutionary War, in which the Continental Congress approved,
and General George Washington implemented, military trials against
spies and, in at least one case, a civilian charged with aiding the British
army. Citing the Court’s understanding in Ex parte Quirin that “it was not
the purpose or effect of § 2 of Article III . . . to bring within the sweep of
the guaranty those cases in which it was then well understood that a jury
trial could not be demanded as of right,”99 the government has argued
that this preconstitutional history, or the “backdrop” against which the
94. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
95. Id. amend. VI.
96. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119 (1866).
97. Id. at 120. Moreover, the government has opted not to invoke functional,
pragmatic, or normative justifications for abandoning civilian judges and juries in such
cases—the sorts of justifications that the Supreme Court has relied on to recognize most of
the small handful of other exceptions to Article III’s criminal trial guarantees. The
government apparently has concluded, with good reason, that no such functional or
normative justifications would be compelling enough to warrant an atextual exception for
military trials of domestic-law offenses, at least not in the context of our current armed
conflicts. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1567–72. (In its
brief in opposition to certiorari in the Al Bahlul case, the government made passing
reference to Justice Brennan’s suggestion that “structural imperatives of the Constitution
as a whole,” N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 (1982)
(plurality opinion), might be grounds for an Article III exception. Brief for the United
States in Opposition, supra note 86, at 20. Notably, however, the government did not
advert to any such “structural imperatives” in this context—it relied instead almost
exclusively on “historical practice,” and on the Lincoln assassination trial in particular. Id.
at 21–22.).
98. Al Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017).
99. 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942) (citation omitted); see also Miller v. United States, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 268, 312 (1871) (reasoning that, with few exceptions, the Constitution was
designed to give the government “the power of carrying on war as it had been carried on
during the Revolution”).
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Constitution was drafted and ratified,100 demonstrates that the Constitution
does not bar military trial of war-related domestic-law offenses.101 Judge
Kavanaugh has further contended that the early Congresses in effect
ratified that constitutional understanding.102 In a recent article, I explain
why these Founding-era precedents offer meager support for the constitutionality of military trials for war-related domestic-law offenses.103
Second, heeding recent Supreme Court admonitions that “a regular
course of practice” by the political branches—even one that “began after
the founding era”—can, in Madison’s words, “liquidate & settle the
meaning” of contested constitutional text,104 the government argues that
“longstanding practice of the government . . . can inform our determination of what the law is” on the Article III question.105 This theory is at
the heart of Judge Kavanaugh’s recent opinion in Al Bahlul. Kavanaugh
emphasized that in two of the nation’s most important wars—the Civil
War and the Second World War—the executive branch used military
tribunals to try individuals for offenses (including conspiracy) that were
not violations of the international law of war. Citing the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, Judge Kavanaugh concluded
that “we must be ‘reluctant to upset this traditional practice where doing
so would seriously shrink the authority that Presidents have believed
existed and have exercised for so long.’”106

100. See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1813,
1816–18 (2012) (defining constitutional “backdrops” as “rules of law that aren’t derivable
from the Constitution’s text, but instead are left unaltered by the text, and in fact are
protected by the text from various kinds of legal change”).
101. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 33–34, Al Bahlul, 840 F.3d 757 (No. 111324) [hereinafter U.S. 2015 Al Bahlul Brief], 2015 WL 6689466; see also Brief for the
United States in Opposition, supra note 86, at 21.
102. See Al Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 765 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“From the earliest
days of the Republic, Congress has gone beyond international law in specifying the
offenses that may be tried by military commission.”).
103. See generally Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67.
104. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (quoting Letter from James
Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 Writings of James Madison 447, 450
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908)); see also Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015) (“In
separation-of-powers cases this Court has often ‘put significant weight upon historical
practice.’ Here, history is not all on one side, but on balance it provides strong support for
the conclusion that the recognition power is the President’s alone.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559)).
105. U.S. 2015 Al Bahlul Brief, supra note 101, at 32 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560).
106. Al Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 768 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting Noel Canning, 134
S. Ct. at 2573); see also Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(Henderson, J., dissenting) (relying on a “robust history” of wartime military trials of
domestic-law offenses), rev’d en banc, 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 313 (2017).
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On closer examination, this “traditional practice” is not especially
extensive: The government, for instance, cites only a smattering of
executive branch precedents—principally, five trials involving charges of
“conspiracy” and other domestic-law offenses—during the Civil War and
the Second World War.107 And of those five, Judge Kavanaugh’s historical
case rests upon only three. Two of those three were military trials of Nazi
saboteurs in the Second World War, including in the Quirin case. As I
explain later in this Article, however, those saboteur cases can hardly
begin to describe a well-established practice that might be thought to
“liquidate” an implied exception to Article III’s plain words, not least
because the Supreme Court in Quirin expressly declined to sustain the
convictions on the charges in that case—including a charge of aiding the
enemy—that did not describe what the Court viewed as international lawof-war violations.108
That leaves just one other historical precedent, on which the
“liquidation” argument crucially depends: the Lincoln assassination
proceeding, which Judge Kavanaugh referred to as one of the two “most
well-known and important U.S. military commissions in American history”
(along with the Quirin saboteurs case).109 His is not an idiosyncratic view
of the Lincoln trial: Earlier in the Al Bahlul litigation, six judges of the
court of appeals described that proceeding as “a particularly significant
precedent” because it was “a matter of paramount national importance
[that] attracted intense public scrutiny” and “the highest-level Executive
Branch involvement.”110

107. See U.S. 2015 Al Bahlul Brief, supra note 101, at 36–44. During the Civil War, to
be sure, the military tried thousands of individuals for a wide variety of domestic-law
offenses, see infra notes 137–148 and accompanying text, and Abraham Lincoln himself
was deeply involved in that practice, even though he never did quite reconcile himself to
the legality of the military commissions, nor was he able to offer an adequate answer to
critics who complained that such commissions were unconstitutional, see infra notes 258–
288 and accompanying text. The court of appeals, however, has already expressed a
warranted “skepticism” that such trials could offer much constitutional guidance, because
“[u]nlike the Lincoln conspirators’ and Nazi saboteurs’ cases, which attracted national
attention and reflected the deliberations of highest-level Executive Branch officials, the
field precedents are terse recordings of drumhead justice . . . .” Al Bahlul v. United States,
767 F.3d 1, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). The government, accordingly, has relied
primarily on only three Civil War trials, the Lincoln proceeding foremost among them.
See U.S. 2015 Al Bahlul Brief, supra note 101, at 40–44.
108. See infra section V.A.
109. Al Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 767 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); accord Brief for the
United States in Opposition, supra note 86, at 21 (invoking the same “two most important
military commission precedents in U.S. history” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Al Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 767 (Kavanaugh, J. concurring)), along with the
longstanding statutes prohibiting spying and aiding the enemy, as the “historical practice”
that purportedly justifies trials for conspiracies in military tribunals).
110. Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 25.
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In certain respects, it is easy to see why the Lincoln assassination
commission has come to play such a prominent part in the current
debates about the constitutionality of using military commissions to try
Guantánamo detainees for domestic-law offenses. After all, unlike the
recent al-Qaeda defendants such as al Bahlul, the Lincoln defendants
were not even members of an enemy armed force: They were U.S.
citizens (most of whom resided in Union territory), captured and tried in
the United States, for crimes that occurred in the nation’s capital, and
without the sort of congressional authorization of the military proceeding that the Military Commissions Act now provides. Thus, if the
courts were ultimately to accept the Article III challenges to the recent
Guantánamo trials, such a holding would almost certainly repudiate—in
Judge Henderson’s words, “retroactively undermine”—a landmark event
in our national legal and political narrative.111 Arguably, such a result
should be disfavored or, at the very least, viewed with considerable
skepticism.
Or so Judge Kavanaugh has suggested: In an earlier iteration of the
Al Bahlul case, he expressed doubts about al Bahlul’s constitutional
argument precisely because it “would render the Lincoln conspirators
and Nazi saboteur convictions for conspiracy illegitimate and unconstitutional.”112 And in his most recent opinion for three judges, Kavanaugh
concluded that this is something courts should not do because the
Lincoln trial (together with Quirin) is “at the core” of historical military
practice, which “cannot be airbrushed out of the picture.”113
As I demonstrate in this Article, however, such respect for the
Lincoln assassination trial as an important constitutional precedent
would itself be an historical anomaly. To be sure, that proceeding might,
indeed, be the “highest-profile and most important” military trial in the
nation’s history.114 Prominence does not necessarily correlate with
precedent, however—not precedent worthy of respect, anyway. Until very
recently it was folly—virtually unthinkable—for anyone to rely on the
conspirators’ proceeding as a venerated example that might support,
rather than undermine, the argument that domestic-law offenses in
wartime can be tried in military commissions rather than in Article III
courts.

111. See Al Bahlul, 792 F.3d at 60–61 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
112. Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 72 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); see also id. at 52 (Brown, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (“[A]s the Lincoln conspirators’ cases, Quirin, Colepaugh, and the
Korean War decisions demonstrate, domestic practice traditionally treated conspiracy as
an offense triable by military commission.”).
113. Al Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 768 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
114. Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 68 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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Indeed, even at the time of the trial, the constitutionality of the
military court was deeply contested. Members of Lincoln’s own cabinet,115
and at least one member of the commission itself,116 thought it was
unconstitutional. Much of the pro-Union press inveighed against the
constitutionality of the trial, as well.117 And an esteemed New York judge,
noting “grave” constitutional doubts, went so far as to invite a grand jury
to issue a “presentment” concerning the unlawfulness of the Lincoln
commission.118 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court’s 1866 decision in
Ex parte Milligan was widely, and correctly, viewed as the death knell for
the sorts of military courts that had become ubiquitous during the Civil
War—including the Lincoln conspiracy tribunal itself—because all of the
Justices in that case rejected the government’s central arguments for
bypassing the civilian courts.119 Accordingly, when Booth’s primary
accomplice, John Surratt, was extradited to the United States several
months after the Milligan decision, the government tried him in the local
Article III court, where he was eventually freed after the jury was unable
to reach a verdict.120
As far as the legal world was concerned, that was just about the last
anyone heard of the constitutionality of the Lincoln assassination trial for
well over a century, even though the constitutional question (whether
Article III and the Sixth Amendment preclude such wartime military
tribunals) was the subject of substantial debate in both World Wars. The
Lincoln case disappeared from the leading treatises and academic
accounts of military jurisdiction—so much so that the author of the most
recent law review article devoted to the question of the trial’s constitutionality, published in 1933, described the Lincoln commission precedent
as having been “relegated to the museum of legal history.”121
That was eighty-five years ago, and the constitutional questions
raised by the Lincoln assassination trial have received virtually no
scholarly attention since then.122 As one of the nation’s leading experts
on military law wrote to Justice Frankfurter in 1942, the Lincoln assassi115. See infra note 359 and accompanying text (noting the preference of Secretaries
Welles and McCulloch for a civilian trial).
116. See infra notes 393–397 and accompanying text (discussing Brevet Brigadier
General Cyrus Comstock’s doubts about the constitutionality of the military commission).
117. See infra notes 389–391 and accompanying text (recounting press criticism of the
decision to use a military commission).
118. See infra note 424 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Rufus Peckham’s charge
to a grand jury on the use of a military commission to try the Lincoln conspirators).
119. See infra section III.D.
120. See infra section III.F.2.a.
121. John W. Curran, Lincoln Conspiracy Trial and Military Jurisdiction over Civilians,
9 Notre Dame L. Rev. 26, 46 (1933).
122. Professor John Fabian Witt’s recent, brief account of how the jurisdictional
question was considered at the trial itself is a rare and welcome exception. See Witt, supra
note 41, at 289–94.
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nation tribunal is an example of military jurisdiction that “no selfrespecting military lawyer will look straight in the eye.”123 The trial of the
Lincoln conspirators had, in effect, become the Case That Must Not Be
Named.
Until recently. Seemingly out of the blue, Justice Thomas cited the
assassination trial as a relevant precedent (albeit for a statutory argument)
in his dissenting opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 124—thereby signaling
that the Lincoln trial might, for the first time since 1865, serve as a
possible source of legal authority. Shortly thereafter, the en banc federal
court of appeals in the Al Bahlul case went further still, insisting that it is
“a particularly significant precedent”;125 and several judges on that court
pointed to that proceeding as the principal basis for turning aside al
Bahlul’s constitutional objections.126 This completes an extraordinary
about-face: All of a sudden, the Lincoln trial is no longer a dusty museum
relic, let alone an antiprecedent—a case so palpably unconstitutional and
unlawful that no one dare invoke it for over a century; instead, it “looms
as an especially clear and significant precedent,”127 one that “cannot be
airbrushed out of the picture” because it lies “at the core” of our
constitutional tradition.128
* * *
This Article is a study of the Lincoln assassination trial and its place
in our constitutional narrative. The most immediate reason for revisiting
the 1865 commission is that a fair assessment of the constitutional
arguments associated with that trial might bear heavily on the recent
military commissions litigation testing the limits of Article III in
wartime—an unresolved question that has bedeviled courts and commentators throughout the nation’s history. Indeed, the Lincoln precedent looms especially large now, given the new President’s professed

123. Letter from Frederick Bernays Wiener to Justice Felix Frankfurter 9 (Nov. 5,
1942), in Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library, Part III, Reel 43; accord
Frederick Bernays Wiener, A Practical Manual of Martial Law 138 (1940) [hereinafter
Wiener, Practical Manual] (“[M]ilitary men generally have hesitated to regard the
occasion as a sound precedent or, indeed, as anything more than an indication of the
intensity of popular feeling at the moment.”).
124. 548 U.S. 557, 699 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 693–94 (relying
on Attorney General Speed’s after-the-fact legal opinion in support of the Lincoln trial’s
constitutionality).
125. Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); accord id. at
52 (Brown, J., concurring).
126. See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Kavanaugh’s
opinion).
127. Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d at 69 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
128. Al Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017).
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desire to do what President Johnson did then—namely, use military
courts to try U.S. citizens alleged to have assisted the enemy.129
Moreover, and wholly apart from how modern courts might settle
that particular constitutional controversy, the Lincoln assassination trial
was a signal event in our constitutional history and the centerpiece of a
fascinating constitutional debate about military justice that raged
throughout the Civil War and into Reconstruction. There is a rich academic literature on many of the great constitutional questions raised
during the Civil War, such as secession, habeas suspension, emancipation, and presidential prerogatives. Yet, until now, there has not been
any comparable, comprehensive account of the ways in which all three
branches engaged repeatedly with the difficult question of the
permissible scope of military justice and whether certain wartime
exigencies might justify circumvention of Article III’s guarantees. As I will
demonstrate, the question was so vexing throughout the war that even
Lincoln himself—the greatest constitutional thinker of his time—
appeared to be singularly uncertain how to resolve it.130 Finally, at war’s
end, the President and many of his congressional allies appeared to be
on the verge of repudiating the system of military tribunals that Lincoln
himself had superintended.131 His assassination, however, prompted the
new President, Andrew Johnson, to convene the most controversial
military trial of them all, in the name of avenging Lincoln’s death. That
unorthodox, landmark proceeding revived the heated debate over the
constitutional question in acute form.132 It also offered the occasion for
the Article III courts themselves to resolve the question—only to have
that opportunity stymied at the last moment, when Johnson dramatically
suspended the habeas jurisdiction of the court hearing Mary Surratt’s
petition,133 one of the only instances in the nation’s history in which the
Executive has disregarded a judicial order.
The story of this constitutional contestation during the Civil War is
certainly worth recovering and conveying to new generations, if only as a
cautionary tale, on the occasion of the trial’s sesquicentennial. This
Article is the first detailed academic treatment of the legal debates
surrounding the system of Civil War military tribunals.
The Article also contributes to the current, robust academic interrogation of the use of custom, or practice, as an interpretive guide to
questions involving the separation of powers.134 In particular, the Article
129. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
130. See infra section I.B.2.
131. See infra section I.B.3.c.
132. See infra Part III.
133. See infra notes 471–485.
134. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice,
Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; Curtis A.
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explores the place of the Lincoln trial in constitutional discourse after
1868—the ways in which that proceeding, and other Civil War military
trials, have been accorded authority, or dismissed as nonauthoritative, in
subsequent generations. This historical exhumation might help inform
current debates about whether and under what circumstances political
branch practice, especially high-profile precedents, ought to establish, or
“liquidate,” the meaning or proper application of the Constitution.135 It
might also provide insight into how particular precedents come to be
established as canonical or as “anticanonical”136—and perhaps, as in this
case, how they might toggle back and forth between the anticanon and
the canon.
Part I of the Article sets the stage for the events of 1865. It recounts
the sudden proliferation, during the Civil War, of military trials of persons
who were not part of the Union armies and the considerable constitutional
debates surrounding that practice in the military proceedings themselves
and in both of the political branches. In Part II, the heart of the Article, I
then examine the ways in which the constitutional question was contested and resolved in connection with the Lincoln assassination trial itself.
Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L.
Rev. 411 (2012); Harlan Grant Cohen, “Undead” Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis and the
Lessons of History, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 957, 1012–16 (2010); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many
and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1753
(2015); Alison L. LaCroix, Response, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 Harv. L. Rev. Forum
75 (2013), http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/forvol126_lacroix.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9NGK-437U]; H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 929–31 (1985); Shalev Roisman, Constitutional
Acquiescence, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 668 (2016); Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive
Judicial Power: Constitutive and Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal
Courts Law, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 535 (2016); William Baude, Constitutional
Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
135. See Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 Writings of
James Madison 447, 450 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908) (“It . . . was foreseen at the birth of the
Constitution, that difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in
expounding terms & phrases . . . and that it might require a regular course of practice to
liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them.”); see also Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct.
2076, 2091 (2015) (examining the weight of the historical evidence to assess whether
Congress can regulate the President’s “recognition” power); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134
S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014) (“[T]his Court has treated practice as an important
interpretative factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to
dispute.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss
which life has written upon them.”); Baude, supra note 134, at 7 (“The core idea [of
liquidation] is that legal texts, including the Constitution, do not have a fully determined
meaning and must have those indeterminacies settled through subsequent practice.”).
136. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 380 (2011); see also
Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption 119 (2011) (arguing that “attempting to move
arguments from off-the-wall to on-the-wall is the process of constitutional development in
America”).
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In Part III, I turn to the effects of the postwar Milligan decision and
how the generation immediately after the war came to view both the
Lincoln trial, in particular, and the constitutionality of military criminal
adjudication generally. In Part IV, I show how the Lincoln trial virtually
disappeared as a constitutional precedent during wartime debates of the
constitutional question in the two World Wars. Part V briefly examines
the cases from World War II on which the government and Judge
Kavanaugh have relied and the furtive revival of the Lincoln trial as legal
authority since September 11, 2001. Finally, in Part VI, I offer some
thoughts on what this history of the Lincoln trial might demonstrate, not
only about the merits of the Article III question currently at issue in the
courts but also, and more broadly, about the use of high-profile historical
practices as a source of constitutional authority.
I. CONSIDERATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
DURING THE CIVIL WAR
Long before the tragic events of April 14, 1865, criminal trials in
military commissions had become commonplace in the Civil War. In the
forty or so months that preceded Lincoln’s assassination, the War
Department instituted an elaborate system of such commissions (and
some courts-martial) throughout the land—military courts that, in many
places, virtually displaced ordinary civilian courts.137 These military
tribunals occasionally tried members of the Union and Confederate
armed forces for violations of the law of war. Much more frequently,
however, Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt and his august team of
prosecutors138 brought a wide range of charges against persons who were
unconnected to military forces, in most cases for conduct that did not
violate the international law of war.139
Commission proceedings began early in the war in the border states
of Missouri and Kentucky, primarily against organized “guerrilla” groups
and other marauders—persons sympathetic to, but not formally in
league with, the Confederate cause, who endeavored to undermine the
Union war effort by sabotage, including the destruction of railroads,
137. The best, most thorough accounts of this practice include Mark E. Neely, Jr., The
Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties chs. 2, 8 (1991); Witt, supra note 41,
at 263–73; see also Kastenberg, Law in War, War as Law, supra note 56, at 294–313; J.G.
Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln ch. 8 (rev ed. 1951); Gideon M. Hart,
Military Commissions and the Lieber Code: Toward a New Understanding of the
Jurisdictional Foundations of Military Commissions, 203 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (2010).
138. See Witt, supra note 41, at 264–65 (describing how Holt pulled together a cadre
of extraordinary, talented judge advocates, including Representative John Bingham, John
Knox, John Chipman Gray, and William Winthrop).
139. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1643–44 (describing
the types of conduct, ranging from ordinary crimes to activities viewed as harmful to the
Union war effort, over which the commissions asserted jurisdiction).
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bridges, and telegraph lines.140 After President Lincoln appointed Holt as
Judge Advocate General in September 1862, however, the cases quickly
expanded to other jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia and
some northern states, and to what Professor John Witt rightly characterizes as a “stunningly wide array of conduct.”141 Some cases involved
ordinary crimes—“often with only a very attenuated or nonexistent
connection to the war—while others involved a wide array of activities
that the military viewed as harmful to the Union war effort,” including
expressions of sympathy for the Confederacy or criticizing the Union
Army.142 William Winthrop, a member of Holt’s team of judge advocates,
later listed many of the charges tried in the commissions, roughly corresponding to these two categories of charges. Winthrop’s enumeration is,
indeed, stunning in its breadth:
murder, manslaughter, robbery, larceny, burglary, rape, arson,
assault and battery, attempts to commit the same; criminal
conspiracies, riot, perjury, bribery, accepting bribes, forgery,
fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or other illegal
disposition of public property, receiving stolen goods, obtaining
money or property under false pretences, making or uttering
counterfeit money, uttering false Treasury notes, breaches of
the peace and disorderly conduct, keeping a disorderly house,
selling obscene books, &c., malicious mischief or trespass,
carrying concealed weapons, abuse of official authority by civil
officials, resisting or evading the draft, discouraging enlistments,
purchasing arms, clothing, &c., from soldiers, . . . aiding
desertion, &c., . . . breaches of the law of non-intercourse with
the enemy, such as running or attempting to run a blockade;
unauthorized contracting, trading or dealing with, enemies, or
furnishing them with money, arms, provisions, medicines, &c.;
conveying to or from them dispatches, letters, or other communications, passing the lines for any purpose without a permit, or
coming back after being sent through the lines and ordered not
to return; aiding the enemy by harboring his spies, emissaries,
&c., assisting his people or friends to cross the lines into his
country, acting as guide to his troops, aiding the escape of his
soldiers held as prisoners of war, secretly recruiting for his army,
negotiating and circulating his currency or securities—as
confederate notes or bonds . . . , hostile or disloyal acts, or
publications or declarations calculated to excite opposition to
the federal government or sympathy with the enemy, &c.;
engaging in illegal warfare as a guerilla, or by the deliberate
burning, or other destruction of boats, trains, bridges, buildings,
&c.; acting as a spy, taking life or obtaining any advantage by
means of treachery; abuse or violation of a flag of truce; violation
140. See id. at 1643.
141. Witt, supra note 41, at 268.
142. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1643–44.
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of a parole or of an oath of allegiance or amnesty, breach of
bond given for loyal behaviour, good conduct, &c.; resistance to
the constituted military authority, bribing or attempting to bribe
officers or soldiers or the constituted civil officials; [and]
kidnapping or returning persons to slavery.143
Winthrop added that even “treason,” as such, was “not infrequently
charged.”144 John Witt and Mark Neely also recount cases in which
individuals were charged with traveling into the South without a pass;
permitting rebels to lurk in a neighborhood without reporting them;
corresponding with a child in the Confederate Army; stealing horses; and
simply speaking aloud, “I am a Jeff Davis man.”145 In addition to all this,
courts-martial—which, unlike commissions, were statutorily authorized—
also tried individuals for spying and for providing forms of aid to the
enemy specified in the Articles of War, neither of which were offenses
that violated the law of war.146
Even early in the war, this practice induced one shocked senator to
remark that Secretary of War Stanton was “prone to bring every person
and every act within military law and military courts.”147 Similarly,
Lincoln’s Attorney General Edward Bates lamented that “[t]here seems
to be a general and growing disposition of the military, wherever stationed,
to engross all power, and to treat the civil Government with contumely,
as if the object were to bring it into contempt.”148 By the time of the
Lincoln assassination trial, such characterizations were not exaggerations.
A.

The War Department’s Justifications for the Constitutionality of Military
Adjudication of Domestic-Law Offenses

There was frequent public debate about the constitutionality of
these tribunals, and occasionally the issue was litigated, mostly inside the
military justice system itself. During the course of the war, the military
143. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, supra note 61, at 839–40 (footnotes
omitted).
144. Id. at 839 (emphasis omitted).
145. See Neely, supra note 137, at 171–72; Witt, supra note 41, at 268–69.
146. I discuss this court-martial practice in Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals,
supra note 67, at 1634–35. For example, a court-martial in 1861 convicted a Missouri
civilian, Isaac Wilcox, for “[t]reason against the Government of the United States,” by
virtue of his enlisting in the rebel army and inducing others to do the same. See
Headquarters, War Dep't, Case of Isaac Wilcox—Citizen, Missouri (Sept. 20, 1861),
National Archives Identifier 1813076, Local Identifier KK-817, in Records of the Office of
the Judge Advocate General (Army), 1792–2010 (National Archives Record Group 153),
Court Martial Case Files, 12/1800–10/1894.
147. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 957 (1863) (statement of Sen. Davis).
148. Letter from Attorney General Edward Bates to Judge J.G. Knapp (Sept. 16, 1863),
in Arbitrary Arrests in New-Mexico.; A Letter from Attorney-General Bates, N.Y. Times
(Feb. 20, 1864), http://www.nytimes.com/1864/02/20/news/arbitrary-arrests-in-new-mexicoa-letter-from-attorney-general-bates.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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lawyers and officers who defended the legality of the tribunals did not
settle upon a single rationale or justification. Instead, they invoked a
smattering of different theories, in various combinations. Prior to the
landmark Milligan and Lincoln assassination trials at the close of the war,
the military relied primarily on three theories. One of them—an
argument of “necessity” by virtue of the alleged inadequacy of civilian
courts149—did not withstand the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in
Milligan.150 The second argument, which fully flowered only after the
Lincoln trial itself, rested on a rationale that the Supreme Court would
later endorse in Quirin151—namely, that Congress may authorize military
tribunals to adjudicate offenses against the international law of war.152
The third rationale, which took various forms and was somewhat undertheorized, was that constitutional guarantees simply did not apply to
certain forms of belligerent conduct, an argument that the courts never
endorsed when it came to trial guarantees (including judge and jury)
and that, more broadly, has not survived to the modern era.153

149. See infra section I.A.1.
150. See infra section III.D. Moreover, that argument is inapposite in today’s armed
conflicts (and the government therefore has not invoked it), because Article III courts
obviously can be, and since 2001 have been, used to try many terrorism-related cases
against the enemy and its supporters.
151. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
152. See infra section I.A.2. This, too, is by definition not a ground for the military
trial of domestic-law offenses in the United States’ current conflicts with nonstate terrorist
organizations.
153. See infra section I.A.3. In addition to the three theories described in the text,
Holt also sometimes proffered a quasi-textual argument for an Article III exception,
predicated on an express exception in the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces . . . .”). This argument had two constituent parts: First,
Holt assumed that if a case “arises in” the land or naval forces, it is exempt not only from
the grand jury guarantee but also from the petit jury guarantees of the Sixth Amendment
and Article III and (implicitly) from the Article III guarantee of an independent, lifetenured judge. The second component of the argument was a capacious notion of how to
identify those cases “arising in” the armed forces: According to Holt, that category
included not only cases alleging offenses committed by persons in or accompanying the
armed forces, and persons doing business with the armed forces, but also any case
involving conduct that “directly connects itself with the operations and safety of th[e]
forces, whose overthrow and destruction it seeks.” Judge Advocate Gen.’s Office, Case of
William T. Smithson (Nov. 13, 1863) [hereinafter Case of William T. Smithson], in 5
Bureau of Military Justice Record Book 287, 293 (1863). On this view, any aid to the
enemy that was likely to undermine the Union war effort would “arise in” the armed or
naval forces and would, for that reason, permit military adjudication, even when the
conduct could also be tried in an Article III court. This argument never took root in the
courts, presumably because it was flawed in multiple respects, and the Supreme Court
finally put it to rest in a series of cases in the middle of the twentieth century. See
Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1563, 1584, 1642.
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1. The “Martial Law” Argument from Necessity. — The most common
and prominent explanation the War Department offered to justify its use
of military commissions was one of exigency—namely, that military
tribunals were necessary because the defendants could not be tried in
ordinary civilian courts.154 Early in the Civil War, for example, both the
President and his generals, including, most importantly, General Henry
Halleck, declared “martial law” in areas where the civil justice system was
said to be unavailable or ineffective—and in such locales, the Army then
used military commissions regularly, as a substitute for civilian justice.155
Looking back upon the use of military commissions as the war was
ending, Judge Advocate General Holt wrote that the commissions
“originat[ed] in the necessities of the rebellion” and were employed “in
regions where other courts had ceased to exist, and in cases of which the
local criminal courts could not legally take cognizance, or which, by
reason of intrinsic defects of machinery, they were incompetent to pass
upon.”156
The difficulty with this justification, however, was that the civilian
courts had not actually “ceased to exist” in those areas where President
Lincoln and his generals declared martial law and began to regularly use
military commissions in the Civil War; nor were the civil courts unable to
“take cognizance” over most of the dangerous conduct that was adjudicated in military commissions. In fact, and not surprisingly, the true
reason the War Department turned to military commissions was not out
of necessity but because it was understandably eager to deliver justice
that was much swifter and more unconstrained than in the ordinary
course of trials in Article III (and state) courts—and, in some places,
because the military officials feared that lay juries might refuse to convict,
due to the presence of Confederate sympathizers within the jury pools.

154. The Supreme Court would later endorse the use of military courts in certain
other settings in which Article III courts are unavailable, such as foreign places of
occupation, “where civilian government cannot and does not function.” Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314 (1946); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 595–
96 (2006) (plurality opinion) (referring to the commission established “to apply the
German Criminal Code, in occupied Germany following the end of World War II”). “The
limitations on these occupied territory or military government commissions are tailored to
the tribunals’ purpose and the exigencies that necessitate their use.” Id. at 596 n.26.
155. See, e.g., section I.A.1.a (discussing the assertion of martial law in Missouri).
Martial law is often and aptly described as “the public law of necessity.” See, e.g., Wiener,
Practical Manual, supra note 123, at 16. “Necessity calls it forth, necessity justifies its
exercise, and necessity measures the extent and degree to which it may be employed.” Id.
(citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866)).
156. Letter from J. Holt, Judge Advocate Gen., to E.M. Stanton, Sec’y of War (Nov. 13,
1865), in United States Department of War, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, ser. III, vol. 5, at 490, 493
(1900) [hereinafter Official Records].
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This can be seen by looking closely at the two most dramatic
declarations of martial law early in the war: Major General Henry
Halleck’s declarations in Missouri in 1861 to 1862 and President Lincoln’s
own extraordinary nationwide declaration in September 1862 (which
was, in turn, preceded by a similar declaration by Secretary of War Edwin
Stanton).
a. Halleck, December 1861. — Henry Halleck was a lawyer and a
scholar, as well as an Army officer. Just before the war, Halleck published
one of the first comprehensive international law treatises in the United
States that focused on the law of war.157 Lincoln appointed him commander of the Department of the Missouri in November 1861158 (and
would later appoint him to be General-in-Chief of all the Union armies
in July 1862159). In Missouri, Halleck confronted a state overrun by
persons who were not part of the Confederate Army but who nonetheless
worked assiduously to undermine the Union war effort. There were
“numerous rebels and spies within our camps and in the territory
occupied by our troops, who give information, aid, and assistance to the
enemy,” he wrote.160 “[R]ebels scattered through the country threaten
and drive out loyal citizens and rob them of their property; . . . they
furnish the enemy with arms, provisions, clothing, horses, and means of
transportation; and . . . insurgents are banding together . . . to rob, to
maraud, and to lay waste the country.”161
On November 20, 1861, his very first day in command, Halleck wrote
to General McClellan, seeking the President’s written authority to declare
martial law within his department.162 Receiving no response, Halleck wrote
in greater detail five days later. He began by assuring McClellan and
Lincoln it was not his intent to enforce martial law “in any place where
there are civil tribunals which can be intrusted with the punishment of
offenses and the regular administration of justice” and that he
“intend[ed] to restrict [martial law] as much as possible.”163 Halleck did
not claim, however, that the state and federal courts in St. Louis were
closed or unavailable. Instead, he obliquely suggested that there were
“no civil authorities” to prosecute frauds against the government due to
157. H.W. Halleck, International Law; or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in
Peace and War (San Francisco, H.H. Bancroft & Co. 1861) [hereinafter Halleck,
International Law].
158. See Stephen E. Ambrose, Halleck: Lincoln’s Chief of Staff 11 (1996).
159. Id. at 61; see also Witt, supra note 41, at 188 (describing Halleck).
160. Headquarters, Dep’t of the Mo., General Orders, No. 13 (Dec. 4, 1861), in
Official Records, supra note 156, ser. I, vol. 8, at 405, 405.
161. Id.
162. Telegram from Major Gen. H.W. Halleck to Gen. McClellan (Nov. 20, 1861), in
Official Records, supra note 156, ser. I, vol. 8, at 817, 817.
163. Letter from Major Gen. H.W. Halleck to Brigadier Gen. Lorenzo Thomas (Nov.
25, 1861), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. I, vol. 8, at 817, 817.
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an “absence of the proper civil tribunals.”164 Halleck did not specify what
was “improper” about the existing courts or why they could not be
“intrusted.” He probably did not need to spell out his thinking for his
commanding officers.
The next day, still having received no answer, Halleck pleaded again
for the presidential authority that was, he said, “absolutely necessary to
enable me to procure evidence” of frauds against the government.165 “If
this authority be refused,” wrote Halleck, “I shall not exercise it, no
matter how much the public service may suffer.”166 In fact, unbeknownst
to Halleck, McClellan had already sent a response to his previous
request. (Presumably the missives crossed in the proverbial mail.)
McClellan—perhaps reflecting some uncertainty in Washington about
whether displacement of civilian courts in Missouri was truly necessary—
requested Halleck to “give your views more fully as to the necessity of
enforcing martial law in your department.”167 On November 30, then,
Halleck offered a more desperate—but still not very specific—plea, this
time not focused on fraud in particular: Missouri, he wrote, was “in a
state of insurrection,” but the threat was diffuse, such that there was no
“large gathering in any one place so that we can strike them.”168 Instead,
Halleck needed to “punish these outrages” individually—something that
was necessary because “there is no civil law or civil authority to reach
them.”169 Once again, he did not explain why the civil law and authority
were inadequate to punish wrongdoers.
On December 2, Lincoln finally authorized Halleck not only to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus in Missouri but also “to exercise
martial law as you find it necessary in your discretion to secure the public

164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Telegram from Major Gen. H.W. Halleck to Major Gen. George B. McClellan
(Nov. 26, 1861), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. I, vol. 8, at 818, 818.
166. Id.
167. Letter from Adjutant Gen. L. Thomas to Major Gen. H.W. Halleck (Nov. 25,
1861), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 1, at 231, 231.
168. Telegram from Major Gen. H.W. Halleck to Major Gen. George B. McClellan
(Nov. 30, 1861), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 1, at 232, 232.
169. Id. As Halleck described it, he wished only to be given the authority to continue a
form of martial law that his predecessor, John C. Frémont, had been exercising without
authority for months. Halleck was a stickler for proper process—and he was wary of being
blamed for either unlawful actions or a failure to deal with the problem of the disloyal
violence if he acted unilaterally. “I mean to act strictly under authority and according to
instructions and where authority will not be granted the Government must not hold me
responsible for the result,” he wrote. Id. at 233. Accordingly, he added that if Lincoln was
not willing to entrust him with the authority to enforce martial law, “he should relieve me
from the command.” Id. at 232.
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safety and the authority of the United States.”170 Two days later, Halleck
issued an order directing commanding officers within the Department of
the Missouri not only to arrest and confine “all persons in arms against
the lawful authorities of the United States, or who give aid, assistance, or
encouragement to the enemy” but also to convene military commissions
for the trial “of persons charged with aiding and assisting the enemy, the
destruction of bridges, roads, and buildings, and the taking of public or
private property for hostile purposes.”171
In a follow-on General Order four weeks later, Halleck prescribed
how such commissions would work.172 In that January 1, 1862, Order, he
nominally guaranteed that “[c]ivil offenses cognizable by civil courts
whenever such loyal courts exist will not be tried by a military commission.”173 Halleck then proceeded, however, to render this an empty
promise by adding that “many offenses which in time of peace are civil
offenses become in time of war military offenses and are to be tried by a
military tribunal even in places where civil tribunals exist.”174 In other
words, by recharacterizing conduct ordinarily condemned as a civil crime
as a so-called “military” offense, the War Department could ensure that
the offense was “not within the jurisdiction of any existing civil court”175—
and in that case, the argument went, necessity required military
adjudication. For example, although Halleck’s order acknowledged that
treason, as such, was “a distinct offense . . . defined by the Constitution
[that] must be tried by courts duly constituted by law,”176 nevertheless
“certain acts of a treasonable character,”177 such as conveying information to
the enemy, were “military offenses triable by military tribunals and
punishable by military authority.”178
170. Telegram from President Abraham Lincoln (sent by William Seward, Sec’y of
State) to Major Gen. Henry W. Halleck (Dec. 2, 1861), in Official Records, supra note 156,
ser. II, vol. 1, at 233, 233.
171. See Headquarters, Dep’t of the Mo., General Orders, No. 13, supra note 160, at
405. Halleck would later suggest that this order applied only in St. Louis, rather than
across the state. Headquarters, Dep’t of the Miss., General Orders, No. 2 (Mar. 13, 1862)
(signed by Assistant Adjutant Gen. N.H. McLean “[b]y command of Major-General
Halleck”), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 1, at 270, 270. The text of the
December 4 order, however, was not so limited.
172. Headquarters, Dep’t of the Mo., General Orders, No. 1 (Jan. 1, 1862), in Official
Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 1, at 247, 247–49.
173. Id. at 248.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 247.
176. Id. at 248. Halleck would later disapprove of some treason convictions in military
commissions. See, e.g., Headquarters, Dep’t of the Mo., General Orders, No. 20 (Jan. 14,
1862), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 1, at 402, 405 (charges against
George H. Cunningham).
177. Headquarters, Dep’t of the Mo., General Orders, No. 1, supra note 172, at 248.
178. Id.
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This barely disguised sleight of hand did not include an explanation
of why the criminal conduct could not simply be characterized in the
traditional manner (e.g., as treason) and then be tried in a civilian court.
The December 4 Order, however, was unusually candid in explaining
why Halleck was so eager to use military commissions: not because
Missouri courts were literally unavailable or without jurisdiction to punish the conduct in question—as Justice Samuel Miller would later note,
“the process of the courts [in the state] had never been interrupted”179—
but because they were insufficiently harsh. Their structures and
procedures, Halleck explained, were not designed for the purpose of
winning a war: “The mild and indulgent course heretofore pursued
toward this class of men has utterly failed to restrain them from such
unlawful conduct.”180 A “more severe policy” therefore was necessary,
according to Halleck—one in which the miscreants were not afforded
“the rights of peace.”181 Halleck wrote more along these lines in a letter
to then–Chief Justice of the Kansas Supreme Court Thomas Ewing on
January 1, 1862, explaining his resort to martial law in Missouri: Bridgeburners, wrote Halleck, are not “armed and open enemies but . . .
pretended quiet citizens living on their farms,” who are back “quietly
plowing or working in [the] field” a mere hour after the sabotage.182 The
civil courts, Halleck explained, “are very generally unreliable” in dealing
with this problem; therefore he had “determined to put down these
insurgents and bridge-burners with a strong hand.”183 (It is probably not
a coincidence that Ewing would later represent some of the accused in
the Lincoln conspiracy trial and, in that capacity, offer an eloquent attack
on the constitutional authority of the military court.184)
In fact, and contrary to Halleck’s suggestion, the Army did not need
military tribunals to restrain the individuals who were committing such
crimes: Many of them could have been convicted in civilian courts, and
the military was arresting most of the others and asserting the authority
to preventively detain them for the duration of the war. Accordingly,
Halleck here was admitting, in effect, that the principal purpose of the
179. In re Murphy, 17 F. Cas. 1030, 1031 (C.C.D. Mo. 1867) (No. 9,947).
180. Headquarters, Dep’t of the Mo., General Orders, No. 13, supra note 160, at 405.
181. Id. In a related declaration that martial law would be enforced “in and about all
railroads in this State,” Halleck likewise wrote that resort to civil courts would be the
default rule where they adequately served the military’s purposes: “It is not intended by
this declaration to interfere with the jurisdiction of any civil court which is loyal to the
Government of the United States and which will aid the military authorities in enforcing
order and punishing crimes.” Headquarters, Dep’t of the Mo., General Orders, No. 34
(Dec. 26, 1861), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 1, at 155, 155.
182. Letter from Major Gen. H.W. Halleck to Hon. T. Ewing (Jan. 1, 1862), in Official
Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 1, at 247, 247.
183. Id.
184. See infra notes 425–427 and accompanying text (discussing Ewing’s oral
argument attacking the jurisdiction of the military commission).
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military tribunals was not so much to incapacitate the particular defendants who had been arrested but instead to deter others with the
prospect of harsh and unrelenting military justice, unencumbered by
due process or other constitutional protections. As Judge Advocate Holt
would put the point in his argument for court-martial jurisdiction to try
an alleged Confederate abettor in 1863, “Proceedings in the ordinary
criminal courts, by indictment and jury trial, would have no terror for
such traitors”; if offenses are not “promptly and unsparingly punished,
there can be no successful prosecution of hostilities.”185 This sort of
argument—that the use of severe military justice is necessary in order to
terrorize citizens sympathetic to the enemy and to thereby deter them
from misdeeds—is not one that the government ever could, or did, offer
forthrightly to any reviewing, civilian court assessing the constitutionality
of the tribunals (such as the Supreme Court in Milligan a few years later).
It would not do to say, in such a setting, that the judge and jury
protections of Article III—the “rights of peace” or, as Holt would later
characterize them dismissively, the “intrinsic defects of machinery” of
such courts186—were inadequate because they undermined the in terrorem
impact that might be realized by the use, and threat, of summary and
unforgiving military justice.
b. Stanton and Lincoln, August and September 1862. — In August 1862,
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton issued an order entitled “Authorizing
Arrests of Persons Discouraging Enlistments.” Its authority to arrest was
not limited, however, to conduct involving military enlistment, nor was it
geographically cabined. It directed all U.S. marshals, and the superintendents or chiefs of police of “any town, city, or district,” to “arrest
and imprison any person or persons who may be engaged, by act, speech,
or writing, in discouraging volunteer enlistments, or in any way giving aid
and comfort to the enemy, or in any other disloyal practice against the United
States.”187 Stanton’s decree, like Lincoln’s a few weeks later, is primarily
remembered today for its authorization to arrest and detain those who
urged resistance to the new conscription laws and other critics of the
Union cause. Stanton’s order, however, went further still: It ordered the
civilian officials in question to report the arrested offenders “to [Major]
L. C. Turner, judge-advocate, in order that such persons may be tried
before a military commission.”188 Seven weeks later, President Lincoln
himself followed suit, “order[ing]” that “all rebels and insurgents, their
aiders and abettors,” as well as any other persons throughout the United
States “discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts” or
185. Case of William T. Smithson, supra note 153, at 292.
186. Letter from J. Holt to E.M. Stanton, supra note 156, at 493.
187. War Dep’t, Order Authorizing Arrests of Persons Discouraging Enlistments (Aug.
8, 1862), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. III, vol. 2, at 321, 321 (emphasis added).
188. Id.
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guilty “of any disloyal practice, affording aid and comfort to rebels
against the authority of the United States” were to be “subject to martial
law, and liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or military
commission.”189
Lincoln’s nationwide order on its face offered a purported
justification for such an extraordinary assertion of military jurisdiction:
“[D]isloyal persons are not adequately restrained by the ordinary
processes of law from [calling volunteers and draftees into service] and
from giving aid and comfort in various ways to the insurrection.”190 This
was, however, a gross overstatement (at least absent any further
elaboration). As one state judge would shortly remark, the President’s
order made little sense, at least in those states, such as Wisconsin, where
the ordinary Article III and state courts were entirely adequate to the task
of adjudicating cases involving aid to the enemy;191 indeed, in July 1862,
Congress had enacted a new treason law predicated on the assumption
that such civilian trials were the proper means of dealing with the
problem.192 Apparently, then, Lincoln, like Halleck and Stanton, had
turned to so-called “martial law,” and to military tribunals, not because
civilian courts and other mechanisms (including military detention) were
unavailable to incapacitate and punish wrongdoers but instead because
such civil processes did not, in Lincoln’s words, adequately “restrain,” or
deter, others. As I explain below, this reasoning, a very aggressive notion
of the “necessity” that required circumvention of ordinary civilian courts,
did not survive the Supreme Court’s decision in Milligan.193
2. The Lieber Code’s Theory of Alleged Violations of the “Laws of War.” —
As John Fabian Witt has recently documented, as the Civil War
progressed the War Department increasingly alleged that many of the
accused on trial in commissions who were not members of either the
Union or Confederate forces had violated the “laws of war.”194 There
were some such charges in Missouri, even before Lincoln’s martial-law
declaration in September 1862.195 The incidence of such “law of war”
189. War Dep’t, General Orders, No. 141 (Sept. 25, 1862), in Official Records, supra
note 156, ser. III, vol. 2, at 587, 587.
190. Id.
191. See In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 382, 400 (1863) (“The civil authorities here maintain
themselves. Justice is dispensed by the courts; the laws are administered without difficulty,
and . . . no necessity can exist for subjecting the citizen to the control of military power.”).
But cf. Ex parte Field, 9 F. Cas. 1, 8 (C.C.D. Vt. 1862) (No. 4,761) (“[I]t may be argued
that Vermont is a loyal state, . . . that the enforcement of civil law has not been interfered
with within her borders; and that, therefore, there is nothing to justify martial law. But . . .
this is a question for the president, not for the court, to determine.”).
192. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 1, 12 Stat. 589, 589–90.
193. See infra section III.D; see also infra notes 429–439 and accompanying text
(explaining that Lincoln’s declaration of “martial law” was a misnomer).
194. Witt, supra note 41, at 267–71.
195. See Neely, supra note 137, at 42–43; Hart, supra note 137, at 16.
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charges increased dramatically, however, late in 1862 and into 1863; by
the end of the war, nearly 1,000 individuals had been so charged, by
Witt’s count.196 Because the defendants in these cases were overwhelmingly civilians, the “law of war” charges were not usually what we
have come to think of today as violations of the jus in bello—the rules that
govern the conduct of armies—such as targeting civilians, torture,
perfidy, or the use of prohibited weapons. Instead, as Witt describes, the
so-called law-of-war charges in Civil War commissions covered a
stunningly wide array of conduct, much of it involving private violence
and disloyal conduct (including speech) that, directly or indirectly, was
thought to undermine the Union war effort.197
As we will see, this became the primary basis that Attorney General
James Speed offered, in mid-1865, to justify the constitutionality of the
Lincoln assassination trial.198 It is not clear, however, that the War
Department ever placed much weight on this rationale to justify the
constitutionality of commissions earlier in the war. The closest instance I
have found is an offhand claim made by General Halleck in a
memorandum he wrote in 1864, which was not published until many
decades after his death. Because the offenses in question were “against
the common laws of war,” Halleck wrote, “the civil courts could impose
no punishment.”199 This assertion would not have been very persuasive,
even if the military had relied upon it openly. Although it is true that,
during the Civil War, Congress had not enacted any laws making law-ofwar violations subject to civilian prosecution, certainly Congress could
have done so, as it has done in modern times,200 pursuant to its power to
define and punish offenses against the law of nations.201
There would have been a more fundamental problem with this
argument, too, as Halleck well knew—namely, that most of the offenses
tried in military commissions were not violations of the law of war,
notwithstanding the characterizations of the War Department. This
confusion about the source of law arose, in large measure, from the way
in which the famous “Lieber Code” treated certain hostile conduct by
persons who were not part of enemy forces.
In 1862, at Halleck’s urging, Professor Francis Lieber completed a
study of the problem that Halleck confronted in Missouri—how the law
treated so-called “guerrilla” parties who engaged in actions to sabotage
196. Witt, supra note 41, at 267.
197. See id. at 268–69.
198. See infra section II.B.6.
199. Henry Wager Halleck, Military Tribunals and Their Jurisdiction, 5 Am. J Int’l L.
958, 965 (1911); see also id. at 958 n.1 (explaining, in an editor’s note, that the
memorandum was found among Halleck’s papers at his death).
200. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012) (making it a crime under federal law for a U.S.
national or member of the armed services to “commit[] a war crime”).
201. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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the nation’s war effort even though they were not formally affiliated with
the enemy.202 The subject matter, Lieber noted in the first sentence of his
paper, “has rarely been taken up by writers on the law of war” and was
“substantially a new topic in the law of war.”203 The issue was not quite
unprecedented, however: In fact, Halleck himself had dealt with the issue
briefly the preceding year, in his international law treatise.204 Halleck
explained that, unlike the belligerent acts of members of a nation’s
armed forces, which are privileged by international law against
prosecution (such fighters can, wrote Halleck, “plead the laws of war in
their justification”—what today is known as the combatant’s privilege),
the hostile acts of bands of men who riot, plunder, and destroy without
the sanction of their government, even in support of a war, “are not
legitimate acts of war, and, therefore, are punishable according to the
nature or character of the offense committed.”205 So, for example, if such
persons take property by force in offensive hostilities it is not an act
“authorized by the law of nations, but a robbery”; and the killing of the
state’s armed forces by such bands of private parties likewise is not a
privileged act of war “but a murder.”206 Halleck explained that such
persons, when captured, are treated not as prisoners of war but instead
“as criminals, subject to the punishment due to their crimes.”207 Lieber’s
paper on guerrilla parties was to similar effect: Guerrillas, banditti, and
the like, he reasoned, do not receive the benefits of the law of war; they
are “answerable for the commission of those acts to which the law of war
grants no protection.”208 Brigands, prowlers, bushwackers, and private
assassins cannot “expect to be treated as a fair enemy of the regular war,”
entitled to the “privileges of regular warfare” that attach to authorized
202. For a compelling account of Halleck, Lieber, and the problem of “guerrilla”
warfare, see Witt, supra note 41, at 188–95.
203. Francis Lieber, Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and
Usages of War (1862) [hereinafter Lieber, Guerrilla Parties], in 2 Francis Lieber,
Contributions to Political Science, Including Lectures on the Constitution of the United
States and Other Papers 277, 277 (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1881) [hereinafter
Lieber, Contributions to Political Science].
204. See Halleck, International Law, supra note 157, ch. XVI, § 8, at 386.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. A letter from Halleck on December 31, 1861, reporting the proceedings of an
early Missouri military commission, included the same distinction: Whereas a soldier “duly
enrolled” in an enemy’s service by “proper authority” cannot be prosecuted for “taking
life in battle or according to the rules of modern warfare,” by contrast “it is a wellestablished principle that insurgents and marauding, predatory, and guerrilla bands are
not entitled to this exemption” and “are, by the laws of war, regarded as no more nor less
than murderers, robbers, and thieves,” whose “military garb . . . cannot change the
character of their offenses nor exempt them from punishment.” Letter from Major Gen.
H.W. Halleck to Brigadier Gen. John Pope (Dec. 31, 1861), in Official Records, supra note
156, ser. I, vol. 8, at 822, 822.
208. Lieber, Guerrilla Parties, supra note 203, at 289.
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forces.209 This, then, was Lieber’s effort “to ascertain what may be considered the law of war, or fair rules of action toward so-called guerrilla
parties”210: Their misdeeds will not go “unpunished,” for the law of war
does not protect them.211 Importantly, however, Lieber did not argue
that the law of war proscribes their unauthorized conduct or that it insists
upon their punishment, in the way that a subset of the law of nations
forbids certain practices of war (e.g., targeting civilians or torture).
This same, altogether accurate perspective is reflected in much of
what came to be colloquially known as the “Lieber Code”—the regulations, written primarily by Lieber, that the Adjutant General’s Office
issued in April 1863 for use by the Union armies.212 The Lieber Code
addressed a “dazzling array of questions.”213 In light of Lieber’s expertise
in international law, much of the Code consists of descriptions of the
“limitations and restrictions” that the customary laws of war impose on
the conduct of war,214 including, for instance, that parties may not
engage in cruelty or break “stipulations solemnly contracted by the
belligerents in time of peace,”215 use poison in any manner,216 harm
prisoners “in order to extort the desired information or to punish them
for having given false information,”217 or punish a “successful spy” who
returns to his own army.218 Other parts of the Code, however, explain
what belligerents can do without transgressing the law of war—including
which law-of-war privileges they are not required to provide to those they
capture. Most importantly for present purposes, Article 82 stated:
[Individuals] who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or
inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind,
without commission, without being part and portion of the
organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the
war, but who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and
avocations, or with the occasional assumption of the semblance
of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or
appearance of soldiers . . . are not public enemies, and therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of
war.219
209. Id. at 291.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 292.
212. See War Dep’t, General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field (Apr. 24, 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code],
reprinted in Lieber, Contributions to Political Science, supra note 203, at 246, 246–74.
213. Witt, supra note 41, at 231.
214. Lieber Code, supra note 212, art. 30, at 253.
215. Id. art. 11, at 249.
216. Id. art. 70, at 260.
217. Id. art. 80, at 262.
218. Id. art. 104, at 266.
219. Id. art. 82, at 262–63 (emphasis added).
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Likewise, Article 84 provided:
Armed prowlers, by whatever names they may be called, or
persons of the enemy’s territory, who steal within the lines of
the hostile army, for the purpose of robbing, killing, or of
destroying bridges, roads, or canals, or of robbing or destroying
the mail, or of cutting the telegraph wires, are not entitled to the
privileges of the prisoner of war.220
So far, so good: The vast majority of the Lieber Code distinguished
between conduct that the law of war prohibited and conduct that it
simply did not immunize. Unfortunately, a few stray remarks in the Code
suggested the further, and misleading, idea that the laws of war not only
fail to privilege the belligerent conduct of persons outside the armed
forces (such as “banditti”)—so that those persons can be subjected to
ordinary criminal prosecution—but that the law of nations affirmatively
prohibited such conduct, or prescribed a penalty for it. Article 82, for
example, stated not only that the individuals committing war-related
violence without authorization “are not entitled to the privileges of
prisoners of war” (which was correct) but also that such persons “shall be
treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.”221 Similarly, Article 98
stated that “[a]ll unauthorized or secret communication with the enemy
is considered treasonable by the law of war.”222
Here, Lieber erred. Secret communication with the enemy could be,
and often is, “considered treasonable,” and states have severely punished
it; but such treatment is a function of a state’s domestic law, not the
international law of war itself. Likewise, individuals unaffiliated with the
enemy military could be “treated summarily” (at the time, anyway)—
unlike members of enemy forces, they were not entitled to the
combatant’s privilege—but such treatment would be a function of
municipal law, not “by the law of war.” Indeed, the law of war is generally
indifferent as to how a state treats such unprivileged conduct and
whether particular procedural protections will apply; those are matters
for domestic law, which can vary from state to state. In the United States,
such questions are determined by the corpus of federal statutes and by
Article III and the Bill of Rights in the Constitution—bodies of law that
the Lieber Code did not purport to describe (and concerning which
Lieber himself was hardly an expert).
Unfortunately, this mistaken conflation between conduct that the
law of war prohibits and conduct that it does not privilege, reflected in a
few stray remarks in the Lieber Code, would later infect the Attorney
220. Id. art. 84, at 263 (emphasis added).
221. Id. art. 82, at 262–63; see also id. art. 83, at 263 (“Scouts or single soldiers, if
disguised in the dress of the country, or in the uniform of the army hostile to their own,
employed in obtaining information, if found within or lurking about the lines of the
captor, are treated as spies, and suffer death.”).
222. Id. art. 98, at 265 (emphasis added).
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General’s analysis of the Lincoln assassination trial,223 as well as the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in the important Quirin decision in 1942.224
3. “The Power to Make War . . . Without Limitations.” — The third, and
most extreme, of the government’s principal arguments in support of the
constitutionality of military commissions was fully vetted for the first time
in the most notorious and controversial commission case preceding the
Lincoln assassination.
On March 16, 1863, the Secretary of War assigned General Ambrose
Burnside to be Commanding General of the Department of the Ohio.225
The next month, Burnside issued General Order No. 38, designed to
address the increasingly prominent opposition to the war being voiced by
Copperheads and other northern Democrats.226 Burnside feared that
such public attacks on the Union cause were grievously injuring the
Army’s efforts, such as by inspiring or even encouraging disregard of the
compulsory enlistment laws.227 His order not only announced that
anyone committing acts “for the benefit of the enemies of our country”
would be “tried as spies or traitors and if convicted will suffer death”; it
also went much further, declaring that “[t]he habit of declaring
sympathies for the enemy will not be allowed in this department” and
that persons “committing such offences will be at once arrested with a
view to being tried as above stated or sent beyond our lines into the lines
of their friends.”228
Burnside’s decree incensed a prominent leader of the “Copperhead”
faction of anti-war Democrats, Clement Vallandigham.229 As a member of
the House of Representatives from 1858 until March 3, 1863, Vallandigham
had been a prominent opponent of the war.230 His antagonism only
increased once he left office. In an inflammatory speech in Mount
Vernon, Ohio, on May 1, 1863,231 Vallandigham described the war as
“wicked, cruel, and unnecessary” and alleged that it was being prosecuted

223. See infra section II.B.6 (discussing Attorney General Speed’s legal opinion on the
constitutionality of the Lincoln commission).
224. See infra section V.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Quirin); see
also Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1587–88.
225. See Letter from Major Gen. H.W. Halleck to Major Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside
(Mar. 16, 1863), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. I, vol. 23, at 147, 147.
226. See Headquarters, Dep’t of the Ohio, General Orders, No. 38 (Apr. 13, 1863), in
Official Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 5, at 480, 480.
227. See Witt, supra note 41, at 271.
228. See Headquarters, Dep’t of the Ohio, General Orders, No. 38, supra note 226, at
480.
229. See Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham and the
Civil War 149–52 (1998).
230. Id. at 44–60, 74–75.
231. See id. at 152–55.
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“for the purpose of crushing out liberty and to erect a despotism.”232 He
also decried General Order No. 38 as “a base usurpation of arbitrary
authority,” adding that “the sooner the people inform the minions of
usurped power that they will not submit to such restrictions upon their
liberties, the better” and that he was “resolved to do what he could to
defeat the attempts now being made to build up a monarchy upon the
ruins of our free government.”233 Predictably, this speech prompted
Burnside to order Vallandigham’s arrest, on May 5; the Democrat was
accused of making a public speech that “he well knew did aid, comfort,
and encourage those in arms against the government, and could but
induce in his hearers a distrust of their own government, sympathy for
those in arms against it, and a disposition to resist the laws of the
land.”234
The next day, Vallandigham was arraigned before a military commission, which proceeded to find him guilty of most of the specifications
of the charge and sentenced him to close military confinement for the
duration of the war.235 Burnside confirmed the sentence on May 16,
designating Fort Warren as the place of Vallandigham’s imprisonment.236
Even before the commission issued its sentence, Vallandigham
petitioned a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the
military lacked authority to detain him.237 Judge Humphrey Leavitt
denied the petition, reasoning that the question was controlled as a
matter of stare decisis by an earlier decision of the court that he was
powerless to second-guess.238 The judge was careful to stress, however,
that he was ruling on only the legality of Vallandigham’s arrest (i.e., his
detention) and was not opining on whether the military trial was lawful:
“Whether the military commission for the trial of the charges against Mr.
232. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 244 (1864) (quoting from the
military’s charge against Vallandigham).
233. Id. at 245. Regardless of the possible merits of Vallandigham’s attack on
Burnside, and however questionable his later arrest and banishment might have been, he
was anything but a sympathetic figure. One observer described him as “the incarnation of
Copperheadism,” infected by a “pro-slavery virus that he had been collecting from his
boyhood days.” Horace White, The Life of Lyman Trumbull 203 (1913) [hereinafter
White, Life of Lyman Trumbull]. Horace White recounted:
As a public speaker [Vallandigham] had no attractions, but rather, as it
seemed to me, the tone and front of a fallen angel defying the Almighty.
There was neither humor nor persuasion nor conciliation in his makeup. He was cold as ice and hard as iron. Although born and bred in a
free state, he avowed himself a pro-slavery man.
Id.
234. Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874, 875 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (No. 16,816).
235. See Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 245–47 (statement of the case).
236. See id. at 247–48.
237. See Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 874–76.
238. See id. at 920.

372

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:323

Vallandigham was legally constituted, and had jurisdiction of the case, is
not a question before this court . . . . The sole question is whether the
arrest was legal . . . .”239
Before Judge Leavitt ruled, however, counsel for the parties offered
him their arguments on the constitutionality of the commission. Counsel
for Vallandigham, for instance, contended that the military trial was
precluded by an 1863 congressional enactment (on which more below)
and that it violated Article III of the Constitution.240 The government’s
lead counsel was Aaron Fyfe Perry, a private lawyer who had declined
President Lincoln’s 1861 offer for an appointment to the Supreme
Court.241 Perry’s argument was long and discursive, weaving together
several different themes. For example, he somewhat melodramatically
suggested that civilian juries were inappropriate for such cases because
they were apt to be either too harsh or too lenient with such defendants
in the heat of a war, when “the entrails of the volcano, covered for a
while, have at length broken forth,” and “[s]moke and ashes obscure the
sky.”242 Perry also made some effort to argue the exigency defense of
martial law243—a tough argument to sustain, given that the ordinary

239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.

Id. at 923.
Id. at 878–79, 888–91.
See Witt, supra note 41, at 272.
Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 894. It was a remarkable, florid argument:
If they should be put upon trial before a jury in such moments of
overwhelming excitement, one of two results would follow. If the jury
should not be so divided by the passions raging through the whole
population as to disagree, and thus bring the law into contempt, their
passions would take them to one side or the other. Men might be let
loose, and certainly would be, whom the safety of the state required to
be restrained, or more probably convicted and executed without
sufficient evidence. When society is imperiled by intestine war, the
passions rage which occasioned the war, the entrails of the volcano,
covered for a while, have at length broken forth. Smoke and ashes
obscure the sky. Fiery floods pour along the earth. No good man could
be impartial. Who claims to be impartial impeaches himself. Believing
his government to be in the right, interest, feeling, lawful duty,
compelled him to uphold it with all his power. He has no decent
pretext, certainly no lawful excuse, for throwing on others a duty to
uphold the government which he shrinks from. It is each man’s duty as
much as any other’s. Its enemies are, and in the nature of the case must
be, his enemies; its friends his friends. The law allows him no other
position. On the other hand, he who believes the government to be
wrong has no choice but to sympathize with its enemies. He must assist
them, and will assist them, either openly or by secret and suppressed
sympathy. On one side or the other, men go to the jury box under the
influence of deep feeling.

243. Id. at 903–06.
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operations of law prevailed in Ohio, and Burnside had not specifically
declared martial law there.244
At the heart of Perry’s case, however, was a more fundamental
argument—namely, that in the midst of an armed conflict, the laws of
peacetime, including constitutional guarantees, are effectively displaced
by the Executive’s “rights of war,” at least as applied to those actions
taken in the service of defeating the enemy:
War is the last resort, but when properly appealed to, its
processes are due and reasonable processes, and, like the rest,
must be allowed to work out results exclusively by its own
rules . . . . The power to make war is given without limitations.
So far as war may be a means of preservation, or for warding off
imminent danger, and keeping at a distance whatever is capable
of causing its ruin, the nation is safe. The rights of war are as
sacredly guaranteed as trial by jury, or personal liberty, or any
other right whatever. The president cannot claim to have
preserved, protected, and defended the constitution, to the best
of his ability, until he shall have used all the ability given him by
the utmost rights of war . . . . The constitution does not define
the meaning of habeas corpus, or trial by jury, or liberty, or war.
They were to be ascertained elsewhere . . . . By war was intended
not a hollow pretext of war, but a lifting high of the red right
hand of avenging justice. A thorough, condign, effectual laying
hold of enemies, a summary breaking-up of their hiding places,
and a terrifying deathly pursuit, until they shall cease to exist, or
cease to be enemies. In Scott’s Military Dictionary, a recent
work, which, he says, was not prepared in view of existing
disturbances, he states the following rule (page 273): “With
regard to the requisition of military aid by the civil magistrate,
the rule seems to be that when once the magistrate has charged
the military officer with the duty of suppressing a riot, the
execution of that duty is wholly confided to the judgment and
skill of the military officer, who thenceforward acts independently of the magistrate until the service required is fully
performed. The magistrate cannot dictate to the officer the
mode of executing the duty; and an officer would desert his
duty if he submitted to receive any such orders from the
magistrate . . . .”245

244. Professor Witt notes that Perry also invoked the laws of war. Witt, supra note 41,
at 272. That is true, but Perry did not suggest that Vallandigham himself had violated any
of the laws of war. Instead, he simply argued that the law of war, which on Perry’s
view governed the case, did not forbid Burnside from having Vallandigham arrested,
Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 894, and detained, id. at 895.
245. Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 902–03 (quoting H.L. Scott, Military Dictionary 273–74
(New York, D. Van Nostrand 1861)).
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This argument, too, would not survive the Supreme Court’s decision,
three years later, in Milligan.246
B.

Views from the Political Branches

Before turning to the Lincoln assassination trial itself, it is important
to understand how these arguments on behalf of the War Department—
and the constitutionality of the military commissions practice—were
treated throughout the rest of the federal government before the
presidential assassination in April 1865. The Supreme Court itself did not
opine on the substantive constitutional question, even in the Vallandigham
case itself, in which it never reached the merits.247 The President and his
Attorney General, however, did consider the question, and it was a
recurrent topic of debate in Congress, too.
1. Attorney General Bates. — Lincoln’s first Attorney General, Edward
Bates, was not shy about defending the President’s more aggressive
assertions of constitutional authority—including, most famously, the
unilateral suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.248 He
drew the line at the War Department’s military commissions, however.
Writing in his diary in March 1865, after civil law in Missouri was finally
restored, Bates recounted that he had been an insistent opponent of the
commissions, which he viewed as a “manifest wrong” aggravated by a
“false pretense of lawful authority”:
I have, constantly and openly, held—Officially at Washington
and personally, every where—that martial law was not established in Mo. That the military and provotal government,
actually used here, was a bald usurpation of power—and every
instance of its exercise, which concerned the civil rights of

246. See infra section III.D.
247. Three days after Judge Leavitt’s decision, Lincoln commuted the sentence,
directing Burnside to exile Vallandigham to the South, beyond the Union lines, for the
duration of the conflict. Order of the President (May 19, 1863), reprinted in The Trial of
Hon. Clement L. Vallandigham by a Military Commission 34 (Cincinnati, Rickey & Carroll
1863). This temporary banishment ended Vallandigham’s detention and thus mooted his
habeas case. Vallandigham’s counsel then sought to challenge his military conviction
directly in the Supreme Court, asking the Court to issue a writ of certiorari to the Judge
Advocate General of the Army to bring before the Court the record of the trial and
judgment. See 6 Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864–1888, Part One 193 n.49 (1971) [hereinafter Fairman,
History of the Supreme Court]; Klement, supra note 229, at 258. The merits of the
constitutional challenge, however, were never fully briefed, let alone decided, because the
Court held that it lacked constitutional and statutory jurisdiction to review the judgment
of the military tribunal. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 251–53 (1864).
248. See Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att’y Gen.
74 (1861).

2018]

THE LAW(?) OF THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION

375

individuals and the jurisdiction of the Courts, was a manifest
wrong, aggravated by the false pretense of lawful authority.249
According to Bates, he had “always contended that the Law, rightly
administered, has amble [sic] power to protect itself, to vindicate the
constitution, to uphold the Government and to subdue and punish the
public enemy” and that therefore it was “not only a crime, but a gross
folly, to break the law, in order to serve or save the country!”250
It is not clear how Bates conveyed his legal views to the President, or
to the rest of the cabinet, in the preceding years, while the use of
commissions became commonplace. There is no record of any official
opinion by the Attorney General on the question; perhaps it is fair to
assume that others assiduously avoided asking him for his formal views,
for fear of what he would opine. He did make his views publicly known in
at least one instance, however: In February 1864, the New York Times
published a letter Bates had written five months earlier to a judge in New
Mexico, Associate Justice Joseph G. Knapp, in which Bates insisted that
certain “arbitrary” military proceedings “ought to be suppressed”—and
that he had informed Lincoln of that view:
SIR: Your letter of the 4th August, complaining of military
arrests, was slow in [r]eaching me, and then such was the
urgent and continued occupation of the President in the great
affairs of the Government, that I have not been able until now
to fix his attention upon the particular outrage upon you, as
your letter makes me believe it to be.
There seems to be a general and growing disposition of the
military, wherever stationed, to engross all power, and to treat
the civil Government with contumely, as if the object were to
bring it into contempt.
I have delivered my opinion very plainly to the President,
and I have reason to hope that he, in the main, concurs with me
in believing that those arbitrary proceedings ought to be
suppressed.251
2. President Lincoln. — As noted above, Lincoln’s September 1862
order expressly authorized the trial by military commission of anyone
who was “guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid and comfort to
rebels against the authority of the United States.”252 The commissions
system therefore unquestionably enjoyed Lincoln’s formal imprimatur, at
least at that high level of generality. There is reason to believe, however,

249. Diary Entry of Edward Bates (Mar. 9, 1865), in 4 The Annual Report of the
American Historical Association for the Year 1930, at 457, 457 (1933) [hereinafter The
Diary of Edward Bates].
250. Id. (alteration in original).
251. Letter from Edward Bates to J.G. Knapp, supra note 148.
252. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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that Lincoln was never entirely comfortable with the constitutional basis
for the way in which those commissions operated in many cases.
For one thing, in his 1863 letter to Judge Knapp,253 Attorney General
Bates stated that after meeting with the President he had “reason to
hope” that Lincoln, “in the main,” shared Bates’s view that at least some
“arbitrary” proceedings “ought to be suppressed.”254 Less ambiguously, in
September 1866, after Lincoln’s death, Supreme Court Justice David
Davis, the author of the Court’s decision in Milligan, told a Lincoln
biographer that he and others had advised Lincoln that the various
military trials in the northern and border states, “where the courts were
free and untrammeled, were unconstitutional and wrong,” and that the
Supreme Court would not sustain them.255 Davis further represented that
he was “fully satisfied . . . that Lincoln was opposed to these military
commissions, especially in the Northern States, where everything was
open and free.”256
Such secondhand accounts must, of course, be treated with some
caution; after all, even if they fairly represented Lincoln’s privately stated
views, the President was not willing to express those positions publicly.257
More telling, then, were Lincoln’s very public responses to the Democratic
critics of Vallandigham’s detention and prosecution.
A group of prominent pro-Union New York Democrats wrote to
Lincoln in May 1863, enclosing a series of resolutions adopted at one of
the “most earnest [meetings] in support of the Union, ever held in
[Albany].”258 Those resolutions “denounce[d]” General Burnside’s
treatment of Vallandigham and “demand[ed]” that the Administration
“be true to the Constitution” and “exert all its powers to maintain the
supremacy of the civil over military law” everywhere outside of the lines
of “necessary military occupation and the scenes of insurrection.”259 The
Albany resolutions complained not only about the suspension of habeas
corpus, “arbitrary arrests,” and the infringement of freedom of speech,
253. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
254. Letter from Edward Bates to J.G. Knapp, supra note 148.
255. 2 William H. Herndon & Jesse W. Weik, Abraham Lincoln: The True Story of a
Great Life 266 n.* (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1893) (1888) [hereinafter Herndon &
Weik, Abraham Lincoln].
256. Id.
257. Davis’s representation might well have been based on an incident in 1864, when
Lincoln ordered prisoners released from military custody before trial after Davis had
informed Lincoln of his view that military custody and trial were unlawful. See infra
section III.A (discussing the case of Coles County rioters).
258. Letter from Erastus Corning, President, N.Y. Democrats, et al. to President
Abraham Lincoln (May 19, 1863), in The Political History of the United States of America,
During the Great Rebellion 163, 163 (Edward McPherson ed., Washington, D.C., Philp &
Solomons 1864).
259. Id.
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but also about the denial of the civilian trial guarantees of Article III and
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.260
Lincoln’s response—the famous “Corning Letter” of June 12, 1863,
published in many newspapers261—was, according to Horace Greeley,
editor of the New York Tribune, “the most masterly document that ever
came from his pen.”262 The Corning Letter is perhaps best known for two
things: First, Lincoln offered a subtle distinction between protected and
unprotected speech. If, as the New York Democrats alleged, Vallandigham
was seized and tried “for no other reason” than that he criticized the
government and condemned Burnside’s order, “then I concede that the
arrest was wrong,” wrote Lincoln; in that case, “his arrest was made on
mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct, on reasonably satisfactory
evidence.”263 As Lincoln understood the case, however, Burnside arrested
Vallandigham because he “was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the
raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and to leave
the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it.”264 If that
was his aim, reasoned Lincoln, then “[h]e was warring upon the military;
and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon
him.”265
Second, Lincoln made an impassioned defense of the view, which he
had been asserting from early in the war, that the constitutional power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus, when “in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it,”266 also includes the ancillary
power to detain those who may not lawfully petition the courts for relief
from military detention.267 “[S]uspension is allowed by the constitution
on purpose that, men may be arrested and held, who can not be proved
to be guilty of defined crime, ‘when, in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.’”268 Moreover, according to Lincoln the

260. Id.
261. Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others (June 12,
1863) [hereinafter Corning Letter], in 6 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 260
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
262. Horace Greeley, An Estimate of Abraham Lincoln, in Greeley on Lincoln 11, 52
(Joel Benton ed., New York, Baker & Taylor Co. 1893).
263. Corning Letter, supra note 261, at 266.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
267. Corning Letter, supra note 261, at 264.
268. Id. Three years later, in Milligan, the Justices divided on this question, in dicta.
Compare Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 115 (1866) (“The suspension of the writ
does not authorize the arrest of any one, but simply denies to one arrested the privilege of
this writ in order to obtain his liberty.”), with id. at 137 (Chase, C.J., concurring)
(“[W]hen the writ is suspended, the Executive is authorized to arrest as well as to
detain . . . .”). For further discussion of the Justices’ disagreement in Milligan, see Trevor
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Suspension Clause permits such arrests to be “made, not so much for
what has been done, as for what probably would be done”—for
“preventive” rather than “vindictive” purposes, and thus before the
commission of any offense.269 “Of how little value the constitutional
provision I have quoted will be rendered, if arrests shall never be made
until defined crimes shall have been committed . . . .”270
Whatever the merits of these arguments about free speech and the
office of the suspension power, they were unresponsive to another aspect
of the Democrats’ objections—the fact that Vallandigham not only was
arrested and detained but also subjected to a military trial, sentenced for his
delicts, and ultimately banished, on Lincoln’s order, to the South. In the
Corning Letter, Lincoln acknowledged that the Albany resolutions had
also complained about the circumvention of the Treason Clause and the
denial of the jury protections of the Constitution.271 The President
proffered a modest, but hardly compelling, response to this argument:
Civil courts, wrote Lincoln, were inadequate to adjudicate crimes in
wartime cases involving enemy “sympathizers [who] pervaded all departments of the government, and nearly all communities of the people.”272
“Nothing is better known to history,” he wrote, “than that courts of
justice are utterly incompetent to such cases.”273 Juries in such a heated
environment, he complained, “too frequently have at least one member,
more ready to hang the panel than to hang the traitor.”274 Lincoln
presumably recognized that this basic distrust in the jury system was
hardly an adequate justification for a military criminal trial—especially if
the arrested individuals could be detained in any event. Thus, he fell
back on a remarkable, alternative argument—that the arrests were not
made “to hold persons to answer for any capital, or otherwise infamous
crimes” and that the military commission proceedings were not, “in any
constitutional or legal sense, ‘criminal prossecutions’” at all!275
Lincoln left that thought hanging—in the Corning Letter he did not
further elaborate on the purpose of the commission trial if, as he
insinuated, it was not for criminal prosecution and punishment.
At this point, Democrats in Ohio, meeting in Columbus, actually
nominated the exiled Vallandigham as their candidate for governor;
W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1533,
1566–67 (2007).
269. Corning Letter, supra note 261, at 265.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 263–64.
272. Id. at 263.
273. Id. at 264.
274. Id. Justice Robert Jackson later pointed to this passage—with a mixture of
criticism and sympathy—as “voic[ing] the impatience with the process of the civil courts
that always develops in wartime.” Jackson, supra note 66, at 110.
275. Corning Letter, supra note 261, at 262.
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moreover, like the New York Democrats, they passed resolves condemning his military trial and punishment, including his banishment. The
Ohio Democrats took sharp issue with Lincoln’s view, in the Corning
Letter, that the authority to suspend habeas includes a power to arrest
and detain: Even when there is a habeas suspension, they insisted, “the
other guaranties of personal liberty . . . remain unchanged.”276 Lincoln
agreed to meet with the Ohio Democrats when they visited Washington
on June 25. On June 29, he wrote them a letter—commonly known as
the “Birchard Letter”—responding to the points they had made at the
meeting in Washington.277
It appears that the Ohio Democrats pressed Lincoln, at their
meeting, on how he could justify a military trial, in addition to the arrest
276. Letter from M. Birchard, Chairman, 19th Dist., et al. to President Abraham
Lincoln ( June 26, 1863), in The Political History of the United States of America, During
the Great Rebellion, supra note 258, at 167, 169. In a later letter to Lincoln, sent July 1,
1863, the Ohio Democrats elaborated:
[T]he denial of [the habeas petition] did not take away [Vallandigham’s]
right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury, or deprive him of his
other rights as an American citizen. Your assumption of the right to
suspend all the constitutional guaranties of personal liberty, and even of
the freedom of speech and of the press, because the summary remedy of
habeas corpus may be suspended, is at once startling and alarming to all
persons desirous of preserving free government in this country.
Letter from M. Birchard, Chairman, 19th Dist., et al. to President Abraham Lincoln ( July
1, 1863), in 7 The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events 376, 377 (F. Moore ed.,
New York, D. Van Nostrand 1864). This echoed the response the New York Democrats
themselves made to Lincoln a day earlier:
[A] suspension of the writ of habeas corpus merely dispenses with a single
and peculiar remedy against an unlawful imprisonment; but if that
remedy had never existed, the right to liberty would be the same, and
every invasion of that right would be condemned not only by the
Constitution, but by principles of far greater antiquity than the writ
itself . . . .
. . . It seems to us, moreover, too plain for argument that the sacred
right of trial by jury, and in courts where the law of the land is the rule
of decision, is a right which is never dormant, never suspended, in
peaceful and loyal communities and States. Will you, Mr. President,
maintain, that because the writ of habeas corpus may be in suspense, you
can substitute soldiers and bayonets for the peaceful operation of the
laws, military commissions and inquisitorial modes of trial for the courts
and juries prescribed by the Constitution itself? And if you cannot
maintain this, then let us ask, where is the justification for the monstrous
proceeding in the case of a citizen of Ohio, to which we have called your
attention?
Reply from John V. L. Pruyn, Chairman of Comm., et al. to President Abraham Lincoln
(June 30, 1863), in Papers for the Society for the Diffusion of Political Knowledge, No. 10,
at 1, 5–6 (New York 1863).
277. Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to Matthew Birchard, Chairman, 19th
Dist., et al. ( June 29, 1863), in 6 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, supra note
261, at 300, 300–06.
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and detention, of Vallandigham and similar military defendants, for
Lincoln devoted a full paragraph of the Birchard Letter to the question.
In that paragraph, Lincoln elaborated on what the Corning Letter had
merely implied:
The earnestness with which you insist that persons can
only, in times of rebellion, be lawfully dealt with, in accordance
with the rules for criminal trials and punishments in times of
peace, induces me to add a word to what I said on that point, in
the Albany response. You claim that men may, if they choose,
embarrass those whose duty it is, to combat a giant rebellion,
and then be dealt with in turn, only as if there was no rebellion.
The constitution itself rejects this view. The military arrests and
detentions, which have been made, including those of Mr. V.
which are not different in principle from the others, have been
for prevention, and not for punishment—as injunctions to stay
injury, as proceedings to keep the peace—and hence, like
proceedings in such cases, and for like reasons, they have not
been accompanied with indictments, or trials by juries, nor, in a
single case by any punishment whatever, beyond what is purely
incidental to the prevention. The original sentence of imprisonment
in Mr. V.’s case, was to prevent injury to the Military service only,
and the modification of it [i.e., Lincoln’s banishment order]
was made as a less disagreeable mode to him, of securing the
same prevention.278
Lincoln argued, in other words, not only that “military arrests and
detentions” were preventive rather than punitive, but that the commission
proceedings and sentences were, too; he insisted that the function of such
trials was merely to identify persons who, like prisoners of war, should be
incapacitated for the duration of the war, so that they could no longer
undermine the war effort.
There was at least a smidgen of truth in what Lincoln suggested: In
many commissions cases, Vallandigham’s included,279 the sentences appeared to be tailored to the aim of wartime incapacitation, such as a term
of confinement (or, here, exile) limited to the duration of the conflict.
Even so, the idea that the military commission proceedings were not
punitive in nature, designed to impose punishment for criminal wrongdoing, was untenable, as Lincoln must have known and as the Ohio
Democrats pointedly noted in their response on July 1.280 The War
278. Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
279. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
280. They wrote:
You claim that the military arrests made by your Administration, are
merely preventive remedies “as injunctions to stay injury, or proceedings to
keep the peace, and not for punishment.” . . . If the proceeding be merely
preventive, why not allow the prisoner the benefit of a bond to keep the
peace? But if no offence had been committed, why was Mr.
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Department regularly referred to the punitive nature of the proceedings,
beginning in Halleck’s very first order in December 1861, in which he
wrote that those committing hostilities “will be held and punished as
criminals,”281 and continuing right through to Holt’s final, extended
defense of the commissions in November 1865, in which he explained
that they were “indispensable for the punishment of public crimes” and
had been a “powerful and efficacious instrumentality . . . for the bringing
to justice of a large class of malefactors . . . who otherwise would have
altogether escaped punishment.”282 More importantly, Lincoln’s own
actions betrayed his understanding that the commission trials were,
indeed, punitive in character: Although Lincoln himself sometimes
commuted death sentences to confinement for the duration of the war,283
he also regularly approved death sentences, as well as fixed terms of
confinement that might have easily extended beyond the conflict’s
end.284 Recall, as well, that back in September 1862, when Lincoln
Vallandigham tried, convicted, and sentenced by a court-martial? And
why the actual punishment, by imprisonment or banishment, without
the opportunity of obtaining his liberty in the mode usual in preventive
remedies, and yet say, it is not for punishment?
Letter from M. Birchard et al. to Abraham Lincoln (July 1, 1863), supra note 276, at 378.
281. Headquarters, Dep’t of the Mo., General Orders, No. 13, supra note 160, at 406.
282. Letter from J. Holt to E.M. Stanton, supra note 156, at 493. To similar effect, in
the context of courts-martial, was a formal opinion of Lincoln’s Attorney General, Edward
Bates, in 1864, that a President’s approval of a court-martial verdict establishes the “guilt”
of the accused. See President’s Approval of the Sentence of a Court Martial, 11 Op. Att’y
Gen. 19, 22 (1864). Bates elaborated:
Undoubtedly the President, in passing upon the sentence of a court
martial, and giving to it the approval without which it cannot be
executed, acts judicially. The whole proceeding from its inception is
judicial. The trial, finding, and sentence, are the solemn acts of a court
organized and conducted under the authority and according to the
prescribed forms of law. It sits to pass upon the most sacred questions of
human rights that are ever placed on trial in a court of justice; rights
which, in the very nature of things, can neither be exposed to danger
nor entitled to protection from the uncontrolled will of any man, but
which must be adjudged according to law. And the act of the officer who
reviews the proceedings of the court, whether he be the commander of
the fleet or the President, and without whose approval the sentence
cannot be executed, is as much a part of this judgment, according to
law, as is the trial or the sentence. When the President, then, performs
this duty of approving the sentence of a court martial dismissing an
officer, his act has all the solemnity and significance of the judgment of
a court of law. As it has to be performed under the same sanctions, so it
draws with it the same consequences.
Id. at 21.
283. See Witt, supra note 41, at 196.
284. See generally Thomas P. Lowry, Merciful Lincoln: The President and Military
Justice (2009). There is reason to be cautious about Lowry’s scholarship: He later
confessed to altering at least one date on a presidential pardon at the National Archives,
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authorized military tribunals to deal with persons engaged in disloyal
conduct throughout the United States,285 he wrote that such persons
were to be “liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or military
commission.”286
Lincoln, then, was undoubtedly aware that the military commissions
proceedings were, at least in part, punitive in nature, designed to
adjudicate whether the accused was guilty of an offense. That Lincoln
had to deny, or obscure, such an obvious truth in order to offer even a
superficially plausible account of why such military justice fell outside the
guarantees of Article III and the Bill of Rights reveals his probable
doubts about the commissions’ constitutionality. Lincoln was one of the
greatest constitutional lawyers of his (or any) time. The fact that even he
could not justify military courts except by denying their punitive
nature—in the course of his otherwise robust and unapologetic public
defenses of the military’s role in suppressing disloyal conduct in the
North—suggests that perhaps Bates and Davis were correct: Maybe
Lincoln was “opposed to these military commissions, especially in the
Northern States, where everything was open and free,”287 although he
did not have the courage or wherewithal to say so while the war was in
full flower. As Mark Neely has surmised, “He must have hoped [the
military commission system’s] disappearance at war’s end would erase
the military trials of civilians from national memory.”288
In any case, Lincoln’s sweeping 1862 authorization of military
tribunals for civil offenses, and his own personal complicity thereafter in
the machinery of such Article I courts, has hardly withstood the test of
time as an executive precedent worthy of respect, even among those who
generally admire Lincoln.289

so as to make it look as though it was Lincoln’s last official pardon in 1865 (whereas in fact
it occurred in 1864). See Press Release, Nat’l Archives, National Archives Discovers Date
Change on Lincoln Record: Thomas Lowry Confesses to Altering Lincoln Pardon to April
14, 1865 (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2011/nr11-57.html
[http://perma.cc/3BEF-S63S]. Even if not all of Lowry’s assertions can necessarily be
trusted, however, his 2009 book does reflect general patterns in Lincoln’s review of
military tribunal verdicts.
285. See supra notes 189–193 and accompanying text.
286. War Dep’t, General Orders, No. 141, supra note 189, at 587 (emphasis added).
287. Herndon & Weik, Abraham Lincoln, supra note 255, at 266 n.*.
288. Neely, supra note 137, at 175.
289. See, e.g., Daniel Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution 20 (2003) (“What authoritarian
government could have asked for a broader charter?”); Neely, supra note 137, at 49
(explaining that the profligate use of commissions “dealt a blow to Lincoln’s reputation as
a steward of the Constitution from which he never recovered in the constitutional history
books”); Randall, supra note 137, at 152 (claiming that it “is of course evident” that the
1862 order was “arbitrary”); id. at 183 (“All this was out of keeping with the normal tenor
of American law.”).
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3. Congress. — On at least three occasions between March 1863 and
March 1865, Congress confronted the question of the legality of the War
Department’s system of military commissions. The legislature, not surprisingly, was not of a single mind about the constitutional question, and
the results of its debates were decidedly ambiguous. At a minimum, however, it is fair to say that the Thirty-Seventh and Thirty-Eighth Congresses
recognized, and agonized about, the seriousness of the constitutional
concerns, even if they did not ultimately resolve them.290
a. The Habeas Act of 1863. — The Habeas Act of 1863 is best
remembered for Congress’s ratification of President’s Lincoln’s authority
290. In addition to the three initiatives discussed in the text, Congress enacted two
laws of possible relevance in 1862. First, on January 31, 1862, Congress authorized courtsmartial to punish any persons who attempted to interfere with the government’s
“unrestrained use” of telegraph and railroad lines. Act of Jan. 31, 1862, ch. 15, § 2, 12 Stat.
334, 334. That authority extended, however, only to states or districts in which federal law
was “opposed” (i.e., the Confederate South) or in which federal law execution was
obstructed by insurgents and rebels “too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course
of judicial proceedings.” Id. In other words, the 1862 enactment expressly provided for
military jurisdiction only in cases of necessity, where ordinary proceedings were
obstructed. I have not found any instances in which courts either construed the scope of
the “necessity” condition of this Act or had any occasion to opine on the circumstances in
which it could be constitutionally applied.
Second, on July 17, 1862, Congress enacted a law authorizing courts-martial to
impose punishment for fraud or willful neglect of duty by military contractors in their
dealings with the Army and Navy. See Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 200, § 16, 12 Stat. 594, 596.
That law contained within its very terms a recognition of the constitutional problem: It
further provided that such contractors “shall be deemed and taken as a part of the land or
naval forces of the United States, . . . and be subject to the rules and regulations for the
government of the land and naval forces of the United States.” Id. In other words,
Congress purported to “deem” military contractors as “part of” the land and naval forces,
ostensibly so as to bring them within the reach of the Article III exception, recognized by
the Supreme Court four years earlier, that allows the military trial of such forces. See
Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1858); Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals,
supra note 67, at 1562–63. The bill passed over sharp constitutional objections in the
Senate. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 954 (1863) (statement of Sen. Cowan)
(characterizing the provision authorizing court-martial trial of civilian contractors to be a
“monstrous proposition” and an “absurdity”). In 1866, a federal judge held that the
provision was “clearly unconstitutional” under Article III, Ex parte Henderson, 11 F. Cas.
1067, 1075 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866 (reported 1878)) (No. 6,349), and that its constitutionality
could not be salvaged by the “deeming” clause, which “no more places [the contractor] in
the land or naval forces than he would be without such declaration.” Id. at 1078. Almost a
century later, when the Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert rejected the constitutionality of
subjecting spouses accompanying the armed forces to military trial, Justice Black’s
governing plurality opinion noted with disapproval that “Congress once went to the
extreme of subjecting persons who made contracts with the military to court-martial
jurisdiction with respect to frauds related to such contracts,” and favorably cited Henderson
as the “only judicial test” of the 1862 statute, in which “a Circuit Court held that the
legislation was patently unconstitutional.” 354 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1957) (plurality opinion); see
also Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice
II, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 266, 285 & n.460 (1958) (calling the 1862 provision “plainly
unconstitutional”).
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to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus “whenever, in his
judgment, the public safety may require it, . . . in any case throughout the
United States, or any part thereof.”291 Less well known is that the Act was
a compromise, of sorts, as a more comprehensive reading of the text
reveals: On the one hand, it permitted the President to suspend habeas
and thereby (at least) remove judicial supervision of the individuals who
were being preventively detained by the military on a temporary basis. Its
other provisions, however, were designed to guarantee that such detention would not be unregulated, unreviewable, or indefinite and to
further guarantee the primacy of civilian courts for any criminal prosecutions. Section 2 of the Act directed the Secretaries of State and War to
furnish federal courts a list of all persons within their jurisdictions who
were “citizens of states in which the administration of the laws has
continued unimpaired in the said Federal courts” and who were being
held by the military “otherwise than as prisoners of war.”292 If the grand
jury in a particular federal district then terminated its session without
indicting a person whose name appeared on one of those prisoner lists,
the Act required a judge of that court to discharge the person, so long as
the detainee first swore an oath of allegiance to the Union.293 Section 3
of the Act further provided that if the Secretaries, for whatever reason,
failed to supply the court with the list of prisoners’ names, a detainee
could petition the court for the same relief, on the same grounds.294
Thus, the 1863 Act was (arguably) designed to afford the President
an authority to secure temporary detention of dangerous persons, but
only on the condition that “there should be this provision for the safety
of the citizen”295—the President’s “great discretionary power over the
liberty of the citizen” was not to be a “substitute for the administration of
the criminal law.”296 As Chief Justice Chase would later explain in the
Milligan case, “[T]he act seems to have been framed on purpose to
secure the trial of all offences of citizens by civil tribunals, in states where
these tribunals were not interrupted in the regular exercise of their
functions.”297 Chief Justice Chase’s supposition was correct. The chief
Senate proponent of the bill, Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, was hardly
opposed to the President’s exercise of the power to suspend habeas, but
he considered it a significant error—harmful to the war effort—for the
Union to subject detainees to military justice in places where the civil
291. An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in
Certain Cases, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755 (1863).
292. Id. § 2, 12 Stat. at 755.
293. Id. at 755–56.
294. Id. § 3, 12 Stat. at 756.
295. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1047 (1865) (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
296. Id. at 318 (statement of Rep. Davis).
297. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 136 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring).
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courts were open.298 In a speech he delivered shortly after enactment of
the 1863 Habeas Act, Trumbull insisted that the Constitution, and the
laws adopted for the suppression of the rebellion, furnished ample means
for dealing with traitors:
[T]he Administration and its friends were weakened by resort
to measures of doubtful authority against rebel sympathizers
where the law furnished adequate remedies; [and] while no one
questioned the authority of military commanders in the field
and within their lines where the civil authorities were overborne, to exercise supreme authority, the right to do this in the
loyal portions of the country, where the judicial tribunals were
in full operation, was very questionable.299
Trumbull warned that the use of military tribunals in such locations
actually afforded the Union’s enemies “a great advantage, by alleging
that their constitutional rights and privileges were arbitrarily interfered
with.”300
The legislation Senator Trumbull sponsored, therefore, was indeed
a significant congressional rebuke—or constitutional corrective, at a
minimum—of the War Department’s expanding practice of using military
tribunals to try individuals for civil offenses. As James Randall would later
recognize, “Had this law been complied with, the effect would have been
to restore the supremacy of the civil power.”301
Alarmingly, however, Holt and his colleagues in the War
Department rarely complied with the law: They continued with impunity
to initiate military adjudications, without providing the required lists of
names to the courts for the consideration of grand juries.302 What
happened? The answer was simple, even if it was not widely appreciated
at the time: Holt quietly determined that he would construe the provisions of the 1863 Act “strictly,” so as not to cover “those cases which are
clearly triable by court-martial or military commission and which are
being every day thus tried and readily and summarily disposed of.”303
Making felicitous, double use of the passive voice, Holt wrote to Stanton
that “[i]t is not believed that it was intended in the act to invite attention
to cases of persons charged with purely military offenses or of persons
suffering under sentences of military tribunals.”304
In this way, the War Department was able to disregard the significant
constraints Congress had imposed, and the reign of military commissions
298. White, Life of Lyman Trumbull, supra note 233, at 198–99.
299. See id. at 208 (quoting the Chicago Evening Journal’s report of the speech).
300. Id.
301. Randall, supra note 137, at 164.
302. See id. at 166–67 & n.50.
303. Report from J. Holt, Judge Advocate Gen., to E.M. Stanton, Sec’y of War ( June 9,
1863), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 5, at 765, 765–66.
304. Id. at 766.
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continued. Holt’s tendentious statutory interpretation would not be
challenged for another two years, and it was not corrected until the
Court’s decision (unanimous on this point) in Milligan, after the Lincoln
assassination trial was long over.305
b. The 1864 Guerrilla Sentencing Provision. — In 1864, General
William Tecumseh Sherman reportedly wrote to Holt, asking him to
secure legislation that would permit execution of military commission
sentences without presidential approval, so as to avoid undue delay of
sentences against so-called “guerrillas.” Holt prepared such legislation
and offered it up to the House.306 The House approved the bill without
substantial debate,307 but only after Representative James Garfield (who
would later represent Lambdin Milligan in his Supreme Court challenge
to military jurisdiction) assured fellow Ohio Representative Francis Le
Blond that the bill would not provide for punishment of civilians and
would “have no effect where civil courts are established”308 (although
neither of those limitations appeared on the face of the bill itself).
When the other chamber took up the legislation, two Senators from
border states where such commissions were becoming increasingly
common—Reverdy Johnson of Maryland and Garrett Davis of Kentucky—
raised objections: Johnson argued that if the bill were construed to apply
to civil parties in those states, as its plain language appeared to provide, it
“would be a clear violation of the Constitution” by “substituting in
Maryland military authority for the civil authority,”309 and Davis called it a
“strange and absurd” bill that was plainly unconstitutional.310 Senator
Lyman Trumbull of Illinois assured the objecting senators that although
the constitutional objection to such jurisdiction “may or may not be a
very good one,” the legislation did not establish any such jurisdiction or
“authoriz[e] the trial of anybody.”311 According to Trumbull, it left the
tribunals’ jurisdiction as it already was (wherever that was) and merely

305. See infra notes 594–597 and accompanying text (discussing this holding in
Milligan). The failure of the War Department to comply with the statute did not go
entirely unremarked at the time. In their first letter to the President about the
Vallandigham case, for example, the Ohio Democrats noted in passing that “the charge in
the specifications upon which Mr. Vallandigham was tried entitled him to a trial before
the civil tribunals, according to the express provisions of the late acts of Congress
approved by yourself July 17, 1862, and March 3, 1863 . . . .” Letter from M. Birchard et al.
to Abraham Lincoln (June 26, 1863), supra note 276, at 169. In his response to Birchard’s
Letter, see supra note 277 and accompanying text, Lincoln did not address the statutory
objection.
306. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3416 (1864) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
307. Id. at 2772.
308. Id. at 2771 (statements of Reps. Le Blond and Garfield).
309. Id. at 3003 (statement of Sen. Johnson).
310. Id. (statement of Sen. Davis); see also id. at 3029–30 (statement of Sen. Davis).
311. Id. at 3030 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
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authorized the execution of sentences without presidential approval312—
an assurance he repeated just before the Senate approved its version of
the legislation on June 30.313
As enacted, the legislation stated that the “commanding general in
the field, or the commander of the department, as the case may be, shall
have power to carry into execution all sentences” of military commissions
and courts-martial “against guerilla marauders for robbery, arson,
burglary, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and for violation of
the laws and customs of war, as well as sentences against spies, mutineers,
deserters, and murderers.”314 On its face, this provision did not authorize
any military jurisdiction or establish any offense (as Senator Trumbull
had assured); even so, unless the House was relying on Representative
Garfield’s representation about implied limits, the legislation did appear
to reflect—at a minimum—congressional awareness that such trials were
continuing, and it was certainly vulnerable to the stronger reading that
Congress had, at least implicitly, blessed such trials.
c. The Eleventh-Hour Initiative in March 1865 to Prohibit Commission
Trials in Places Where Civil Courts Were Open. — At the outset of 1865,
when Union victory was finally in sight, Representative Henry Winter
Davis of Maryland took to the House floor to inquire about the apparent
failure of the War Department to comply with the provisions of the 1863
Habeas Act.315 Davis, a cousin of Supreme Court Associate Justice David
Davis, had by this time become a Radical Republican, one who thought
Lincoln’s plans for reconstruction were far too lenient.316 Even so, Davis
was very concerned that the forthcoming victory, and the Republicans’
legacy, would be tainted by the aggressive and constitutionally dubious
practices of the War Department in northern states, especially the system
of military commissions. He explained that the “great discretionary
power” Congress had afforded Lincoln in 1863 “over the liberty of the
citizen”—the power to suspend habeas—was not a “substitute for the
administration of the criminal law” and that it was “a grave abuse to use
312. Id.
313. Id. at 3416–17 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
314. An Act to Provide for the More Speedy Punishment of Guerilla Marauders, and
for Other Purposes, ch. 215, § 1, 13 Stat. 356, 356 (1864).
315. See Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 318 (1865) (statement of Rep. Davis).
316. A year earlier, Davis sponsored legislation that would have given Congress more
control over Reconstruction and that would have required the Confederate states to
disenfranchise their officers and abolish slavery as conditions of reentry into the Union.
Lincoln pocket-vetoed the legislation, which prompted Davis, together with Senator
Benjamin Wade of Ohio, to issue a famous manifesto, strongly denouncing Lincoln for
not being tough enough on the issue of slavery. See B.F. Wade & H. Winter Davis, The
War Upon the President.; Manifesto of Ben. Wade and H. Winter Davis Against the
President’s Proclamation, N.Y. Times (Aug. 9, 1864), http://www.nytimes.com/1864/08/09/
news/war-upon-president-manifesto-ben-wade-h-winter-davis-against-president-s.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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it for any such purpose.”317 Davis accused the War Department of
“continued, perpetual, and reiterated disobedience” of the 1863 law
requiring the submission of detainees’ names to the civil process, and
inveighed against the “illegal convictions by military commissions” for
offenses “punishable by the laws of the United States upon indictment
before the courts of the United States.”318
The House proceeded to vote 136 to 5 to authorize an inquiry into
the War Department’s practices,319 and the Senate followed suit on
February 14, unanimously passing a resolution directing Secretary of War
Stanton to inform the Senate whether he had been providing courts with
the lists of prisoners, as the 1863 Act required.320 Stanton responded on
February 18 by providing the Senate with Joseph Holt’s report from
1863,321 in which the Judge Advocate General had defanged the
requirement of the 1863 Act by construing it not to apply to “cases which
are clearly triable by court-martial or military commission.”322 At this
point it became clear to Congress—if it was not already—that “no
attention whatever has been paid to this important provision of law”323
and that the practice of using military tribunals to try civil law offenses
was continuing unabated throughout the North, including in many
places where civilian courts were open and available. The War Department,
in other words, was effectively circumventing the protections of the 1863
Act.
Representative Davis then set out to put an end to what he saw as a
constitutional black mark. Thursday, March 2, 1865, was the penultimate
day of the Thirty-Eighth Congress, which would cease to exist at noon
that Saturday. The legislature’s agenda was full, as one might expect; in
particular, Congress had yet to approve a general appropriations bill, in
order to keep the government running—the “grand omnibus on which
everything rides, not otherwise provided for.”324 Davis saw this as his
opening. He rose to offer an amendment to the appropriations bill, one
having nothing to do with funding:

317. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 318 (statement of Rep. Davis).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 320.
320. Id. at 784 (statement of Sen. Powell).
321. Letter from Edwin M. Stanton, Sec’y of War, to the President of the Senate (Feb.
18, 1865), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 8, at 255, 255.
322. Report from J. Holt to E.M. Stanton, supra note 303, at 766; see also supra notes
303–304 and accompanying text (describing Holt’s restrictive reading of the 1863 Habeas
Act).
323. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1047 (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
324. From Washington.; The Closing Work of Congress, N.Y. Times (Mar. 3, 1865),
http://www.nytimes.com/1865/03/03/news/washington-closing-work-congress-tax-billpassed-senate-with-important.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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And be it further enacted, That no person shall be tried by
court-martial, or military commission, in any State or Territory
where the courts of the United States are open, except persons
actually mustered, or commissioned, or appointed in the
military or naval service of the United States, or rebel enemies
charged with being spies; and all proceedings heretofore had
contrary to this provision are declared vacated; and all persons
not subject to trial, under this act, by court-martial or military
commission, now held under sentence thereof, shall be forthwith discharged or delivered to the civil authorities to be proceeded against before the courts of the United States according
to law. And all acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.325
Davis was quick to stress that his intent was not to indict Stanton, or
the War Department, but instead to correct an “error” that had collectively been made by all the people and the Government as a whole, in the
heat of war:
I do not think it is exclusively, perhaps not chiefly, the fault
of those in authority that military commissions have tried,
contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States, many
of its citizens. It began first in the rebel States, then spread to
the border States, the theater of armed conflicts, then invaded
Pennsylvania, Indiana, and New York, amid the general acclaim
of the people; and now that it reaches as far north as Boston we
hear the first murmur of its advocates or instigators. What [my]
amendment contemplates is, not to cast imputation upon any
administration or any officer, but recognizing the error which
the people as well as the Government have in common committed against the foundation of their own safety, now, before the
very idea of the supremacy of the law has faded from the
country, to restore it to its power.326
Representative George Yeaman of Kentucky moved to amend Davis’s
amendment to exclude (i.e., not to prohibit) the military trial of socalled violations of the law of war by “guerrillas,” invoking the military
325. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1323 (statement of Rep. Davis).
326. Id. at 1324. Representative Francis Kernan of New York echoed this sentiment:
We owe it to the cause of constitutional liberty and to the preservation of
republican government to enact a law that shall abrogate the system of
arbitrary imprisonments and trials by military commissions which has
been inaugurated, and which shall secure to every citizen the protection
guaranteed by the Constitution against these weapons of despotism. If,
during the excitement of this civil war, by reason of the real or supposed
exigencies of the times, the practice of arbitrary arrests and trials of
civilians by military tribunals has grown up, it is our right and our duty
now, when it cannot truthfully be claimed that there is any need of
proceedings of the kind, to enact a law which shall forbid them in the
future, and which shall restore to the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals
those who are now in prison.
Id. (statement of Rep. Kernan).
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commission convictions of “vagabonds, cut-throats, and robbers, who
have to-day become the greatest scourge to the States of Missouri,
Tennessee, and Kentucky”327 and who allegedly had themselves prevented the workings of the ordinary, civilian courts of justice: “[I]n three
fourths of Kentucky we have no courts of justice, because from the acts of
these men we cannot hold them,” said Yeaman.328 “In eight counties of
my own district they have burned our court-houses, and the officers of
the law cannot go there, juries cannot be summoned, and witnesses
cannot testify.”329 Davis strongly opposed Yeaman’s amendment; his rebuke went to the heart of the underlying dispute that had been brewing
for four years:
[I]f three fourths of the State of Kentucky are subject to
incursions of guerrillas, the other fourth is not, and that will
furnish jurors enough. If there is room to hold a military court
there is room to hold a civil court. If men are not afraid to go to
testify before a military court they will not be afraid to go before
a civil court. If bayonets are needed to protect them before a
military court, bayonets can protect them before a civil court.
Sir, this hankering after military courts is not because they
cannot be tried and convicted before the courts of the United
State if guilty; but men mad with civil war want a sharper and
easier way to deal with criminals as enemies. It is the cry for
vengeance and not justice! That is what it is and nothing else.330
Davis ended his long oration with an impassioned plea:
“[I]f the House will now say that the liberty of the American
citizen is of equal moment with the miscellaneous appropriation bill, . . . every man in the United States will breathe
freer and bear himself more loftily, and look with assured joy to
the day when armed rebellion shall be destroyed, to be followed
not by armed despotism, but by the peaceful reign of liberty and
law, by submission but not by servitude.”331
The Congressional Globe reports that “[a]pplause on the floor and in the
galleries” broke out when Davis finished his oration.332 According to the
New York Times, Davis was congratulated “by both sides of the House”
after his “powerful and very eloquent speech.”333
Later that evening, Davis himself successfully moved to strip out the
retroactive part of his proposal, so that his amendment would only

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at 1327 (statement of Rep. Yeaman).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1327 (statement of Rep. Davis).
Id. at 1328.
Id.
From Washington.; The Closing Work of Congress, supra note 324.
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preclude future military tribunals334—presumably a concession to some
legislators who said they would support only a forward-looking provision.335 The House then voted 79 to 64 to approve the Davis amendment.336
The next day, March 3—the second anniversary of the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1863 and the final full day of the Thirty-Eighth Congress—
the Senate was confronted with the Davis amendment to the appropriations bill. Senator Henry Lane of Indiana was incredulous that such a
controversial substantive provision had been tacked on to an appropriations measure at the last minute:
[H]ere is a regular appropriation bill, every item of which is to
carry out an express provision of law or is recommended by one
of the Departments of the Government; and upon that bill in
the last hours of the session is introduced this provision
calculated to revolutionize and change the whole military
jurisprudence of the country for the last four years. What
business has this proposition upon such an appropriation
bill? . . . I fail utterly to see that it has any connection with the
bill before the Senate.337
Lane and Jacob Howard of Michigan both raised substantive objections,
too. “[A]way with this mawkish, affected sensibility in regard to courtsmartial,” exclaimed Howard. He continued:
If there be any fault connected with them, and connected with
the Administration on account of them, it is that they have not
been used with sufficient vigor and vigilance. That is my
opinion. The rigors belonging to martial law are in a moment
of war and public danger the only restraining power sufficient
to compel obedience to law and order.338
Other senators, however—including Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, Reverdy
Johnson of Maryland, Thomas Hendricks of Indiana, and Edgar Cowan
of Pennsylvania—offered extended defenses of the Davis amendment.339
Johnson stressed that the problem would not exist but for the fact that
the 1863 Act had been “utterly disregarded,”340 and Hendricks likewise
pleaded with his fellow senators to “stand by this [1863] law” by approving the Davis amendment.341
334. See Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1332.
335. See, e.g., id. at 1325 (statement of Rep. Schenck) (“I shall content myself with
saying that if the resolution . . . were made prospective, . . . I could give it my most hearty
support.”).
336. Id. at 1333.
337. Id. at 1369 (statement of Sen. Lane).
338. Id. at 1374 (statement of Sen. Howard).
339. See, e.g., id. at 1372 (statement of Sen. Johnson); id. at 1373, 1379–80
(statements of Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1374–75 (statement of Sen. Hendricks); id. at 1375–
77 (statement of Sen. Cowan).
340. Id. at 1372 (statement of Sen. Johnson).
341. Id. at 1375 (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
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At this point, the hour was getting very late—it was 1:30 in the
morning of March 4—and the Senate still had several other important
pieces of legislation to take up.342 There was hardly time to debate such a
contentious, substantive question. The Senate therefore voted 20 to 14 to
strike the Davis amendment.343 At 6:35 in the morning, the Senate
finished its consideration of the omnibus appropriations bill, loading it
up with new amendments that would make the conference committee’s
labors over the next few hours “herculean.”344 Just before 7:00 AM, the
House and Senate each selected three representatives to a conference
committee to iron out their differences. Henry Winter Davis was one of
the House emissaries.345 At 10:00 that morning, the Houses reconvened,
the members having spent the interim, early morning hours “refresh[ing]
themselves for the duties of the day.”346 In the Senate, the chamber was
filling with dignitaries, including Supreme Court Justices, for the
swearing in of the new Vice President. The Senate conferees on the
omnibus bill reported that they had reached agreement on every one of
their disputes . . . except one—the Davis amendment.347 The Senate
representatives told Davis that although a majority of Senators concurred
“in the principle” of his amendment, they would not support it as an
appropriations amendment—and it was too late in the day to initiate a
stand-alone bill.348 With the conferees still at stalemate, Senator Sherman
predicted that the House would recede from its insistence on keeping
the amendment, and so the Senate did not relent.349 The ball was now in
the House’s court as the clock ran down.
Henry Winter Davis took the floor just minutes before noon. One of
the three House conferees, DeWitt Littlejohn, thought that they should
capitulate,350 but the other two, Davis and James Rollins, were resolute:
Faced with a choice between “the great result of losing an important
appropriation bill,” on the one hand, and permitting the military trial
amendment to be struck, even after they had raised a “question of this
magnitude touching so nearly the right of every citizen to his personal
liberty and the very endurance of republican institutions,” on the other,
Davis and Rollins regretfully concluded that “their duty to their
342. See id. at 1374 (statement of Sen. Grimes).
343. Id. at 1380.
344. Adjournment of Congress.; Both Houses in Session All Night, N.Y. Times (Mar. 5,
1865) [hereinafter Adjournment of Congress, N.Y. Times], http://www.nytimes.com/
1865/03/05/news/adjournment-congress-both-houses-session-all-night-army-appropriationbill.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
345. See Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1389.
346. Adjournment of Congress, N.Y. Times, supra note 344.
347. See Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1390 (statement of Sen. Sherman).
348. See id. at 1421 (statement of Rep. Davis).
349. See id.
350. See id. at 1422 (statement of Rep. Littlejohn).
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constituents, to the House, and to themselves would not allow them to
provide for any pecuniary appropriations at the expense of so grave a
reflection upon the fundamental principles of the Government.”351
Representative Kasson pleaded with his colleagues to at the very least
pass a separate bill to pay for support of patients at an insane asylum, to
provide for the deaf and dumb, and to furnish critical oil to illuminate
lighthouses, but Davis—and the House more broadly—would not budge
on what they considered sacred principle.352
The clock then struck twelve, and the Thirty-Eighth Congress (and
Davis’s tenure in Congress) came to an end. Because of the struggle over
Davis’s amendment to prohibit military commissions, the House failed to
approve the funding for the following year of government operations.353
Meanwhile, over in the Senate, Andrew Johnson was sworn in as Vice
President and proceeded to give a singularly embarrassing speech—
slurred and melodramatic, virtually confessing that he was a simpleton
not up to the job.354 Minutes later, by contrast, on the East Portico of the
Capitol, President Lincoln solemnly recited a succinct four paragraphs
that were the greatest of his distinguished career355—what Frederick
Douglass described to Lincoln, later that day, as a “sacred effort.”356 The
differences between the two officers could not have been more pronounced.
As Lincoln delivered his inaugural address, John Wilkes Booth stood
watching on a Capitol balcony,357 perched just several yards above the
President as he implored the Union to bind up the wounds of the
Nation, “[w]ith malice toward none, with charity for all . . . .”358

351. Id. at 1421 (statement of Rep. Davis); see also id. at 1422 (conceding that the
“situation is a grave one”).
352. See id. at 1423 (statements of Reps. Kasson, Davis, and Littlejohn).
353. It appears that at least some executive departments proceeded in the months
thereafter to expend funds “on the faith” of both houses having passed an appropriations
bill and the fact that they had been stymied “only . . . in consequence” of the failure to
reach agreement on the Davis amendment. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 856
(1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
354. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1394–95. Johnson emphasized his “plebeian”
roots several times, culminating in this passage: “I, though a plebeian boy, am authorized
by the principles of the Government under which I live to feel proudly conscious that I am
a man, and grave dignitaries are but men.” Id. at 1394.
355. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., S. Spec. Sess. 1424–25 (1865) (President Lincoln’s
Second Inaugural Address).
356. Frederick Douglass, Life and Times of Frederick Douglass 445 (1882).
357. See Dave Taylor, Booth at Lincoln’s Second Inauguration, BoothieBarn (May 31,
2012), http://boothiebarn.com/2012/05/31/booth-at-lincolns-second-inauguration/ [http://
perma.cc/TP3Y-T3JQ] (examining photographs of Lincoln delivering the inaugural address).
Booth later boasted that he had “an excellent chance” to kill Lincoln on inauguration day.
See Pitman, supra note 18, at 45 (testimony of Samuel Chester).
358. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., S. Spec. Sess. 1425.

394

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:323

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LINCOLN
ASSASSINATION TRIAL
Less than two months later, in late April 1865, as the War Department
was rounding up and interrogating the suspects in the assassination plot
against Lincoln, the Johnson Cabinet debated the question of what sort
of trial to convene. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles and Treasury
Secretary Hugh McCulloch favored an ordinary trial in the local Article
III court,359 a tribunal that was open and operating normally and that
Lincoln and the Congress had taken extraordinary steps to ensure would
remain under the supervision of judges who were scrupulously loyal to
the Union cause.360
359. See Diary Entry of Gideon Welles (May 9, 1865), in 2 Diary of Gideon Welles 301,
303 (1911) (“I regret [the assassins] are not tried by the civil court, and so expressed
myself, as did McCulloch; but Stanton, who says the proof is clear and positive, was
emphatic, and Speed advised a military commission, though at first, I thought, otherwise
inclined.”).
360. The creation of the new D.C. court in 1863—the culmination of an extraordinary
rebuke to judicial independence by the political branches—raised a serious Article III
question in its own right.
In 1861, parents of teenage soldiers in the Union Army began to petition for writs of
habeas corpus to have their sons discharged, arguing that a federal law prohibited their
enlistment without parental consent. See Howard C. Westwood, Questioned Loyalty in the
District of Columbia Government, 75 Geo. L.J. 1455, 1459 (1987). One of the D.C. Circuit
Court judges, William Matthew Merrick, began to grant some of these petitions. See id. at
1459–61; see also Jonathan W. White, “Sweltering with Treason”: The Civil War Trials of
William Matthew Merrick, Prologue Mag., Summer 2007, at 27, 28–29 [hereinafter White,
Sweltering with Treason]. Eventually, Merrick met with resistance from the executive
branch. On October 19, 1861, he issued a writ of habeas corpus ordering the Army to
release James Murphy, a seventeen-year-old boy. See United States ex rel. Murphy v.
Porter, 27 F. Cas. 599, 600–01 (C.C.D.C. 1861) (No. 16,074a) (letter of Judge Merrick to
the court). Murphy’s parents’ lawyer delivered the writ to Brigadier General Andrew
Porter. Id. at 600. Porter did not produce Murphy to the court, however. Id. Instead,
Porter not only disregarded the writ but went so far as to have the messenger (the
petitioning lawyer) arrested, and—on the order of Secretary of State Seward—he also
stationed a “strict military guard” outside Judge Merrick’s house. See id. at 600–01;
Westwood, supra, at 1462–63; White, Sweltering with Treason, supra, at 29–30; Letter from
William H. Seward, Sec’y of State, to Brigadier Gen. Andrew Porter (Oct. 21, 1861), in
Official Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 2, at 1021, 1021. (Although Seward privately
informed Porter in a follow-up letter that it was “not expected” Judge Merrick would be
confined to his house, Letter from William H. Seward, Sec’y of State, to Brigadier Gen.
Andrew Porter (Oct. 21, 1861), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 2, at 1022,
1022, Judge Merrick fully appreciated the in terrorem effect of the military guard: He did
not attend court until the guard abandoned its watch on his house several weeks later. See
White, Sweltering with Treason, supra, at 32.) Seward and Porter presumably acted at the
direction of, or at least with the approval of, the President himself; indeed, Lincoln
remarkably ordered Seward to direct the Comptroller of the Treasury to cease payment of
Judge Merrick’s salary. See Letter from William Seward, Sec’y of State, to Elisha Whittlesey,
First Comptroller of the Treasury (Oct. 21, 1861), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser.
II, vol. 2, at 1022, 1022. (It is not clear what came of this patent violation of Article III:
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According to one scholar, Merrick received his check on the next scheduled payday, in
December 1861. See Westwood, supra, at 1465.) The other two judges on the court
proceeded to issue a “rule” to General Porter, ordering him to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt for ignoring the habeas writ. Murphy, 27 F. Cas. at 601. Porter
never received the court’s order, however, because President Lincoln instructed the
Deputy Marshal not to serve it. The Deputy Marshal also reported to the court that
Lincoln had purported to suspend habeas “for the present . . . in regard to soldiers in the
army of the United States within [the] [D]istrict . . . .” Id. The court was duly alarmed: It
issued an opinion describing the executive actions as “without a parallel in the judicial
history of the United States” and denied that Lincoln had the power to suspend habeas
“retrospective[ly].” Id. at 602. The court concluded, however, that it was helpless to
countermand Lincoln’s gambit, as “we have no physical power to enforce the lawful
process of this court on [Lincoln’s] military subordinates against the president’s
prohibition.” Id.
Within sixteen months of this episode, Lincoln’s Republican supporters in Congress
concocted a more permanent method of disempowering Merrick, a jurist whose heart, in
the words of one senator, was suspected to be “sweltering with treason.” Cong. Globe, 37th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1139 (1863) (statement of Sen. Wilson). In February 1863, the Senate
suddenly took up legislation that would disband the D.C. Circuit Court altogether and
replace it with a new court, to which Lincoln could appoint new judges more amenable to
the Union cause. Id. at 1135 (statement of Sen. Davis). Forty-nine District of Columbia
attorneys—virtually all of the jurisdiction’s criminal bar—petitioned Congress to reject the
legislation, which they insisted was unnecessary. Id. Opponents of the legislation alleged,
with good reason, that “[t]here can be but one motive [for the bill], and that is to give to
the present Executive of the United States the power to render the judiciary of this District
subservient to his will, by such appointments as he shall choose to make.” Id. at 1138
(statement of Sen. Saulsbury); see also id. at 1538 (statement of Rep. Delano) (“I have
received a letter from a very respectable source . . . informing me that the passage of this
bill will have the very desirable effect of legislating out of office one judge very old, and
another very disloyal.”); id. (statement of Rep. Pendleton) (“[I]t is nothing more than an
attempt to legislate one set of judges out of office and another in.”); Westwood, supra, at
1471 (“There is little doubt that the dominant element in the federal government was
motivated, not by an interest in reform of the court system, but by a hastily reached
determination to be rid of judges it was unsure of, and to get on with the war.”). Senate
opponents further insisted that if Lincoln and the Senate were to effectively displace any
of the sitting judges (by not reappointing them to the new court), that would violate
Article III’s guarantee of lifetime tenure and emoluments. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 37th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1136–37 (statement of Sen. Davis). Their objections were to no avail. The
Senate narrowly approved the bill, id. at 1140, the House passed it in the waning hours of
the congressional term, id. at 1538–39, and Lincoln signed it into law. See generally
Westwood, supra, at 1468–71; White, Sweltering with Treason, supra, at 33–36. The new law
replaced the Circuit Court, as well as the local criminal court (which had been established
in 1838, with judges who were not tenured, see Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 192, § 1, 5 Stat. 306,
306–07), with the new Supreme Court for the District of Columbia, empowered to hear
both civil and criminal cases. See An Act to Reorganize the Courts in the District of
Columbia, ch. 91, § 3, 12 Stat. 762, 763 (1863).
Eight days after enactment, Lincoln appointed four judges to the new court. See
Matthew F. McGuire, An Anecdotal History of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia 1801–1976, at 45 (1977). Two of those new judges had been members
of the House of Representatives that voted, one week earlier, in favor of the courtswitching legislation. See id. at 45–46; see also Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1538
(recording the affirmative vote of Rep. George Fisher). The loyalty of all four new judges
to the Union cause was “beyond the shadow of doubt.” Westwood, supra, at 1472. Not
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Secretary of War Stanton, however, emphatically urged Johnson to
authorize a military commission.361 Within hours of the assassination,
Stanton and Judge Advocate General Holt had aggressively taken charge
of the investigation, to the virtual exclusion of civil authorities.362 Not
surprisingly, they lobbied to retain control as the case moved to the trial
phase.363 Stanton argued to Johnson that he and Holt had already
developed evidence that the crimes of April 14 were part of a vast
conspiracy to slaughter most of the Cabinet—the work of none other
than Jefferson Davis himself, along with Alabama Senator Clement C.
Clay and other Confederate officials scheming in Canada to effect a
spree of sabotage and terror in Northern cities.364 Stanton’s apparent
argument for the military commission was that the plot was part of the
South’s war effort and that therefore it was only appropriate that it
should be met with a military response, and military justice, rather than
the ordinary workings of a local criminal court. Indeed, on April 20, even
before Johnson made his decision, Stanton took it upon himself to
declare, in a widely distributed poster offering a reward for the capture
of Booth, Herold, John Surratt, and accomplices, that persons aiding the
conspirators “shall be subject to trial before a Military Commission and
the punishment of DEATH.”365

surprisingly, Judge Merrick was not among Lincoln’s appointees, and he therefore had to
abandon his Article III office. See id. at 1472–73. In 1885, however, President Cleveland
appointed Merrick to fill a vacancy on the D.C. Supreme Court, and Merrick served on
that court for the final four years of his life. See id. at 1473–74.
This audacious displacement of disfavored Article III judges in 1863 echoed the more
well-known actions of the Republican Congress in 1802, which eliminated circuit court
judgeships that the lame-duck Federalist Congress had established the previous year,
thereby effectively terminating the service of sixteen “midnight” Federalist judges. See Act
of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, §§ 1, 3, 2 Stat. 132, 132. The constitutionality of this effective
“tenure-stripping” was challenged in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 304–05 (1803)
(argument of Mr. Lee); see also 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States 494–95 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. and Cambridge, Brown, Shattuck, &
Co. 1833) (arguing that the 1802 Act “prostrates in the dust the independence of all
inferior judges, . . . and leaves the constitution a miserable and vain delusion”). The
Supreme Court, however, did not say a word about the question in its opinion in Stuart.
The constitutional question thus remained an open one when Lincoln and his cohorts
acted in 1863.
361. See Diary Entry of Gideon Welles (May 9, 1865), supra note 359, at 303.
362. See Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 8–12, 33–65; see also
Chamlee, supra note 16, chs. 18–23; Hanchett, supra note 2, at 60–65; Kauffman,
American Brutus, supra note 11, at 42–46, 255–85, 324–25.
363. See Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 33–34.
364. Diary Entry of Gideon Welles (Apr. 23, 1865), in Diary of Gideon Welles, supra
note 359, at 295, 296 n.1.
365. See Broadside for the Capture of John Wilkes Booth, John Surratt, and David
Herold, Metro. Museum of Art, http://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/283200
[http://perma.cc/4TTB-MZG5] (last visited Nov. 3, 2017).
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Stanton prevailed: On May 1, President Johnson signed an order
authorizing the military commission and commanding Holt to prefer the
charges and conduct the trial.366
A.

The Policy Arguments for a Military Tribunal in the Assassination Case

There is no first-hand record of Johnson’s policy reasons (nor
Stanton’s) for deviating from the constitutional norm by choosing the
military option. Holt, however, did offer a defense of the assassination
commission later in 1865; and from that and other sources, one can
discern at least three principal incentives that likely influenced President
Johnson’s decision.
First, Stanton and Holt had become very familiar with, and deeply
committed to, the elaborate system of military commissions the War
Department had used throughout the war to try thousands of civilians,
for all manner of offenses.367 Holt, in particular, was prideful of this new
institution, which he considered a critical complement to the nation’s
tools of war. “[T]he experience of three years,” wrote Holt later that
year, had “proved” the commissions to be “indispensable for the
punishment of public crimes . . . .”368 “These tribunals had long been a
most powerful and efficacious instrumentality in the hands of the
Executive for the bringing to justice of a large class of malefactors in the
service or interest of the rebellion, who otherwise would have altogether
escaped punishment . . . .”369 As we have seen, however, by 1865 there
was widespread concern about, and sharp criticism of, the commissions,
including even by some staunchly pro-Union Republicans in Congress,
who thought they had become a singular stain on the legacy that Lincoln
and the Radical Republicans were establishing.370 Holt and Stanton thus
had reason to think that the Lincoln assassination might be a rebuke to
such critics—the crown jewel in their innovative mode of wartime justice,
which would confirm the legitimacy and necessity of their ambitious
program.
Second, Stanton and Holt knew that Holt himself, rather than a
federal judge, would effectively be in charge of the military proceedings,
which meant that the prosecution would have far greater leeway to
introduce whatever evidence it wished. In particular, they had in mind to
use the trial not only to demonstrate the guilt of the eight defendants in
the dock but, far more importantly, to spin out a much broader narrative
366. See Pitman, supra note 18, at 17.
367. See supra notes 137–148 and accompanying text (describing the practice during
the war).
368. Letter from J. Holt to E.M. Stanton, supra note 156, at 493.
369. Id.
370. See supra section I.B.3.c (describing early-1865 legislative debate concerning
Representative Davis’s proposal).
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about the plotting and crimes of Jefferson Davis and his Confederate
“Secret Service” in Canada.371 The efficacy of the commission in this
case, explained Holt, was “chiefly illustrated” by the “extended reach
which it could give to its investigation, and in the wide scope which it
could cover by testimony”: The nefarious plot of the Confederate leaders
would be “published to the community and to the world.”372 Holt
reasoned:
By no other species of tribunal and by no other known mode of
judicial inquiry could this result have been so successfully
attained; and it may truly be said that without the aid and
agency of the military commission one of the most important
chapters in the annals of the rebellion would have been lost to
history, and the most complete and reliable disclosure of its
inner and real life, alike treacherous and barbaric, would have
failed to be developed.373
The proceedings, in other words, were designed to be a show trial, for
purposes reaching far beyond a simple, dispassionate assessment of the
defendants’ legal culpability.374 For that purpose, Holt and his colleagues
were in need of, and they did in fact exercise, “a latitude that no civil
court would allow.”375
371. According to witnesses, in 1864 the Confederate Congress appropriated $5
million to support covert actions in the North, including against civilian targets, with
operations to be coordinated by unindicted coconspirators Jacob Thompson (who had
been President Buchanan’s Secretary of the Interior) and Clement Clay (a pre-secession
senator from Alabama). See Pitman, supra note 18, at 373; see also James M. McPherson,
The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 763 (2003). Witnesses testified of
plots to burn down buildings and boats, to poison the New York water supply, and even, in
the words of prosecutor John Bingham, “the infamous and fiendish project of importing
pestilence” by distributing to Union soldiers clothing infected with yellow fever, smallpox,
and other contagious diseases. Pitman, supra note 18, at 373. The same Confederate
officials in Canada were said to have conspired with Booth on a plan to kill Lincoln and
other U.S. government officials. Id.
372. Letter from J. Holt to E.M. Stanton, supra note 156, at 493.
373. Id.
374. See Witt, supra note 41, at 294 (“The military commission placed virtually no
constraints on the scope of the conspiracy theory that Holt’s team proposed.”).
375. Pitman, supra note 18, at 259 (statement of Reverdy Johnson, counsel for Mary
Surratt, toward the end of the trial). The New York Times identified the trial for what it
was—a cross between a fishing expedition and a grand inquest:
The trial now in progress is not a trial for simple murder. Its object is not
merely to punish one or more individuals for a specific act of crime. The
government seeks to unravel a conspiracy—to follow every clue that may
be offered for the detection and arraignment of every person in any way
connected, directly or indirectly, with the extended and formidable
conspiracy, in which the assassination of the President was only one of
the objects sought.
Trial of the Assassins, N.Y. Times (May 15, 1865), http://www.nytimes.com/1865/05/
15/news/trial-of-the-assassins.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). It is noteworthy
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly for present purposes,
Stanton—and presumably Johnson, as well—had reason to fear what the
outcome might be if the case were entrusted to a jury in the D.C. federal
trial court, where unanimity was required for a guilty verdict. A
significant percentage of adult men in the District were still off at war,
and the remaining, winnowed jury pool included an unusually large
number of Confederate sympathizers, any one of whom would have had
the capacity to prevent a guilty verdict. More generally, as the acquittalby-temporary-insanity verdict in a contemporaneous murder trial376 and
the hung jury in the John Surratt trial in 1867377 would soon after
confirm, the vagaries of high-profile trials before District of Columbia
juries undoubtedly elicited great trepidation on the part of the prosecutors and Administration officials. By contrast, obtaining a mere
majority vote of nine military officers, all of whom were devoted to the
Union war effort and revered their fallen Commander in Chief, was a
much safer bet. The commission was, in this respect, “unencumbered” by
what Holt dismissively referred to as “the technicalities and inevitable
embarrassments attending the administration of justice before civil
tribunals.”378
B.

Addressing the Constitutional Question

Whatever the policy reasons might have been for a military trial,
however, there remained the formidable question whether it would be
constitutional. Accordingly, before he made his final decision, Johnson
turned to his Attorney General, James Speed, for an opinion on that
question.379 As Secretary Gideon Welles later recounted the internal
dynamic, Speed was inclined against such a proceeding, but the new
Attorney General was weak and prone to adopt and echo “the jealousies
and wild vagaries of Stanton.”380 Speed eventually came around to the

that the Times, like Holt, considered this an admirable feature, not a (constitutional) flaw.
See infra note 391 (describing the Times’s about-face regarding the legality of the military
commission).
376. See infra note 467 (recounting the trial of Mary Harris).
377. See infra section III.F.2.a.
378. Letter from J. Holt to E.M. Stanton, supra note 156, at 493.
379. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (assigning the Attorney
General the duty “to give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by
the President of the United States”). As noted above, Lincoln apparently never asked for
such a formal opinion on military commissions from Attorney General Bates, Speed’s
predecessor, perhaps fearing he would not like the answer Bates was prepared to offer. See
supra section I.B.1.
380. Diary Entry of Gideon Welles (Apr. 25, 1865), in Diary of Gideon Welles, supra
note 359, at 296, 297.
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War Secretary’s view.381 The Attorney General produced a formal
opinion for the President on April 28. It reads in its entirety:
SIR:
I am of the opinion that the persons charged with the
murder of the President of the United States can be rightfully
tried by a military court.
I am, sir, very respectfully, Your obedient servant,
JAMES SPEED.382
Apparently that superficial work product was good enough for
Johnson: In his order, the President expressly relied upon Speed’s opinion
that the alleged conspirators and abettors were “subject to the jurisdiction of, and lawfully triable before, a Military Commission.”383
For obvious reasons, that conclusory Attorney General opinion did
not quell anxieties about the legality of the military tribunal. Allies of the
President expressed grave doubts about it. Henry Winter Davis, for
instance, who three months earlier had come very close to persuading
Congress to expressly prohibit such trials,384 wrote Johnson that the
tribunal was “in the very teeth of the express prohibition of the constitu381. Id. Notably, Lincoln had initially asked Holt, in November 1864, to succeed Bates
as Attorney General, but Holt declined “with extreme reluctance and regret,” telling
Lincoln that “[i]n view of all the circumstances, I am satisfied that I can serve you better in
the position which I now hold at your hands, than in the more elevated one to which I
have been invited.” Letter from J. Holt, Judge Advocate Gen., to President Abraham
Lincoln 2 (Nov. 30, 1864), in Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress, ser. 1. The
next day, Holt recommended Speed for the post. See Letter from J. Holt, Judge Advocate
Gen., to President Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 1, 1864), in Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library
of Congress, ser. 1. Speed took office on December 2, 1864.
382. Murder of the President, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 215, 215 (1865). Many years later, the
Chief Justice of the United States would remark of this formal opinion: “The arguments
for and against this position . . . were very much bruited about at the time, and Speed’s
failure to deal with them at all is . . . evidence of his lack of professional ability.”
Rehnquist, supra note 22, at 145. A few weeks after Speed opined, his predecessor, Edward
Bates, wrote that Speed was in effect an empty suit, with “no strong confidence in his own
opinions,” who had been “caressed and courted by Stanton and [Secretary of State]
Seward, and sank, under the weight of their blandishments, into a mere tool—to give such
opinions as were wanted!,” thereby corrupting and degrading Bates’s beloved law
department. Diary Entry of Edward Bates (Mar. 9, 1865), supra note 249, at 483. Although
Speed “must know better,” Bates surmised, he was “wheedled out of an opinion, to the
effect that such a trial is lawful.” Id. By contrast, Stanton’s skills and energy impressed
Secretary of the Navy Welles, who was nonetheless often at odds with the War Secretary
and troubled by his “mercurial” and “impulsive” nature—never more so than in this
instance. Diary Entry of Gideon Welles (May 19, 1865), in Diary of Gideon Welles, supra
note 359, at 307, 309; see also Diary Entry of Gideon Welles (May 9, 1865), supra note 359,
at 304 (“The rash, impulsive, and arbitrary measures of Stanton are exceedingly
repugnant to my notions, and I am pained to witness the acquiescence they receive. He
carries others with him, sometimes against their convictions as expressed to me.”).
383. Pitman, supra note 18, at 17.
384. See supra section I.B.3.c.
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tion; & not less in conflict with all our American usages & feelings
respecting criminal proceedings.”385 Davis assured the President that not
a single one of his acquaintances thought otherwise and that the military
proceeding would likely do damage to the Republic—and would surely
be the ruin of his Administration.386 Similarly, during the trial itself,
David Dudley Field—a renowned Republican lawyer and brother of
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field—wrote Johnson that the trial was
“a matter of great embarrassment to all of us who have been educated to
dread encroachments upon the Constitution. We think a military trial is,
to say the least, of questionable legality.”387 To similar effect, on the day
Johnson approved the verdicts, Republican Senator Orville Hickman
Browning, Lincoln’s close ally and friend from Illinois, wrote in his diary
that the commission “was without authority,” such that its proceedings
were “void” and the imminent executions of Paine, Atzerodt, Herold,
and Surratt “will be murder.”388
Many newspapers, including even some journals ordinarily sympathetic to the Union and to the Administration, also excoriated the
decision to use a military tribunal.389 The New York Times, for example,
opined that the commission was “repugnant to the spirit of our institutions,” a tribunal “for which no precedent is to be found in the history
of any free country, and one to which the worst European despotisms
have rarely ventured, even in Poland or Hungary, to resort.”390 Although
the Times was quick to add, the next day, that it did not mean to impugn
the motives of the relevant government officials, even so, “[i]t would have
been far better every way if these trials could have been held before the
ordinary civil tribunals of the land, and in presence of the public.”391
385. Letter from Henry Winter Davis to President Andrew Johnson (May 13, 1865), in
8 The Papers of Andrew Johnson 65, 65 (Paul H. Bergeron ed., 1989).
386. Id. at 65–66; see also Letter from Gen. Carl Schurz to President Andrew Johnson
(May 13, 1865), in The Papers of Andrew Johnson, supra note 385, at 67, 67 (stating that
submitting the case to a military commission was “perhaps the utmost stretch of power
upon which the government could venture without laying itself open to an imputation of
unfair play”).
387. Letter from David Dudley Field to President Andrew Johnson ( June 8, 1865), in
The Papers of Andrew Johnson, supra note 385, at 201, 201.
388. Diary Entry of Orville Hickman Browning ( July 6, 1865), in 2 The Diary of Orville
Hickman Browning 36, 37 ( James G. Randall ed., 1933).
389. See Turner, supra note 41, at 140–41; see also Diary Entry of Edward Bates (May
25, 1865), in The Diary of Edward Bates, supra note 249, at 482, 483 (“The three leading
Republican papers in New York,—the Post, the Tribune and the Times—come out boldly,
against the trial of the assassins of the President and the Sewards, by a Military
Commission.”).
390. Secret Court.—The Trial of the Assassins, N.Y. Times (May 11, 1865), http://
www.nytimes.com/1865/05/11/news/secret-court-the-trial-of-the-assassins.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
391. The Trial of the Assassins., N.Y. Times (May 12, 1865), http://www.nytimes.com/
1865/05/12/news/the-trial-of-the-assassins.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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During the actual proceedings of the Lincoln assassination commission
the constitutional question was raised five times, and then again, at much
greater length, Attorney General Speed himself addressed the question
in a formal opinion that he signed in July 1865,392 after four of the
accused had already faced the gallows.
1. Comstock’s Doubts. — Before the trial even began, at least one of
the nine original members of the commission itself—Brevet Brigadier
General Cyrus Comstock—thought the accused “ought to be tried by . . .
civil courts,”393 and he raised the question of the commission’s
jurisdiction with the President of the commission (General David
Hunter) during proceedings the next day.394 Holt interjected that
Attorney General Speed had already decided the jurisdictional question,
Other, more vociferous opponents of Stanton and Johnson were pleasantly surprised that
the Times had joined in opposition to the military court. Interestingly, this prompted the
Times to do an about-face; by May 13, it was apologizing for “the ill-judged language of an
article accidentally inserted in these columns, a day or two since,” which had given the
New York World “some color of justice in claiming the TIMES as among the journals which
concur in its opinions on this subject.” The Trial of the Assassins—Action of the
Government.; Prices of Things—Trade Combinations—Systematic Extortion., N.Y. Times
(May 13, 1865), http://www.nytimes.com/1865/05/13/news/trial-assassins-action-governmentprices-things-trade-combinations-systematic.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In
the span of just forty-eight hours, the Times had switched gears and become an
unapologetic defender of the legality of the military commission proceedings:
The assassination of Mr. LINCOLN was the murder of a military officer,
in actual command, during actual war, in a fortified camp, and for the
purpose of aiding the enemy; what more was needed to give the military
tribunals complete cognizance of the case? . . . [D]oes not every
consideration of justice to the public welfare demand that they should
be tried by the most summary, rigorous and inflexible tribunals provided
by the constitution and laws of the land for such dread emergencies? Is
it wise to give to such criminals, as a special favor, the chance of packing
a jury or securing upon it one man who will screen them at all
hazards? . . . It is well to remember that the purpose of the government
is not simply, to punish a criminal, but to unravel a conspiracy; to detect
the threads and connecting links of a vast and powerful organization,
aiming at anarchy and the overthrow of the government by secret
assassinations.
Id. After learning of this remarkable turnabout, former Attorney General Bates wrote in
his diary that the Times, “scared, perhaps, at his own boldness, in daring to assert a
principle contrary to the dictatorship of the war office,” was “easing off and backing down,
into its normal condition of abject dependence upon power.” Diary Entry of Edward Bates
(May 18, 1865), in The Diary of Edward Bates, supra note 249, at 481, 481. Times
cofounder Henry J. Raymond, wrote Bates, “has capacity, and would rather be a statesman,
and a good citizen than a sycophant”—but only when it was “convenient, and consistent
with the pecuniary interest of his paper.” Id.
392. See Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297 (1865); see also infra section
II.B.6.
393. Diary Entry of Cyrus B. Comstock (May 8, 1865), in The Diary of Cyrus B.
Comstock, supra note 49, at 317, 317.
394. See Diary Entry of Cyrus B. Comstock (May 9, 1865), supra note 49, at 317.
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implying that it was not Comstock’s place to second-guess that decision,
but Comstock continued to express his doubts (about that and other
matters)—with no success.395 The next day, May 10, Comstock and Brevet
Colonel Horace Porter were relieved of duty on the commission;396 the
reason they were offered was that they were aides to General Grant, who
was alleged to have been one of the targets of the conspiracy.397
2. The Jurisdictional Pleas. — On May 12, the first day on which they
were represented by counsel, the accused each formally pled the absence
of court jurisdiction, on grounds that they were not in military service
and that “loyal civil courts, in which all the offenses charged are triable,
exist, and are in full and free operation in all the places where the several
offenses charged are alleged to have been committed,” including “in the
City of Washington.”398 Holt’s entire response to this jurisdictional
challenge was the following: “[T]his Commission has jurisdiction in the
premises to try and determine the matters in the Charge and
Specifications alleged and set forth against the said defendant[s].”399 The
court was cleared for the commission’s deliberation of the jurisdictional
objection, after which Holt “announced that the pleas of the accused had
been overruled by the Commission.”400
3. Ewing’s Request for Specification of the Charge. — The third challenge
was more indirect, but it went to the important question of which offenses
could be tried by a military commission. On June 14, 1865, well into the
trial, Thomas Ewing, Jr., the former Chief Justice of the Kansas Supreme
Court (and William Tecumseh Sherman’s brother-in-law), serving as
counsel for Mudd, Spangler, and Arnold, moved to require the prosecution to clarify the charge against the accused, so that Ewing and his
fellow counsel would be able to offer a coherent defense.401 Ewing complained that it was impossible to tell from the written charge exactly what
offenses the defendants were accused of committing and, perhaps more
importantly still, what the legal source of those offenses might be.402
Ewing was right: The charge itself was remarkably undifferentiated
and indistinct. It appeared to accuse each defendant of having done two
things: The first was an unlawful agreement—conspiring with Booth, John
Surratt, Jefferson Davis, and other Confederate officials “maliciously,
395. Diary Entry of Cyrus B. Comstock (May 10, 1865), in The Diary of Cyrus B.
Comstock, supra note 49, at 317, 317–18.
396. Pitman, supra note 18, at 18.
397. See Diary Entry of Cyrus B. Comstock (May 10, 1865), supra note 395, at 317–18.
398. Pitman, supra note 18, at 22–23.
399. Id. at 23.
400. Id. Holt later reported to President Johnson that the commission overruled the
jurisdictional plea “after mature deliberations.” Report of Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate
Gen., to President Andrew Johnson 2 (July 5, 1865) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
401. Pitman, supra note 18, at 244.
402. Id. at 244–47.
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unlawfully, and traitorously, and in aid of the existing armed rebellion,”
to kill the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and
General Grant.403 The second was the substantive offense corresponding
to that alleged plot—acting, together with Booth and Surratt, to
maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously murder the President, assault the
Secretary, and lie in wait with intent to murder Johnson and Grant.404 As
403. Id. at 18.
404. Id. at 18–21. The “Charge” paragraph, in its entirety, read as follows:
For maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously, and in aid of the existing
armed rebellion against the United States of America, on or before the
6th day of March, A.D. 1865, and on divers other days between that day
and the 15th day of April, A.D. 1865, combining, confederating, and
conspiring together with one John H. Surratt, John Wilkes Booth,
Jefferson Davis, George N. Sanders, Beverly Tucker, Jacob Thompson,
William C. Cleary, Clement C. Clay, George Harper, George Young, and
others unknown, to kill and murder, within the Military Department of
Washington, and within the fortified and intrenched lines thereof,
Abraham Lincoln, late, and at the time of said combining, confederating, and conspiring, President of the United States of America, and
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof; Andrew Johnson,
now Vice-President of the United States aforesaid; William H. Seward,
Secretary of State of the United States aforesaid; and Ulysses S. Grant,
Lieutenant-General of the Army of the United States aforesaid, then in
command of the Armies of the United States, under the direction of the
said Abraham Lincoln; and in pursuance of and in prosecuting said
malicious, unlawful, and traitorous conspiracy aforesaid, and in aid of
the said rebellion, afterward, to wit, on the 14th day of April, A.D. 1865,
within the Military Department of Washington aforesaid, and within the
fortified and intrenched lines of said Military Department, together with
said John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt, maliciously, unlawfully, and
traitorously murdering the said Abraham Lincoln, then President of the
United States and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, as aforesaid; and maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously
assaulting, with intent to kill and murder, the said William H. Seward,
then Secretary of State of the United States, as aforesaid; and lying in
wait with intent maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously to kill and
murder the said Andrew Johnson, then being Vice-President of the
United States; and the said Ulysses S. Grant, then being LieutenantGeneral, and in command of the Armies of the United States, as aforesaid.
Id. at 18–19. The charging document then proceeded to include ten more paragraphs,
with further specifications for each of the defendants, many of which sounded in
accessorial culpability. Id. at 19–21. The paragraph respecting Samuel Mudd, for instance,
alleged that
[I]n further prosecution of said conspiracy, the said Samuel A. Mudd
did, at Washington City, and within the military department and military
lines aforesaid, on or before the 6th day of March, A.D. 1865, and on
divers other days and times between that day and the 20th day of April,
A.D. 1865, advise, encourage, receive, entertain, harbor, and conceal,
aid and assist the said John Wilkes Booth, David E. Herold, Lewis Payne,
John H. Surratt, Michael O’Laughlin, George A. Atzerodt, Mary E.
Surratt, and Samuel Arnold, and their confederates, with knowledge of
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Chief Justice Rehnquist would later write, it was, “[t]o put it mildly,” an
“ambitious charge.”405
Ewing noted, for instance, that the defendants were each alleged to
have “traitorously” murdered the President.406 This raised at least two
questions: First, how could any of these individuals be charged with the
murder, since none of them was with Booth in Ford’s Theatre? And
second, what was the offense, anyway? Murder simplicitur was defined by
statutory and common law, explained Ewing, but what was this thing
called “traitorous murder,” which sounded suspiciously similar to the
crime of treason, which is specifically treated in Article III and conviction
for which requires heightened proof?407
Judge Advocate Holt responded that the “general allegation” was a
conspiracy—to murder Lincoln, in particular—but that the defendants
were also charged with “the execution of that conspiracy as far as it
went.”408 As for the law, Holt conceded that “[w]e have no special statute
to which we can point,” but “[w]e have the great principles of jurisprudence, which regulate this trial.”409 The adverb “traitorously” was
included in the charge, said Holt, to specify that the conduct was “in aid
of the rebellion”—without explaining why that objective might be legally
significant or why it was permissible to avoid the constitutional requirements for a treason trial.410 Assistant Judge Advocate Bingham interjected
that each of the defendants was alleged to have committed the assaults
themselves because “the act of any one of the participants to a conspiracy
in its execution, is the act of every party to that conspiracy,” such that
when the President was slain by the “hand of Booth,” he was “murdered
by every one of the parties to this conspiracy.”411 Even so, Bingham
added, although there were charges of both making and executing the
conspiracy, “it is all one transaction.”412
Ewing, by now even more exasperated—“I get no answer intelligible
to me”—probed once more for the “code or system of laws” that

the murderous and traitorous conspiracy aforesaid, and with the intent
to aid, abet, and assist them in the execution thereof, and in escaping
from justice after the murder of the said Abraham Lincoln, in pursuance
of said conspiracy in manner aforesaid.
Id. at 20–21.
405. Rehnquist, supra note 22, at 147.
406. Pitman, supra note 18, at 244.
407. Id. at 245; see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 3; infra note 420 (discussing the Treason
Clause of Article III).
408. Pitman, supra note 18, at 245–46.
409. Id. at 246.
410. Id. at 245–46.
411. Id. at 246.
412. Id. at 247.
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condemns “traitorously” murdering, assaulting and lying in wait.413
Holt’s cryptic response: “I think the common law of war will reach that
case.”414
4. The Oral Arguments on Jurisdiction. — The fourth and most
extensive attack on the jurisdiction of the commission came in the form
of two long disquisitions on the subject: the first on June 16 by Mary
Surratt’s attorney, former Attorney General Reverdy Johnson,415 and the
second on June 23 by Thomas Ewing.416
Surratt had retained Johnson, a Democratic senator from Maryland
who had both defended the slave owner in Dred Scott v. Sandford 417 and
served as one of President Lincoln’s pallbearers,418 especially for the
purpose of the jurisdictional challenge to the military proceeding.419
Johnson proffered several arguments, including that no statute or
constitutional power afforded the Executive affirmative authority to
unilaterally establish the commission; that the commission could not be
defended on the theory that martial law had been declared; and that the
charges appeared to be allegations of treason in the guise of other
“traitorous” offenses and therefore had to be tried in an Article III
court.420 Most pointedly, Johnson argued that whereas military judges
“are absolutely dependent” on executive power, Article III guaranteed
Surratt a trial before a judge who was independent of the executive
power.421 Johnson stressed that this view of constitutional limits on
military jurisdiction was “the almost unanimous opinion of the profession, and certainly is of every judge or court who has expressed
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 251–62.
416. Id. at 264–67.
417. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
418. John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Official Arrangements for the Funeral of
President Lincoln, The Am. Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=69747 [http://perma.cc/X6HW-4KS5] (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
419. See Pitman, supra note 18, at 251.
420. See id. at 251–63. Section 3 of Article III provides that “Treason against the
United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless
on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open
Court.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 3. The defendants before the commission certainly appeared
to be charged with adhering, and giving aid and comfort, to the enemy. Section 3 does not
say in so many words that treason charges must be adjudicated in Article III courts;
however, Attorney General Speed himself opined several months later, with respect to a
potential treason trial of Jefferson Davis, that “I have ever thought trials for high treason
cannot be had before a military court. The civil courts have alone jurisdiction of that
crime.” Case of Jefferson Davis, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 411, 411 (1866); accord Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1, 38–39 (1942) (intimating that the crime of treason is not a violation of the law
of war that can be tried before a military commission).
421. Pitman, supra note 18, at 261.
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any.”422 Johnson then quoted at length from a remarkable contemporary
charge to a grand jury by New York Judge Rufus Peckham (a former
congressman and father of the future Supreme Court Justice), inveighing
against the misuse of military commissions: The constitutional protections in question, instructed Peckham, “were made for occasions of great
excitement, no matter from what cause, when passion, rather than
reason, might prevail.”423 Judge Peckham then took aim at the Lincoln
conspirators’ commission itself:
A great crime has lately been committed that has shocked
the civilized world. Every right-minded man desires the
punishment of the criminals, but he desires that punishment to
be administered according to law, and through the judicial
tribunals of the country. No star-chamber court, no secret
inquisition, in this nineteenth century, can ever be made
acceptable to the American mind.
....
Grave doubts, to say the least, exist in the minds of
intelligent men as to the constitutional right of the recent
military commissions at Washington to sit in judgment upon the
persons now on trial for their lives before that tribunal.
Thoughtful men feel aggrieved that such a commission should
be established in this free country when the war is over, and
when the common-law courts are open and accessible to
administer justice, according to law, without fear or favor.
....
The unanimity with which the leading press of our land has
condemned this mode of trial ought to be gratifying to every
Patriot.
Every citizen is interested in the preservation, in their
purity, of the institutions of his country; and you, gentlemen,
may make such presentment on this subject, if any, as your
judgment may dictate.424
One week later, Ewing homed in on the specific protections of
Article III, including not only the right to a trial by jury but also the
422. Id.
423. Id. at 262 (argument of Reverdy Johnson) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Judge Peckham’s charge to the grand jury). Judge Peckham gave this charge to
the grand jury in the May term of the New York Supreme Court and Court of Oyer and
Terminer, in Albany, and it was reported in local papers, see, e.g., Judge Peckham’s
Charge to the Grand Jury, Albany Argus, May 16, 1865.
424. Pitman, supra note 18, at 262. Judge Peckham apparently understood that the
Albany grand jury’s “presentment” would be merely hortatory: He conceded that no
“remedy” for the unlawful military proceeding was available “except through the power of
public sentiment” and thus implored the grand jury “in all courtesy and kindness, and
with all proper respect, [to] express our disapprobation of this course in our rulers in
Washington.” Id. I have not uncovered any record indicating that the grand jury
responded to Peckham’s plea.
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importance of an independent Article III judge, who would be much
more adept at keeping the trial within proper legal bounds, a function
beyond the commission’s ken:
Inexperienced as most of you are in judicial investigations, you
can admit evidence which the courts would reject, and reject
what they would admit, and you may convict and sentence on
evidence which those courts would hold to be wholly
insufficient. Means, too, may be resorted to by detectives, acting
under promise or hope of reward, and operating on the fears or
the cupidity of witnesses, to obtain and introduce evidence, which
can not be detected and exposed in this military trial, but could
be readily in the free, but guarded, course of investigation
before our regular judicial tribunals.425
Ewing repeated Johnson’s claim that “a large proportion of the legal
profession think now, that your jurisdiction in these cases is an unwarranted assumption.”426 He prophesied that if and when the established
judicial tribunals would find, as they likely would, that this sort of military
proceeding was invalid through and through, history would not look
kindly on the assassins’ commission, no matter the outcome of the trial:
In that event, however fully the recorded evidence may sustain
your findings, however moderate may seem your sentences,
however favorable to the accused your rulings on the evidence,
your sentence will be held in law no better than the rulings of
Judge Lynch’s courts in the administration of lynch law.427
The duty of responding to Johnson and Ewing on the jurisdictional
questions fell to Special Judge Advocate John Bingham, then a member
of the House of Representatives and best known today as the principal
author of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bingham’s lengthy
jurisdictional presentation, part of his closing argument, included several
different strands of justification, most of which had become familiar during
the war, as military officials such as Holt and Halleck had endeavored to
afford legal support to their expansion of military jurisdiction.428
Bingham contended, for example, that because President Lincoln
had, in September 1862, supposedly declared martial law “within the
United States,”429 the ordinary rules of civilian life were simply inapposite
and were displaced by “military law”;430 indeed, Bingham argued, the
425. Id. at 266 (argument of Thomas Ewing). Ewing acknowledged that Judge Advocate
Holt was “learned in the law,” but that was cold comfort because “from his position he can
not be an impartial judge, unless he be more than a man.” Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. See id. at 351–72 (argument of John A. Bingham).
429. See supra notes 189–190 and accompanying text (quoting Lincoln’s September
1862 Order).
430. Pitman, supra note 18, at 359.
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provisions of the Constitution invoked by counsel for the accused are
“silent and inoperative in time of war when the public safety requires
it.”431 To be sure, Lincoln’s 1862 proclamation decreed, somewhat
imprecisely, that a certain class of persons who harmed the Union
cause—“all rebels and insurgents, their agents and abettors, within the
United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments,
resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid and
comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States”—would be
“subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by courtsmartial or military commissions.”432 Because the term “martial law” does
not have any precise or uncontroverted meaning,433 it is not clear what, if
any, legal effect Lincoln intended by such declaration, other than
purporting to lay a predicate for military “trial and punishment.” What is
certain, however, is that the 1862 proclamation did not establish what the
Supreme Court would shortly refer to as “martial rule,” a situation in
which there is “no power . . . left but the military, [which] is allowed to
govern . . . until the laws can have their free course.”434 The system of
civil law remained in place throughout much of the Union—it had not
been suspended and displaced by “the omnipotence of military
power.”435
431. Id. at 361. Bingham reasoned that if it was permissible for the Army to have
chased down and killed Booth himself, without “civil process,” it stood to reason that the
military could try his coconspirators. Id. at 352. At one point, Bingham invoked a wellknown argument offered by then-Representative John Quincy Adams in 1836, to the effect
that when the Executive exercises war powers, municipal laws are displaced by the law of
war—that there is a sharp distinction between the laws that govern “war power” and
“peace power.” Id. at 365. This argument had some traction with the Supreme Court in
the nineteenth century in the context of constitutional property rights, but it was never
successfully applied to displace the rights the Constitution guarantees with respect to
criminal trials. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1579–82.
432. War Dep’t, General Orders, No. 141, supra note 189, at 587; see also supra notes
189–190 and accompanying text (discussing Lincoln’s September 1862 Order).
433. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 315 (1946) (“[T]he term ‘martial law’
carries no precise meaning. The Constitution does not refer to ‘martial law’ at all and no
Act of Congress has defined the term. It has been employed in various ways by different
people and at different times.”); Martial Law, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 365, 368 (1857) (“Martial
law is a thing not mentioned by name, and scarcely as much as hinted at, in the
Constitution and statutes of the United States. And our law books, whether civil or
military, do not afford any correct or useful information on the subject.”).
434. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).
435. Martial Law, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. at 374. In that opinion, Attorney General Caleb
Cushing explained:
When martial law is proclaimed under circumstances of assumed
necessity, the proclamation must be regarded as the statement of an
existing fact, rather than the legal creation of that fact. In a beleaguered
city, for instance, the state of siege lawfully exists, because the city is
beleaguered; and the proclamation of martial law, in such case, is but
notice and authentication of a fact,—that civil authority has become
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Somewhat more narrowly, the prosecution tried to exploit the
notion that “martial law” prevailed at the very least in the District of
Columbia, where Booth committed his crime. To establish this point,
early in the trial Holt called to the stand Lieutenant General Ulysses S.
Grant, who testified that “[m]artial law, I believe, extends to all the
territory south of the railroad that runs across from Annapolis, running
south to the Potomac and the Chesapeake.”436 This idea—that “[m]artial
law had been declared in the District of Columbia”437—has persisted
through the years, to the point that some observers appear to have taken
it for granted.438 Neither Lincoln nor Johnson, however, ever specifically
declared martial law in the District, a point Ewing effectively exploited in
his cross-examination of Grant at the trial:
Q. By virtue of what order does martial law extend south of
Annapolis?
A. I never saw the order. It is just simply an understanding.
Q. It is just an understanding?
A. Yes, sir; just an understanding that it does exist.
Q. You have never seen any order?
A. No, sir.
Q. And do not know that such an order exists?
A. No, sir: I have never seen the order.439
Even if there had been a formal declaration of martial law in the
District, however—or to the extent Lincoln’s 1862 proclamation

Id.

suspended, of itself, by the force of circumstances, and that by the same
force of circumstances the military power has had devolved upon it,
without having authoritatively assumed, the supreme control of affairs,
in the care of the public safety and conservation.

436. 1 The Conspiracy Trial for the Murder of the President, and the Attempt to
Overthrow the Government by the Assassination of Its Principal Officers 39 (Ben: Perley
Poore ed., Boston, J.E. Tilton & Co. 1865) [hereinafter Poore, The Conspiracy Trial].
437. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 297 (1865).
438. In his classic work on constitutional questions during the Civil War, for example,
James Randall wrote that “[b]eginning with September, 1863, the District of Columbia was
subjected to martial law.” Randall, supra note 137, at 170; see also, e.g., Steers, Blood on
the Moon, supra note 11, at 211, 324 n.7. In support of this statement, Randall cited only
an 1874 House Report, see Randall, supra note 137, at 170 n.4; that House Report, in turn,
cited a letter from the Chief Clerk of the State Department, which claimed that “[t]he
date of the President’s proclamation declaring martial law in the District of Columbia is
September 15, 1863.” H.R. Rep. No. 43-262, at 6 n.20 (1874) (quoting Letter from
Sevellon A. Brown, Chief Clerk, Dep’t of State (Feb. 6, 1874)). Lincoln’s September 1863
proclamation, however—principally a suspension of habeas—does not mention martial
law at all, let alone declare martial law in the District. See Proclamation 104—Suspending
the Writ of Habeas Corpus Throughout the United States (Sept. 15, 1863), in 4 A
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 3371, 3371–72 (James D.
Richardson ed., New York, Bureau of Nat’l Literature, Inc. 1897).
439. Poore, The Conspiracy Trial, supra note 436, at 39.
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established that certain classes of persons were “subject to” martial
law440—it was not obvious why that formal legal assertion, in and of itself,
would have been an adequate constitutional justification for subjecting
the accused to a military trial. After all, as defense counsel stressed in
their jurisdictional arguments, the civilian courts in the District of
Columbia were open and available for trial of precisely the sort of
wrongdoing alleged in the case.441 Bingham conceded as much, but he
added that, even after Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House, the
civilian courts were open in the District “only . . . by force of the
bayonet.”442 This retort, although true, was nonresponsive to the legal
point defendants’ counsel were pressing. To be sure, at the time of the
assassination, the District was heavily guarded by military forces.443 Such a
military role, however, did not establish a state of martial law, “which, in
the proper acceptation of the term, was not at any time fully established
over the District.”444 Indeed, the very military protection that Bingham
identified (the “force of the bayonet”), by guaranteeing that the civilian
courts would remain open and running, made it unnecessary to impose
martial law. As one esteemed military treatise writer would later
summarize:
The civil magistracy of the District exercised their vocations
as usual. Civil officers were chosen, they entered upon or
surrendered their duties as in times of peace. To this extent the
military, instead of supplanting the civil authorities, rendered it
possible for the latter to exercise their functions. Without the former
the latter would have been powerless to protect and render
secure either life or property. Yet in doing this the military did
not act in subordination to the civil power. It strengthened the
latter, but in its own way.445
Bingham offered other arguments, as well.446 Some of them sounded
textual or structural themes. He insisted, for instance, that because the
440. War Dep’t, General Orders, No. 141, supra note 189, at 587.
441. See, e.g., Pitman, supra note 18, at 271 (argument of Frederick Stone) (arguing
that Lincoln’s 1862 proclamation left “untouched and undisturbed” the authority and
ability of civil courts in D.C. to try cases alleging murder, conspiracy to murder, and aiding
and abetting murder).
442. Id. at 352.
443. See Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 297 (1865) (“Washington was
defended by fortifications regularly and constantly manned, the principal police of the city
was by federal soldiers, the public offices and property in the city were all guarded by
soldiers, and the President’s house and person were, or should have been, under the
guard of soldiers.”).
444. William E. Birkhimer, Military Government and Martial Law 480 (Franklin
Hudson Publ’g Co. 3d rev. ed. 1914) (1892).
445. Id. (emphasis added).
446. In addition to the substantive arguments described in the text, he argued that the
commission lacked the power to declare that it lacked jurisdiction: “[T]his Court has no
power, as a Court, to declare the authority by which it was constituted null and void, and
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power to create the court emanated from an Article I authority (even
though Congress did not create it!), the commission’s trial of military
offenses was not part of the “judicial power” of Article III447—an
argument that begged the question at issue, which was if and when the
political branches could create Article I courts to perform criminal trial
functions ordinarily entrusted, within the federal government, to Article
III courts. Bingham also suggested that just as Congress has the power to
subject service members to courts-martial—based on its authority to
make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces, together with the exception to the Fifth Amendment Grand Jury
Clause for cases “arising in the land or naval forces”—so, too, should
those same constitutional provisions empower the federal government to
use military tribunals to try persons outside the armed forces who, in a
time of war, commit offenses “in the interests of, or in concert with, the
enemy.”448 It would be deeply unfair, reasoned Bingham, to provide
constitutional protections to those who would conspire with the enemy
to commit murder but to deny those same protections to the lowly
soldier who falls asleep at his post.449
Although none of these arguments has withstood the test of time,450
Bingham offered one other rationale, as well—an argument rooted
firmly in practice and understandings at the Founding. Bingham
explained that, notwithstanding provisions in virtually all of the state
constitutions shortly after independence guaranteeing jury trials for all
crimes, the Continental Congress had passed resolutions during the war
prescribing military tribunals for persons who had aided the British
enemy.451 In particular, Bingham pointed to the following resolution that
the Continental Congress adopted on February 27, 1778:
Resolved, That whatever inhabitant of these states shall kill
or seize, or take any loyal citizen or citizens thereof and convey
him, her, or them to any place within the power of the enemy,
or shall enter into any combination for such purpose, or
attempt to carry the same into execution, or hath assisted or
shall assist therein; or shall, by giving intelligence, acting as a
the act of the President a mere nullity, a usurpation . . . . How can it be possible that a
judicial tribunal can decide the question that it does not exist . . . ?” Pitman, supra note
18, at 353–54.
447. Id. at 354.
448. Id. at 358–59; see also supra note 153 (discussing a similar argument Holt had
made in 1863).
449. Pitman, supra note 18, at 360–61; see also Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals,
supra note 67, at 1574 (addressing this equitable argument).
450. Indeed, a year later, in Ex parte Milligan, the Supreme Court vigorously rejected
Bingham’s arguments premised on the alleged existence of martial law and displacement of
civil law. See 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124–27 (1866); see also infra section III.D (describing the
Supreme Court’s holding in Milligan).
451. Pitman, supra note 18, at 361–62.
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guide, or in any manner whatever, aid the enemy in the
perpetration thereof, he shall suffer death by the judgment of a
court martial as a traitor, assassin, and spy, if the offence be
committed within seventy miles of the headquarters of the
grand or other armies of these states where a general officer
commands.452
What is more, added Bingham, none other than General George
Washington himself, “the peerless, the stainless, and the just, with whom
God walked through the night of that great trial,” attempted to enforce
that resolution in 1780 against a civilian attorney, Joshua Hett Smith.453
Smith was, on Washington’s orders, arraigned by court-martial for having
allegedly abetted Benedict Arnold in his traitorous scheme to surrender
the army garrison at West Point to the British army.454 How could the
jurisdictional arguments of Ewing and Johnson be correct, asked
Bingham, if the Continental Congress had passed such a resolution, and
Washington had enforced it, “when the constitutions of the several States
at that day as fully guaranteed trial by jury to every person held to answer
for a crime, as does the Constitution of the United States at this hour?”455
This was probably Bingham’s most effective response to the accused’s
jurisdictional challenges, but it did not garner much attention during the
trial itself. It appears that Johnson and Ewing did not anticipate or
countermand this quasi-originalist line of argument, and it was not mentioned further.456
It is not reported whether the Lincoln commission members deliberated any further on the question of the tribunal’s jurisdiction or whether,
instead, they merely deferred to Holt’s and Bingham’s insistence that the
proceedings were constitutional, as Attorney General Speed had already
determined. Obviously, Johnson and Ewing did not persuade the panel,
which proceeded to render its verdicts later that month.457
452. 10 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 204–05 (Gov’t Printing
Office 1908) (1778).
453. Pitman, supra note 18, at 362.
454. I discuss the Smith case and the 1778 resolution in greater detail in Lederman,
Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1615–27.
455. Pitman, supra note 18, at 362.
456. This argument, based upon Revolutionary War precedents and the authority of
General Washington, is the principal subject of Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals,
supra note 67.
457. Defense counsel William Doster later wrote that Johnson’s argument on behalf of
Mary Surratt, although nominally addressed to the commission, was in fact “meant for the
President and the people.” Doster, supra note 55, at 263. “From what members of the
court have since told me,” wrote Doster, “it had no effect on them whatever. They had
Stanton’s orders, and that was enough for them who were in the service of the United
States.” Id. Reflecting upon the experience after the fact, one of the commission
members, August Kautz, conceded that although the “slight statutory authority” for
military commissions might have been subject to “abuse,” he doubted the assassination
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5. Mary Surratt’s Habeas Petition and Johnson’s Suspension of the Writ. —
The final, and most dramatic, constitutional challenge to the tribunal’s
jurisdiction occurred after the panel rendered its verdicts. The case
finally did reach the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, at 5th
and E Streets . . . only to have the President himself refuse to recognize
the authority of the first Article III judge who had an opportunity to
consider the constitutional question.
On June 30, the commission sentenced Mary Surratt to death by
hanging.458 Five of the nine members wrote a petition to Andrew Johnson,
asking the President to reduce her sentence to life imprisonment “in
consideration of [her] sex and age.”459 If the President saw that plea for
clemency (which is not certain), he ignored it.460 On Wednesday, July 5,
the President ordered Surratt, together with Atzerodt, Herold, and
Powell, to be put to death two days hence, between the hours of 10:00 AM
and 2:00 PM on Friday, July 7, twelve weeks to the day after the tragic
events of Good Friday.461
At 2:00 AM that Friday morning, Surratt’s principal attorneys, Frederick
Aiken and John W. Clampitt, acting on the advice of Reverdy Johnson,
appeared at the home of one of the judges on the D.C. Supreme Court,
Andrew Wylie.462 Judge Wylie was a deeply loyal Unionist: Of the 1,670
persons who voted for President in the city of Alexandria, Virginia, in
1860, Wylie was one of only two who cast a ballot for Lincoln.463 His
supplicants on that July night carried with them a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.464 Roused from his sleep and still in his dressing gown,
the bearded, stately Judge Wylie received the petition and studied it
carefully.465 It challenged the jurisdiction of the commission to try a
commission would be “styled [as] such by posterity,” for it was “the only way for [a] speedy
result which the loyal spirit of the country seemed to demand at the time.” Kautz,
Memoirs, supra note 49, at 27.
458. Pitman, supra note 18, at 248.
459. Joseph Holt, Vindication of Hon. Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate General of the
United States Army 13 (Washington, D.C., Chronicle Publ’g. Co. 1873).
460. Johnson later claimed that he had never seen the clemency request. Holt insisted
that he presented it to the President; he informed Surratt’s lawyers and daughter that the
President was “immovable” and that they “might as well attempt to overthrow this building
as to alter his decision.” John W. Clampitt, The Trial of Mrs. Surratt, 131 N. Am. Rev. 223,
235 (1880). It has never been definitively resolved whether Holt presented Johnson the
panel majority’s clemency request for Surratt. See generally Hanchett, supra note 2, at 94–
100, 110–14. In 1873, Holt published a short volume, in which he desperately tried to show
that he had faithfully presented the petition to Johnson. See generally Holt, supra note
459.
461. Pitman, supra note 18, at 249.
462. Clampitt, supra note 460, at 236.
463. See Ted Pulliam, Historic Alexandria: An Illustrated History 37 (2011).
464. Clampitt, supra note 460, at 236.
465. Id.
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private citizen such as Surratt for what the petition described as a simple
“offense against the peace of the United States,” triable in Judge Wylie’s
own civilian court, which “was and now is open for the trial of such
crimes and offenses.”466 (Indeed, that very morning, Judge Wylie would
preside over the opening arguments of one of the most notorious murder cases of the era, involving another woman named Mary, accused of
killing in cold blood—in the corridors of the Treasury Department, no
less—the man who had long courted her before marrying another.467)
Aiken and Clampitt’s petition argued that the Constitution afforded
Surratt the right of public trial by jury in that Article III court and thus
that her trial by commission and execution of her impending sentence
were unconstitutional.468 The petition accordingly prayed for the court to
order her jailer, General W.S. Hancock, to bring Surratt to the federal
court that very morning, so that an Article III judge might, finally,
consider the merits of the jurisdictional challenge before the hangman’s
noose would render it forever moot sometime before 2:00 PM.469
Judge Wylie retired to his bedchamber. A few minutes later he
reemerged and is said to have addressed Aiken and Clampitt as follows:
Gentlemen, my mind is made up. I have always endeavored to
perform my duty fearlessly, as I understand it. I am constrained
to decide the points in your petition well taken. I am about to
perform an act which before to-morrow’s sun goes down may
consign me to the old Capitol Prison. I believe it to be my duty,
as a judge, to order this writ to issue . . . .470
Judge Wylie’s signature affixed, Aiken and Clampitt promptly had the
writ served upon General Hancock.
At half-past-eleven that morning, General Hancock did, indeed, appear
in Judge Wylie’s packed courtroom, as ordered. He was accompanied,
however, not by Mary Surratt, but instead by none other than the
466. Pitman, supra note 18, at 250.
467. See J.O. Clephane, Official Report of the Trial of Mary Harris, Indicted for the
Murder of Adoniram J. Burroughs 6–18 (1865). On the very day the Lincoln conspirators
were to be executed, the trial of Mary Harris for the murder of Adoniram Burroughs
generated widespread public interest and morbid curiosity: Judge Wylie’s courtroom was
“crowded to excess; nearly all the legal fraternity of Washington occupying the bar, the
space without being filled by citizens generally.” Id. at 6. Harris’s lawyer, Joseph Bradley
(who would, two years later, defend Mary Surratt’s son John in his trial for the murder of
President Lincoln, see infra section III.F.2.a), proffered a defense of “paroxysmal insanity
from moral causes,” Clephane, supra, at 17, on the theory that Burroughs’s abandonment
of Harris caused her dysmenorrhea, which in turn led to bouts of temporary insanity, see,
e.g., id. at 51–52, 73–74, 78–79, during one of which Harris traveled across the country
and shot Burroughs. After only five minutes’ deliberation, the jury accepted Harris’s
defense and acquitted her, just days after Mary Surratt was hanged. Id. at 181.
468. Pitman, supra note 18, at 250.
469. Id.
470. Clampitt, supra note 460, at 236.
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Attorney General of the United States, James Speed.471 Speed came bearing an “Indorsement” signed by President Johnson. In that document,
Johnson “declar[ed] that the writ of habeas corpus has been heretofore
suspended in such cases as this.”472 Presumably Johnson was referring to
Lincoln’s own declaration from September 1863, in which he declared
that the public safety required suspension of the privilege of the writ
“throughout the United States” in all cases involving military detention of
prisoners of war and other persons “amenable to military law or the rules
and articles of war.”473 The whole point of Surratt’s habeas petition,
471. Pitman, supra note 18, at 250.
472. Id.
473. Lincoln issued his 1863 suspension pursuant to section 1 of the Habeas Act of
1863, see supra section I.B.3.a, in which Congress authorized the President to suspend
habeas “whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require it . . . in any case
throughout the United States, or any part thereof.” An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus,
and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755 (1863)
(emphasis added). (It is an interesting question, beyond the scope of this Article, whether
Congress may delegate to the President the authority to make the “public safety”
determination that Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution requires as a predicate for a
habeas suspension. See generally Amy Coney Barrett, Suspension and Delegation, 99
Cornell L. Rev. 251 (2014).) The operative paragraphs of Lincoln’s September 15, 1863
proclamation read in full:
Whereas, in the judgment of the President, the public safety does
require that the privilege of the said writ shall now be suspended
throughout the United States in the cases where, by the authority of the
President of the United States, military, naval, and civil officers of the
United States, or any of them, hold persons under their command or in
their custody, either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of
the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen enrolled or drafted or
mustered or enlisted in or belonging to the land or naval forces of the
United States, or as deserters therefrom, or otherwise amenable to
military law or the rules and articles of war or the rules or regulations
prescribed for the military or naval services by authority of the President
of the United States, or for resisting a draft, or for any other offense
against the military or naval service:
Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States,
do hereby proclaim and make known to all whom it may concern that
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended throughout the
United States in the several cases before mentioned, and that this
suspension will continue throughout the duration of the said rebellion
or until this proclamation shall, by a subsequent one to be issued by the
President of the United States, be modified or revoked. And I do hereby
require all magistrates, attorneys, and other civil officers within the
United States and all officers and others in the military and naval
services of the United States to take distinct notice of this suspension
and to give it full effect, and all citizens of the United States to conduct
and govern themselves accordingly and in conformity with the
Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress in such case
made and provided.
Proclamation 104—Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus Throughout the United States,
supra note 438, at 3372.
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however, was her counsel’s assertion that she was not “amenable to
military law”—in which case not only would her trial by military
commission have been unlawful, but she also would not have been
subject to Lincoln’s suspension proclamation. No doubt realizing that it
was question-begging to rely on the 1863 suspension, Johnson therefore
added, in his “Indorsement,” that “I do hereby especially suspend this
writ”—that is, the particular writ Judge Wylie had just issued in Mary
Surratt’s case.474 Johnson’s order further directed Hancock to carry out
the sentence upon Surratt as scheduled and to proffer the President’s
order to Judge Wylie in lieu of the detainee herself.475
In retrospect, there were serious reasons to question the validity of
Johnson’s order. For one thing, and as discussed above,476 sections 2 and
3 of the 1863 Habeas Act provided that, notwithstanding any suspension
order by the President, the military was required to notify federal courts
of its detentions, and the courts, in turn, were required to order the
release of prisoners, under specified conditions, if and when the grand
jury failed to indict them. As far as the 1863 decree of Congress was
concerned, then, Surratt and her fellow defendants probably ought to
have been transferred over to the civilian justice system and tried there.
As in many other cases, however, the War Department disregarded those
provisions of the Habeas Act with respect to the Lincoln trial defendants,
based on Joseph Holt’s disingenuous construction of the Act to be
inapposite to such military prisoners477—a reading the Supreme Court
unanimously rejected one year later, in Milligan.478
With respect to the substance of his habeas suspension, Johnson failed
to make any finding, as the 1863 Act (and the Constitution) demanded,
that public safety “required” suspension of the writ in Surratt’s case.479
474. Pitman, supra note 18, at 250 (emphasis added).
475. See id.
476. See supra section I.B.3.a (discussing the 1863 Habeas Act).
477. See supra notes 302–305 (discussing Holt’s narrow interpretation of the 1863
Habeas Act).
478. See infra section III.D (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Milligan).
479. In an impromptu address to Judge Wylie in court that morning, Attorney General
Speed struggled to offer a hamfisted defense of necessity that amounted to nothing much
more than a trite variation on “inter arma enim silent leges”:
It may not be out of order for me to say here that this whole subject has
of course had the most earnest and anxious considerations of the
Executive, and of the war-making power of the government. Everyman,
upon reflection, and particularly every lawyer knows that war cannot be
fought by due process of law, and armies cannot be maintained by the
process of law: there must be armies, there must be battles of war; of war
comes the law of war, and usage permits battles to be fought, permits
human life to be taken without the judgment of the court, and without
the process of the court it permits prisoners to be taken and prisoners to
be held; and your Honor will not undertake to discharge them although
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This crucial lacuna is hardly surprisingly, because Johnson would have
been hard-pressed to defend such a finding. Surratt, after all, was hardly
a danger to the Republic and, in any event, she likely would have
remained in one form of custody or another as higher courts reviewed
Wylie’s writ. (Even in the worst-case scenario, from the government’s perspective, Surratt might eventually have been tried in—and possibly
sentenced by—a civilian court.) The effect of Johnson’s suspension,
then, was merely to expedite her execution—a dubious justification for
invoking the suspension power at all.480
Judge Wylie, however, did not consider these possible objections—
or, in any event, he felt powerless, as a practical matter, to countermand
Johnson’s order, owing to the simple fact that the War Department was
refusing to comply with his command and the hour of execution was at
hand.481 Judge Wylie’s response to the stunning turn of events was terse
and to the point: He ruled that the court had no choice but to “yield[] to
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus from the President of the
United States.”482 “[T]he posse comitatus of his court,” he regretfully
informed Surratt’s attorneys, “was not able to overcome the armies of the
United States under the command of the President.”483
Less than two hours later, beneath a scorching July sun, Mary Surratt
ascended the steps of the hastily built gallows at the Old Arsenal and was
hanged from the neck, alongside Lewis Powell, George Atzerodt, and
David Herold.
the constitution says that human life shall not be taken, or man be
deprived of his liberty or property without due process of law . . . . This
country is now in the midst of a great war, and the Commander-in-Chief
of the armies of the United States was slain in the discharge of his duties,
and if the armies of the United States cannot, under the laws of war,
protect its Commander-in-Chief from assassination, and if the laws and
usages of war cannot protect by military law, its Commander-in-Chief
from assassination and destruction[,] [w]hat has the government come
to?
End of the Assassins, N.Y. Times (July 8, 1865) [hereinafter End of the Assassins, N.Y.
Times], http://www.nytimes.com/1865/07/08/news/end-assassins-execution-mrs-surrattpayne-herrold-atzeroth-their-demeanor.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
480. See Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus in Wartime: From the Tower of London to
Guantanamo Bay 180 (2017).
481. In his address to the court, Attorney General Speed put the point in somewhat
grotesque terms, albeit effectively:
If the government desires to carry out its purpose in regard to the
petitioner, the Court cannot prevent it, and I do not know that it would
be possible ever hereafter to bring the case up for argument on this
court, for if the petitioner be executed as designed, the body cannot be
brought into court, and, therefore, there is an end of the case.
End of the Assassins, N.Y. Times, supra note 479.
482. Id.
483. Clampitt, supra note 460, at 238.
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Aftermath of the execution of (left to right) Mary Surratt, Lewis
Powell, David Herold, and George Atzerodt, outside the
Washington Arsenal, July 7, 1865 (Alexander Gardner) (Source:
Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Civil War
Photographs, LC-DIG-cwpb-04230).

This extraordinary assertion of executive resistance in the teeth of a
judicial order was significant not merely because it determined the fate
of an unusual, celebrated defendant. If Johnson had not “especially”
suspended habeas in Surratt’s case, and if Judge Wylie’s order had
eventually found favor with the Supreme Court, Surratt’s writ would have
cast a legal shadow over the entire Lincoln assassination trial and the
sentences of all the defendants, including the three who were hanged
with her that afternoon.484 More broadly still, it also would have called
into question most of the hundreds or thousands of military tribunals
and sentences over the preceding four years, something the Supreme
Court did not do until the following year, in its decision in Milligan.485
484. Indeed, William Doster, counsel for Paine and Atzerodt, reportedly followed on
the heels of Surratt’s counsel and petitioned for writs on his clients’ behalf that same day,
“but as the writ in the case of Mrs. Surratt had been of no avail, Judge Wylie declined to
issue the writ” on their behalf, as well. President Johnson on Habeas Corpus, in The
Political History of the United States of America During the Period of Reconstruction 260,
260 (Edward McPherson ed., Washington, D.C., Philp & Solomons 1871); see also William
E. Doster, Lincoln and Episodes of the Civil War 256 (1915) (reporting that Surratt “and
other prisoners” applied to Judge Wylie for writs that day).
485. See infra section III.D.
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6. Attorney General Speed’s Legal Opinion. — Recall that back on May 1,
1865, before President Johnson had decided whether to authorize a
military commission, Attorney General Speed issued the shortest formal
opinion in the history of his office, the substance consuming only a
single sentence: “I am of the opinion that the persons charged with the
murder of the President of the United States can be rightfully tried by a
military court.”486 Thereafter, Speed was well aware that the constitutionality of the commission engendered deep skepticism and withering
critique, both inside the courtroom and without. Accordingly, now that
the trial was over and the sentences had been executed, and “[h]aving
given the question propounded the patient and earnest consideration its
magnitude and importance require,”487 he set out to write a more
elaborate defense of the institution he had blessed back in May. His
finished opinion bears the imprecise date “July, 1865.”488
Speed’s opinion began by describing the question presented as
whether the individuals charged “with the offence of having assassinated
the President” could be tried before a military tribunal, “or must they be
tried before a civil court.”489 Of course, the accused before the commission
had not themselves “assassinated” the President; the prosecution claimed
that their culpability for that crime was based on vicarious liability, owing
to the grand conspiracy they were alleged to have joined.490 In its twenty
pages, Speed’s opinion never mentioned the defendants themselves,
their conduct, or, with the exception of one glancing reference,491 the
fact that they were convicted of a conspiracy.
One of the most noteworthy things about Speed’s opinion is that he
did not rely upon some of the more prominent arguments that Holt and
others—including Bingham, during the trial just the month before—had
set forth in defense of military jurisdiction. For example, although Speed
mentioned on the first page of his opinion that “[m]artial law had been

486. Murder of the President, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 215, 215 (1865); see also supra note
382 and accompanying text.
487. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 298 (1865).
488. Id. at 297. (On July 5, Speed wrote Frances Lieber that he was preparing his
opinion on the jurisdiction of the assassins’ military commission and hoping to obtain
Lieber’s “full and free criticism upon it.” Letter from James Speed to Dr. Francis Lieber 1–
2 (July 5, 1865), in Francis Lieber Papers, 1815–1888, The Huntington Library, box 62.
Presumably, then, Speed issued the opinion sometime later in July.)
Once again, Speed’s predecessor, Edward Bates, was unsparing in his criticism of
Speed’s work product. See Diary Entry of Edward Bates (Aug. 21, 1865), in The Diary of
Edward Bates, supra note 249, at 498, 498–503.
489. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. at 297.
490. See supra note 404 (quoting the charge against the conspirators).
491. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. at 298 (“[T]he conspirators not only
may but ought to be tried by a military tribunal.”).
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declared in the District of Columbia,”492 he immediately added that the
civil courts nevertheless were open, held regular sessions, and transacted
business “as in times of peace”;493 accordingly, Speed did not rely upon
martial law, or necessity, as a justification for the military trial.494 Nor did
Speed invoke the formalist, textual argument that Congress’s power to
“make rules for the government of the land and naval forces”495 includes
the power to create military commissions to try persons who are not part
of such forces. To the contrary, he expressly repudiated that argument:
“I do not think that Congress can, in time of war or peace, under this
clause of the Constitution, create military tribunals for the adjudication
of offences committed by persons not engaged in, or belonging to, such
forces. This is a proposition too plain for argument.”496
Speed even went out of his way to express reverence for the constitutional protections of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
without so much as hinting at the argument, often heard in that era, that
such constitutional guarantees are inapplicable in wartime:
These provisions of the Constitution are intended to fling
around the life, liberty, and property of a citizen all the guarantees of a jury trial. These constitutional guarantees cannot be
estimated too highly, or protected too sacredly. The reader of
history knows that for many weary ages the people suffered for
the want of them; it would not only be stupidity but madness in
us not to preserve them. No man has a deeper conviction of
their value or a more sincere desire to preserve and perpetuate
them than I have.497
Accordingly, he wrote, “It must be constantly borne in mind” that
military tribunals “cannot exist except in time of war.” Furthermore,
reasoned Speed, even in times of war such tribunals are impermissible
“where the civil courts are open” . . . with one important exception: to try
“offenders and offences against the laws of war.”498
Speed thereby made a move that the Supreme Court would endorse
many decades later, at least in part, in Ex parte Quirin—concluding that
although military courts are constitutionally dubious, they are permissible in wartime when convened for prosecution of “offences against the
492. Id. at 297. As noted supra notes 429–439 and accompanying text, this assertion
was misleading, at best: There had not been any such declaration of martial law in the
District.
493. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. at 297.
494. In retrospect, this omission is surprising, because Speed and his fellow government attorneys relied almost exclusively on the martial law rationale in defending the
constitutionality of commissions before the Supreme Court several months later in
Milligan. See infra section III.D.
495. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
496. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. at 298.
497. Id. at 311.
498. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
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laws of war.”499 Speed offered many examples of such law-of-war offenses,
such as the rule of distinction, which prohibits the targeting of noncombatants; the injunction against harsh or cruel treatment of prisoners
and the wounded; the requirement to honor flags of surrender; and the
prohibition on breaching terms of surrender.500 Speed was also crystal
clear about the source of the “laws of war” to which he referred—they are
a subset of the international law of nations; indeed, they constituted (at
least at the time) “much the greater part of the law of nations.”501
This left at least two major questions that Speed still had to answer:
What was the source of this constitutional exception for military trials of
offenses against the laws of war? And how, exactly, had Booth’s coconspirators violated that body of international law?
As to the former question, Speed argued that by using the terms
“offenses” rather than “crimes” to describe violations of the law of
nations, the “Define and Punish” Clause of Article I of the Constitution
suggests that such international law violations are not among the
“crimes” to which Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
refer.502 He further suggested that it is the laws of war themselves—
international sources, to be sure, but laws “constitut[ing] a part of the
laws of the land” nevertheless503—that provide the affirmative authority
for the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try violations of the laws of
war, a development that Speed described as “in the interest of justice and
mercy,” to save lives and to prevent cruelty.504
Speed’s argument in this respect was not especially convincing.505
Even assuming Speed was correct concerning a constitutionally permissible
499. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1583–89 (discussing
this aspect of Quirin).
500. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. at 302–04.
501. Id. at 299; see also id. at 300 (“[W]ar is required by the framework of our
Government to be prosecuted according to the known usages of war amongst the civilized
nations of the earth . . . .”); id. at 310 (referring to “the laws and usages of war as
understood and practiced by the civilized nations of the world”); id. at 316 (referencing
the “law of nations”). Speed invoked international historical examples when canvassing
many of the restrictions of the law of war. Id. at 302–04.
502. Id. at 312.
503. Id. at 299.
504. Id. at 305, 308.
505. Speed repeatedly reasoned that the laws of war encourage or even require
military trials of such offenses because the alternative is savage butchery—punishment in
the form of slaughter. Id. at 307–08. Military tribunals therefore “exert a kindly and
benign influence in time of war.” Id. at 309; see also id. at 315–16 (“The object of such
tribunals is obviously intended to save life, and when their jurisdiction is confined to
offences against the laws of war, that is their effect. They prevent indiscriminate slaughter;
they prevent men from being punished or killed upon mere suspicion.”). Speed may have
been correct that the laws of war often insist upon trial rather than summary execution of
detained individuals who have breached those laws. But the alternative to military trials is
not simple butchery of those within the commander’s custody: Such persons can, after all,
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law-of-war jurisdiction of military war tribunals, however, his opinion was
much more opaque on the ultimate question about the Lincoln case
itself: In what way did Booth—or, more to the point, Booth’s alleged
compatriots—violate the international law of war by (allegedly) plotting
to kill Lincoln?
It is tempting to assume, as some often do, that the premeditated killing
of a particular, known individual is, by definition, an “assassination” that
the law of war presumptively forbids, even when the person in question is
a member or leader of enemy forces in an armed conflict.506 Such an
assumption is mistaken, however, as President Barack Obama explained
in a landmark speech he delivered in 2013 at the National Defense
University,507 just across a parking lot from the spot at Fort McNair where
Powell, Atzerodt, Herold, and Surratt were executed for their involvement in the killing of the Commander in Chief of U.S. forces. In that
speech, Obama explained that targeting an operational leader of enemy
forces with lethal force does not, without more, violate international

be detained during hostilities and can be tried in civilian courts for any crimes they
committed. (Indeed, the general rule under the law of war is that prisoners, like other
persons who are hors de combat, may not be harmed.) Nor, contrary to Speed’s suggestion,
does the law of war affirmatively authorize the use of military, rather than civilian,
tribunals in a particular state’s legal system. The law of nations is generally indifferent as to
the civilian or military nature of the tribunal a state may choose to use. At one point in his
opinion, Speed claimed that “it would be . . . palpably wrong for the military to hand [lawof-war offenders] over to the civil courts.” Id. at 317. He did not defend that proposition,
however, and the “wrongness” of civilian trials of law-of-war violations is certainly not
“palpable,” at least not today. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012) (providing that certain
war crimes committed by U.S. nationals are criminal offenses, which are triable in Article
III courts).
506. See, e.g., Stephen Carter, The Violence of Peace: America’s Wars in the Age of
Obama 74 (2011). “[T]he [Obama] Administration does not like this word,” writes Carter,
“but, to paraphrase one of my wisest professors, you can call it Thucydides or you can call
it bananas, but it’s assassination all the same.” Id. at 80. Carter thus assumes that such a
targeted killing by the United States of a leader of enemy forces not only violates
customary law, id. at 74, and the so-called “plain language” of Article 23(b) of the 1907
Hague Convention (which Carter misquotes as prohibiting “assassination,” although that
term does not appear in Article 23), id., but that it also must violate section 2.11 of
Executive Order 12,333, entitled “United States Intelligence Activities,” 46 Fed. Reg.
59,941, 59,952 (Dec. 4, 1981), which provides that “[n]o person employed by or acting on
behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in,
assassination.” Carter is simply mistaken, however: Such a targeted killing might be
colloquially referred to as an “assassination,” but it is not an “assassination” as that term is
understood in international law or in Executive Order 12,333. See Marty Lederman, The
U.S. Perspective on the Legal Basis for the Bin Laden Operation, Opinio Juris (May 24,
2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/24/the-us-perspective-on-the-legal-basis-for-the-binladen-operation/ [http://perma.cc/2D5E-QZPH].
507. See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University
(May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-presidentnational-defense-university [http://perma.cc/M7RA-RSR4].
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law.508 Indeed, the law of war would in the ordinary course privilege such a
killing of the leader of enemy forces, in the sense of immunizing
members of state armed forces from culpability for what would otherwise
be murder under the victim state’s domestic law.509
If that is right, then why did Attorney General Speed conclude that
the individuals who were tried and executed just a couple of hundred
yards from where Obama spoke had committed a law-of-war offense?
One possible theory might have been premised, not on the fact that
Booth targeted the Union Army’s Commander in Chief, a legitimate military target, but instead on virtually the converse concern—namely, that
the targets of the plot described in the charge included two civilian
officers, Vice President Johnson and Secretary of State Seward.510 Today,
it would likely violate the law-of-war principle of distinction for a member
of a state army to deliberately target such civilians (at least to the extent
they were not directly participating in the armed conflict),511 and such
conduct almost certainly would have been considered a violation in 1865,
as well.512 Indeed, just one year before Lincoln’s killing, a rumored Union
plot to destroy Richmond and to kill the entire Confederate cabinet
engendered great controversy because of the widespread understanding
that such a scheme would have violated settled norms of civilized warfare.513
508. See id.
509. See Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. at 305–06 (referring to the
combatant’s privilege); see also, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
art. 43(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 4 [hereinafter API] (“Members of the armed forces
of a Party to a conflict . . . are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate
directly in hostilities.”); Lieber Code, supra note 212, art. 57, at 258 (“So soon as a man is
armed by a sovereign government, and takes the soldier’s oath of fidelity, he is a
belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts, are no individual crimes or
offences.”); Jens David Ohlin, The Combatant’s Privilege in Asymmetric and Covert
Conflicts, 40 Yale J. Int’l L. 337, 342–43 (2015) (challenging the view that the combatant’s
privilege does not apply to noninternational armed conflicts).
510. See supra note 404 (quoting from the charge).
511. See, e.g., API, supra note 509, art. 51(2) (“The civilian population as such, as well
as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”).
512. See Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. at 302 (“Non-combatants are not to
be disturbed or interfered with by the armies of either party except in extreme cases.”).
513. In March 1864, Confederate soldiers claimed to have found on the body of a slain
Union officer, Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, papers directing forces under his command to
burn Richmond to the ground and to slaughter President Jefferson Davis and his entire
cabinet “on the spot.” See Duane Schultz, The Dahlgren Affair: Terror and Conspiracy in
the Civil War 144–45, 152–57 (1998); see also Letter from Gen. R.E. Lee to Major Gen.
George G. Meade (Apr. 1, 1864), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. I, vol. 33, at 178,
178–79 (enclosing documents allegedly found on Dahlgren’s body). This naturally caused
great consternation in the South, because such a plot would, at the very least, have violated
well-established chivalric norms. Union Army General George Mead assured Robert E.
Lee, however, that “neither the United States Government, myself, nor General Kilpatrick
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Speed did not, however, invoke this theory, either, presumably
because Booth and his cohorts were not part of the Confederate forces
and therefore could not have violated the law-of-war norm that prohibits
combatants from deliberately targeting civilians. To the contrary, Speed’s
opinion might be read to suggest, at least implicitly, that the accused
violated the law of war precisely because they were not members of the
Confederate forces at the time of their conduct.514 At several places,
Speed asserted that certain unprivileged forms of belligerency in wartime—
such as killing without a commission from the state;515 “unit[ing] with
banditti, jayhawkers, guerillas, or any other unauthorized marauders”;516
spying;517 and even communicating with the enemy518—are themselves
offenses against the law of nations. In this respect Speed fundamentally
misunderstood the law of war—in particular, the critical distinction
between belligerency that violates that law (such as targeting civilians or
torture), and belligerent acts that international law does not prohibit but
that the law of war also does not privilege (i.e., belligerent conduct that can
be punished pursuant to a state’s domestic law).519 As we have seen with

[Dahlgren’s commander] authorized, sanctioned, or approved the burning of the city of
Richmond and the killing of Mr. Davis and cabinet, nor any other act not required by
military necessity and in accordance with the usages of war.” Letter from Major Gen.
George G. Meade to Gen. R. E. Lee (Apr. 17, 1864), in Official Records, supra note 156,
ser. I, vol. 33, at 180, 180.
514. Lewis Powell had previously been in the Confederate Army, and spent some time
as a Union prisoner, but he deserted from the army in January 1865 and had taken an
oath of allegiance to the United States. During the trial, his counsel argued that his
conduct—the attack on Secretary of State Seward—was morally indistinguishable from
that of “the best rebel soldiers,” who had themselves “picked off high officers of the
government.” Pitman, supra note 18, at 310. Whatever the moral merits of that somewhat
desperate plea might have been, Powell’s conduct differed from that of the rebel soldiers
in question in at least two important legal respects: Most fundamentally, Powell was no
longer a member of the Confederate Army, acting within the chain of command; thus the
combatant’s privilege no longer protected him from an attempted murder prosecution
under U.S. law. Second, he attacked not “the chief of the enemy,” id. at 311, but instead a
civilian officer (Seward)—conduct that is presumptively a violation of the law of war when
committed by enemy forces. (Powell’s counsel tried to justify the attack on Seward by
describing the Secretary as “an adviser in oppression, and a slippery advocate of an
irrepressible conflict.” Id. It is unclear, even today, whether such a military advice
function, performed by a civilian official, would make that official a permissible target of a
state’s armed forces.).
515. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. at 301.
516. Id. at 312.
517. Id. at 312–13.
518. Id. at 312.
519. See, e.g., Richard R. Baxter, So-called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies,
Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 323, 339–40 (1951); Marty Lederman,
Unprivileged Does Not Mean Prohibited, Just Security (Sept. 26, 2013), http://
www.justsecurity.org/1153/unprivilegedunlawful/ [http://perma.cc/A4RY-C3X8].
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respect to a similar conflation in the Lieber Code,520 this was and is a
common mistake—indeed, one the Supreme Court itself later committed
in Quirin.521
This error probably was not of great consequence for Speed’s
opinion itself, however, because the Attorney General never did quite
come out and argue that the Lincoln conspirators violated any of those
alleged law-of-war prohibitions on unprivileged belligerency. Instead, at
the very end of his opinion, Speed suggested a different theory for why
Booth “and his associates” had violated the law of war: by virtue of the
fact that they were “secret active public enemies.”522 Citing the great lawof-war theorist Emer de Vattel, Speed intimated that what made Booth’s
killing of Lincoln an “assassination” that violated the law of nations
rather than an ordinary domestic-law murder was a combination of two
things: (i) that Booth acted as a “public foe”—that is, with the objective
of harming the state as such (rather than, e.g., for private gain); and (ii)
that the killing of Lincoln was “treacherous.”523
The first factor—Booth’s motive to harm the state—does not
establish a law-of-war offense: After all, that is what enemy soldiers try to
do every day, and it does not violate the law of war. But what about the
alleged “treacherous” nature of the killing? Treachery is, indeed, a
violation of the law of war. The most familiar variant of the offense of
treachery is what we know today as perfidy. Not all secret attacks in war
are perfidious, however, and Booth’s was not. Perfidy requires a
particular form of deceit (not simply stealth)—namely, the feigning of a
protected status under the law of war in order to induce the deceived
party to forebear its own use of force, and thereby to gain an advantage
that empowers the deceiving party to attack the deceived party. The modern formulation of the offense is described in Article 37(1) of Protocol I
to the Geneva Conventions:
It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort
to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead
him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord,
protection under the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall
constitute perfidy.524
Article 37(1) offers examples of perfidious conduct, including, of most
pertinence, “the feigning of civilian . . . status.”525 Importantly, however,
520. See supra section I.A.2 (discussing the Lieber Code’s theory of alleged violations
of the “laws of war”).
521. See infra section V.A.
522. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. at 316 (emphasis added).
523. Id. at 316 (quoting 3 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations ch. 8, § 155, at 559
(Béla Kapossy & R. Whatmore eds., 2008)).
524. API, supra note 509, art. 37(1).
525. Id.
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a feigned civilian status is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish an
unlawful perfidious killing—at least not under modern formulations of
the prohibition. What is required, in addition, is proof that the victim
target exercised forbearance because of the killer’s feigned civilian—that is,
protected—status, thereby enabling the fatal attack to occur.526
There is no reason to believe—and neither Speed nor the prosecution argued—that Booth’s killing of Lincoln was perfidious. There was
no evidence, for instance, that Booth was able to enter the President’s
box in Ford’s Theatre by deceiving Army officers into thinking that he
was an ordinary civilian rather than a part of enemy forces.527 Indeed,
Booth was a civilian, not a member of the Confederate Army. He didn’t
feign any status at all, let alone induce reliance by the Union Army on
any such feigned status.
It appears, then, that Speed must instead have been referring to
another, less familiar variant of “treachery,” distinct from perfidy. The
Attorney General’s citation to Vattel is telling. Vattel opined, in the
passage of his treatise Speed cited, that it would be an impermissible
“treacherous murder,” “contrary to the law of nature,” for one
belligerent party to “hir[e] a traitor to assassinate our enemy,” including, in
particular, a “subject[] of the party whom we cause to be assassinated.”528
This particular ancient corner of the customary law of treachery—a
prohibition on inducing or soliciting an enemy’s subject to kill his
leader—does not appear often, if at all, in modern codes. Yet perhaps it
was understandable for Speed to refer to it. Vattel, after all, did describe
it, as did one of the leading international law treatises of the day, written
by the esteemed international law scholar Henry Halleck, who was also
General in Chief of the Union Armies during the war.529 This obscure
526. See generally Sean Watts, Law-of-War Perfidy, 219 Mil. L. Rev. 106 (2014). As
Professor Watts explains, the law of perfidy was more indistinct, and less well-settled, in the
nineteenth century and typically was focused on the idea that it was impermissible to
breach “good faith” in a way that was inconsistent with chivalric norms of honor. Id. at
125–34. Nevertheless, the modern idea of the prohibition was present, at least in nascent
form. See, e.g, Lieber Code, supra note 212, art. 117, at 268 (“It is justly considered an act
of bad faith, of infamy or fiendishness, to deceive the enemy by flags of protection.”).
527. Lincoln was not protected by a military guard on the evening of April 14. See
Kauffman, American Brutus, supra note 11, at 393 (“Mr. Lincoln had never been guarded
in the theater before, and if anyone had suggested he be accompanied by guards on Good
Friday, he undoubtedly would have rejected the idea.”). Of course, others in Ford’s
Theatre that evening, including off-duty officers, paid Booth no mind precisely because he
was a well-known actor who did not appear to be doing anything out of the ordinary.
Presumably someone in the vicinity, even if not Army personnel, might have tried to
interdict Booth had he revealed his true intentions—what Speed called his role as a
“public foe”—upon entering the theater. But that fact does not establish that the killing
was in violation of the law of war.
528. Vattel, supra note 523, ch. 8, § 155, at 559.
529. Halleck, International Law, supra note 157, ch. XVI, § 20, at 400.
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subset of the law of treachery described the conduct implied in the first
part of the charge against the Lincoln defendants: Recall that they were
accused of “traitorously” “combining, confederating, and conspiring”
with not only Booth and John Surratt, but also with Jefferson Davis and
other Confederate officers and agents, “to kill and murder” Lincoln,
Johnson, Seward, and Grant.530
That charge, to be sure, might have suggested a violation of the lawof-war prohibition on treachery, as described by Vattel, committed by
Davis and the other Confederate officers. Even on this theory, however, it is
difficult to see how the actual defendants before the military commission
might have committed a law-of-war violation (nor did Speed even try to
establish the case against them). After all, they were the disloyal subjects
who allegedly agreed to betray Lincoln, rather than the enemies who
induced such subjects to betrayal.531 Moreover, the prosecution introduced very little evidence—as to some of the defendants, none at all—
that the accused themselves (as opposed to Booth and John Surratt) were
induced to act by Confederate officers and agents. Speed was, therefore,
almost certainly wrong in his assumption that the defendants had
violated the international law of war.
Most importantly for present purposes, however, even if Speed were
correct that some or all of the alleged conspirators were charged with lawof-war violations of an attempted “treacherous killing” by virtue of the
alleged Confederate inducement, it would only mean—per the Court’s
later decision in Quirin—that the military commission had constitutional
jurisdiction to try the defendants for those law-of-war violations. But to the
extent the defendants were also charged with domestic-law offenses, such
as a “traitorous” killing and a conspiracy, Speed’s opinion did not establish
the commission’s proper jurisdiction—indeed, he did not endeavor to
do so. To the contrary, Speed opined that where civil courts are open,
military tribunals “cannot exist except in time of war” to try “offenders
and offences against the [international] laws of war.”532
* * *

530. See supra note 404 (quoting from the charge).
531. Vattel wrote that the attempted killing by the induced subject would be
“infamous and execrable, both in him who executes and in him who commands it.” Vattel,
supra note 523, ch. 8, § 155, at 559. But Vattel did not say directly whether the disloyal
subject (as opposed to the enemy inducer) would thereby violate the law of war. Halleck,
to similar effect, characterized famous cases of killings by disloyal subjects as “infamous
and execrable” and added that the “detestation of the civilized world is not confined to
the perpetrators of such acts; those who command, encourage, countenance, or reward
them, are equally execrated.” Halleck, International Law, supra note 157, ch. XVI, § 20, at
400. Like Vattel, however, Halleck did not specify whether the subjects who were induced
to kill their leader would thereby violate international law.
532. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 309 (1865).
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In sum, Attorney General Speed’s post hoc opinion, whatever its
flaws, actually undermined rather than supported the notion that military commissions can be used to try wartime defendants for offenses other
than violations of the international law of war. Moreover, almost all of
the arguments offered by the prosecution during the assassins’ trial itself
do not withstand scrutiny, and the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
principal such argument shortly thereafter, in Milligan.
III. AFTER THE WAR: MILLIGAN AND ITS AFTERMATH
The end of the war did not mean that the question of the
constitutionality of military adjudication dissipated—to the contrary, in
the first few years after the Lincoln assassination trial, all three branches
of the federal government had repeated opportunities to consider the
question afresh, without the exigencies of war pressing upon them and in
circumstances in which emotions were not nearly so charged as in the
weeks after the killing of the President. Both the executive branch and
the judiciary took significant steps to repudiate the wartime practices of
Stanton and Holt’s War Department. Congress, by contrast, which had
pushed back on military jurisdiction during the war itself, now took steps
to empower the military, not so much due to a change of heart about the
past but instead in order to facilitate Reconstruction. Remarkably,
throughout these years of intense attention to the constitutional
question, the trial of the assassination conspirators, so fresh in everyone’s
mind, played virtually no role—from all that appears, it had already
come to be viewed as an idiosyncratic outlier or aberration, rather than a
signal event that might shed light on the pressing constitutional question.
A.

Precursor to Milligan: The Coles County Riot and Justice Davis’s Advice to
Lincoln

The most significant postwar assessment of the constitutional
question was, of course, the Supreme Court’s 1866 decision in Milligan.533
That decision, however, was presaged by a less well-known case—one
that, like Vallandigham and Milligan itself, also involved Northern resistance to the Union war effort.
After Clement Vallandigham’s exile, factions of the so-called “Peace
Democrats,” or “Copperheads,” began to form secret societies across the
Midwest, some of which became, in effect, military arms of the Northern
antiwar movement, which engaged in sporadic violent interventions designed to weaken the Union Army.534 By early 1864, they called themselves

533. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
534. See Charles H. Coleman & Paul H. Spence, The Charleston Riot, March 28, 1864,
33 J. Ill. St. Hist. Soc’y 7, 10–11 (1940).
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the Sons of Liberty; Vallandigham was (nominally) their Supreme
Commander.535
On March 28, 1864, a riot between Union soldiers on leave and a
band of Peace Democrats broke out at a courthouse in Charleston,
Illinois.536 Six soldiers and three civilians were killed.537 A grand jury in
Coles County returned indictments for murder and riot against several of
those alleged to have targeted Union soldiers in the fight.538 It was
military, rather than civilian, authorities, however, who rounded up and
arrested sixteen individuals (only some of whom had been indicted by
the grand jury).539 In his report to Washington on the riot and the
arrests, Lieutenant Colonel James Oakes wrote that “I fear it would be
useless to turn [the detainees] over for trial by the civil tribunals,
whether State or Federal, to whose jurisdiction they would belong”;
instead, “[p]rompt and vigorous dealing by military law could not fail to
be of salutary and lasting effect.”540 A military commission for the case
was presently appointed, which was to sit in Cincinnati.541
Counsel for the prisoners filed a request for a writ of habeas corpus
in the Fourth Circuit federal court in Illinois, seeking to be discharged
from military custody.542 A pair of jurists—Judge Samuel Treat and
Supreme Court Justice David Davis—granted the writ.543 Davis was a
longtime friend of the President—he effectively managed Lincoln’s
campaign in 1860—and they had both practiced in the Coles County
courthouse where the riot occurred.544 In 1862, Lincoln appointed Davis
to serve on the Supreme Court.545 In 1864, however, the President
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the alleged
Charleston rioters—in other words, he authorized the military to
disregard Justice Davis’s discharge order—and the judges therefore had

535. Id.
536. See generally Peter J. Barry, The Charleston Riot and Its Aftermath: Civil,
Military, and Presidential Responses, 7 J. Ill. Hist. 82 (2004) [hereinafter Barry, The
Charleston Riot]; Coleman & Spence, supra note 534, at 22–30.
537. Coleman & Spence, supra note 534, at 29.
538. Id. at 43.
539. Id. at 37–39.
540. Report from Lieutenant Colonel James Oakes to Colonel James B. Fry (Apr. 18,
1864), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. I, vol. 32, pt. 1, at 630, 633.
541. Barry, The Charleston Riot, supra note 536, at 91.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 92.
544. See Peter J. Barry, “I’ll Keep Them in Prison Awhile . . .”: Abraham Lincoln and
David Davis on Civil Liberties in Wartime, J. Abraham Lincoln Ass’n, Winter 2007, at 20,
20–21 & n.1 (2007) [hereinafter Barry, Civil Liberties in Wartime]; see also Barry, The
Charleston Riot, supra note 536, at 93 (discussing Lincoln and Davis’s friendship and
correspondence).
545. Barry, Civil Liberties in Wartime, supra note 544, at 20.
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no choice but to dismiss the case, paving the way for a military
adjudication.546
Even though he had undermined the court’s jurisdiction, apparently
Lincoln was concerned about the case, because on July 2 he wrote to
Justice Davis, asking for his views on it.547 Justice Davis promptly wrote
back that he would “very cheerfully give you my impression of the case,”
which was, quite simply, that the government “ought not to have taken
these men out of the hands of the law.”548 Presaging what the Court
would later do in Milligan (in an opinion that he himself would write),
Justice Davis focused mainly on section 2 of the 1863 Habeas Act549:
Because the Secretary of War had failed to furnish a list of the detainees
to the court, they were entitled to be discharged from military custody
once the local grand jury had adjourned (which it had done after issuing
indictments in the case).550 For the military to continue to hold them,
explained Justice Davis, was not only “oppression” but also a violation of
the “purpose and intention of the act of Congress.”551 In addition to the
statutory problem, Davis also noted that although the prisoners might
have committed horrible crimes, they had not violated any federal law,
and certainly could not be “tried by military law” because they had
“violated no military law.”552
Davis apparently persuaded Lincoln. The President decided that the
prisoners should not be subject to military jurisdiction. Although he
delayed issuing his order until November 4,553 some of the prisoners were
eventually transferred to the civilian justice system and the others were
released before any military trial could take place.554
B.

Meanwhile, in Indiana (Early Developments in the Milligan Case)

Contemporaneous with Davis’s exchange with Lincoln in July 1864,
a number of leaders of the Sons of Liberty hatched a plan to release
Confederate prisoners from Army camps throughout the Midwest and
546. See Report from Major Addison A. Hosmer to President Abraham Lincoln ( July
26, 1864), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. I, vol. 32, pt. 1, at 635, 643 (referring to
the “express order” of the President that the writ be disregarded and the prisoners
retained by the military).
547. Barry, Civil Liberties in Wartime, supra note 544, at 23.
548. Letter from Justice David Davis to President Abraham Lincoln ( July 4, 1864),
reprinted in Barry, Civil Liberties in Wartime, supra note 544, at 27, 28.
549. See supra notes 292–293 and accompanying text (quoting section 2 of the 1863
Habeas Act).
550. Letter from David Davis to Abraham Lincoln, supra note 548, at 29.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 28.
553. Order of President Lincoln (Nov. 4. 1864), in Official Records, supra note 156,
ser. I, vol. 32, pt. 1, at 643, 643.
554. See Barry, The Charleston Riot, supra note 536, at 98–103.
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arm them with weapons seized from government arsenals.555 The government, however, had a source on the inside and interdicted the plan
before it became operational, arresting several of the participants, including Lambdin Milligan, a prominent Indiana lawyer. The detainees
were charged with five vaguely identified offenses before a military
commission: conspiracy against the government; affording aid to rebels;
inciting insurrection; disloyal practices; and an alleged “violation of the
laws of war,” namely, endeavoring to aid the enemy “while pretending to
be peaceable loyal citizens of the United States.”556 The commission found
four of the defendants guilty and sentenced three of them (Milligan,
William Bowles, and Steven Horsey) to hang.557
One of the condemned’s counsel, who knew Lincoln well, met with
the President and asked him to review the case. Reportedly, at their
meeting the President identified “errors and imperfections” in the
record that required correction—a process, Lincoln noted with a “pleased
expression,” that would take a considerable amount of time, by which
point the war might well be over, thus mooting out the case.558 This is yet
further evidence that the President was uncomfortable with the legality
of the commissions559—or, at a minimum, that Lincoln was not eager to
press the point or to tee up the question to the Supreme Court, especially
given Justice Davis’s warnings that the Court would likely declare the
tribunals to be unlawful.
After Lincoln was killed, however, his successor had no such qualms.
Johnson approved the verdicts against Milligan, Bowles, and Horsey on
May 2, the day after he established the Lincoln assassination commission,
and execution was set for May 19, in the midst of the assassination trial.560
On May 10, just as the assassination trial was getting underway, Milligan’s
counsel filed a habeas petition in a circuit court in Indianapolis.561
As in the 1864 Coles County case, Justice Davis was one of the two
judges who considered the petition; and, once again, Justice Davis
(joined by the other judge, District Judge David McDonald) wrote an
extraordinary letter to the President.562 The judges explained to Johnson
that it was their “duty as your friends, as judicial officers, and as citizens,
555. See The Milligan Case, supra note 34, at 68–69 (reporting the third and fourth
specifications of the first charge in the military commission proceeding).
556. See id. at 67–73.
557. See id. at 81–82.
558. Herndon & Weik, Abraham Lincoln, supra note 255, at 267 n.* (recounting the
statement of Joseph E. McDonald to Herndon on August 28, 1888).
559. See supra section I.B.2.
560. See The Milligan Case, supra note 34, at 39.
561. See id. at 40.
562. Letter from Justice David Davis and Judge David McDonald to President Andrew
Johnson (May 11, 1865), in Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, supra note 247, at
197, 197–99.
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in all good faith and good will to lay [these] suggestions before you.”563 It
would be a “safe and wise policy,” they explained, not to execute the
prisoners until the judicial challenges were completed: “We would most
respectfully but earnestly urge the wisdom and justice of giving [the
prisoners] time to be heard before [the Supreme Court],” because if
they were executed and then the Court were to hold that the tribunal was
without jurisdiction, it would be a “stain on the national character,” and
“the government would be justly chargeable with lawless oppression.”564
Although purporting not to express an opinion on the merits, the judges
pointedly added that the military commission “is a new tribunal
unknown to the Common Law” and that “[t]here is no denying the fact
that many learned lawyers doubt its jurisdiction over citizens
unconnected with the military, as these men were”—a fairly audacious
suggestion, in light of the fact that Johnson had recently authorized the
Lincoln assassination trial that was just then commencing.565
Just as before, the judges’ letter had its intended effect: Later that
month, Johnson commuted the sentences to life at hard labor.566
Meanwhile, the two judges certified that they were split on the merits of
the habeas petition, a result that arguably permitted a form of
certification of the merits questions to the Supreme Court.567 The Court
did not hear argument in Milligan, however, until March of 1866, long
after the Lincoln assassination trial ended.568
C.

What to Do with Jefferson Davis?

May 10, 1865, was an auspicious day, owing to a confluence of three
distinct, watershed events related to military justice at the end of the Civil
War. The accused in the Lincoln assassination proceeding were arraigned before the new military commission. Lambdin Milligan filed his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the jurisdiction of the
military commission that had convicted him. And, perhaps most
important of all, Union Army forces captured Confederate President
Jefferson Davis in Irwin County, Georgia.
A few days earlier, President Johnson had publicly offered a $100,000
reward for Davis’s capture, so that he could “be brought to trial . . . to the
end that justice may be done.”569 In his call for capture, Johnson alleged:
563. Id. at 198.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 199.
567. Id. at 199–200.
568. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 4 (1866).
569. President Andrew Johnson, Proclamation 131—Rewards for the Arrest of
Jefferson Davis and Others (May 2, 1865), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=72356 [http://perma.cc/9BJP-GQEH].
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[E]vidence [exists] in the Bureau of Military Justice, that the
atrocious murder of the late President, Abraham Lincoln, and
the attempted assassination of the Hon. William H. Seward,
Secretary of State, were incited, concerted, and procured by and
between Jefferson Davis, . . . and other rebels and traitors
against the Government of the United States, harbored in
Canada.570
Indeed, the charges in the pending Lincoln conspirators’ military commission even alleged that the eight accused individuals had conspired with
Davis and other Confederate officials to kill the President.571 In theory,
therefore, Davis might have been joined to the pending trial proceedings
in the Old Arsenal. Instead, the military held Davis as a prisoner of war,
so that Johnson could decide how to deal with him after the Lincoln trial
ended.572
In the conspirators’ trial, the prosecution’s case for Davis’s involvement with the assassination turned out to be far more uncertain than
Holt and Stanton had promised; and in the months that followed, the
case became flimsier still, as one witness after another was revealed to be
duplicitous.573 The prospect of trying Davis for Lincoln’s murder—or
some law-of-war offense related to the killing574—therefore rapidly
dissipated. In any event, Johnson was inclined to try Davis for treason, in
order to demonstrate to the nation that the secession itself was an
inexcusable criminal act. Johnson’s Cabinet, however, was deeply split on
the question of whether to try Davis and, if so, whether the trial should
be in a civilian or a military tribunal.575

570. Id.
571. See supra note 404 (quoting from the charge).
572. See Case of Jefferson Davis, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 411, 413 (1866).
573. See, e.g., Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 217–18. Secretary
Stanton even asked Francis Lieber to scour the Confederate archives to find evidence of
Davis’s complicity in the Lincoln killing or in other violations of the laws of war. That
effort came to naught. See Witt, supra note 41, at 319–20.
574. See supra notes 528–532 and accompanying text (discussing Speed’s theory of
treachery-by-inducement).
575. The cabinet debates are detailed in Diary of Gideon Welles, supra note 359, at
335–39, and nicely summarized in Cynthia Nicoletti, Secession on Trial: The Treason
Prosecution of Jefferson Davis 33–36 (2017); see also Witt, supra note 41, at 318. Francis
Lieber himself concluded—and probably advised cabinet officials with whom he was
meeting in Washington that July—that a military trial was inadvisable, in part because the
people had become “jealous” of military trials (perhaps owing to the taint of the Lincoln
assassination proceeding), in part because Davis had “committed plain, broad and wide
treason, and trying him for any special military crime (or rather for a crime at the
common law of war,) would [be] avoiding the main question,” and also because such a
choice would “look like a positive distrust in our law as it stands.” Memorandum from
Francis Lieber to James Speed 1–2 (July 15, 1865), in Francis Lieber Papers, Johns
Hopkins Univ., Sheridan Libraries, Special Collections, MS71, box 2, folder 33; see also
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Finally, on January 6, 1866—just six months after his opinion on the
assassination commission and in the shadow of the upcoming arguments
in Milligan—Attorney General Speed formally advised that it would be
unconstitutional to try Davis in a military court for “high treason”576 and
thus that the military was obliged to transfer him to civil custody.577
Speed’s opinion appeared to presage the Court’s decision several months
later in Milligan: He did not so much as entertain the notion that
“martial law” or “necessity” might justify a military trial of Davis for a
domestic-law crime (treason), even though he found that a “state of war
still exist[ed].”578 After Speed’s decision, a grand jury returned a treason
indictment against Davis.579 A “series of maddening obstacles” precluded
the case from going forward, however.580 Eventually, Davis was released
on bail,581 was indicated a second time,582 and then, in December 1868,
was subject to Johnson’s blanket pardon and amnesty for the offense of
treason for all those who participated in the insurrection or rebellion.583
The President of the Confederacy never stood trial.584

Frank Freidel, Francis Lieber: Nineteenth Century Liberal 369–70 (1971) (describing
Lieber’s involvement with cabinet officials that July).
576. Case of Jefferson Davis, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. at 411–12.
577. Id. at 413.
578. Id. at 411. Speed mentioned in passing that if Davis had been tried and convicted
for offenses against the laws of war, as Speed’s opinion of the previous July suggested he
might have been, he could remain in military custody. Id. at 413. But Speed’s opinion
appeared to assume that no law-of-war offense could be proved, and therefore a civilian
treason trial was the only prosecutorial option. Speed’s reasoning in this January 1866
opinion—that Davis could in theory be tried for law-of-war offenses in a military court but
not for the domestic-law offense of treason—was consistent with his Lincoln trial opinion
from the preceding July, yet it contradicted what Speed himself would write several weeks
later in the government’s brief in Milligan, see infra notes 615–616 and accompanying text
(quoting the government’s brief in Milligan), namely, that military jurisdiction could be
predicated only on martial law and that such tribunals could not try law-of-war offenses.
Even after Speed’s opinion, Joseph Holt continued to advocate for a military trial,
see Letter from J. Holt, Judge Advocate Gen., to E.M. Stanton, Sec’y of War (Mar. 20,
1866), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 8, at 890, 891; but by this point his
pleas were to no avail.
579. See Nicoletti, supra note 575, at 164–66.
580. Witt, supra note 41, at 321.
581. See Nicoletti, supra note 575, at 187–89.
582. See id. at 266–68.
583. Id. at 300; see also President Andrew Johnson, Proclamation No. 179—Granting
Full Pardon and Amnesty for the Offense of Treason Against the United States During the
Late Civil War (Dec. 25, 1868), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72360 [http://
perma.cc/4WMV-CE7J].
584. See Witt, supra note 41, at 319–24.
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D. The Supreme Court Finally Weighs In—The Milligan Case
The transcripts of the records in the Milligan case were not all filed
in the Supreme Court until early 1866.585 The Court allotted three hours
apiece for oral argument to seven lawyers in the case and heard argument over the course of six days in March 1866.586
On April 2, 1866, President Johnson declared the insurrection—the
Civil War—to be at an end in all of the Confederate states other than
Texas.587 That declaration suggested that the justification for military
tribunals therefore had expired.588 The very next day, the Court issued its
preliminary, summary decision in Milligan, sustaining the prisoners’
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court briefly stated that Milligan
and his codefendants “ought to be discharged from custody” pursuant to
the Habeas Act of March 1863589 and that the military commission “had
no jurisdiction legally to try and sentence [them].”590 The Court
promised to issue its opinions in due course, which it finally did at the
start of its next term, on December 17, 1866.591 The author of the
majority opinion was none other than David Davis. Not surprisingly, his
opinion reflected the advice he had offered to Lincoln, regarding both
the 1863 Habeas Act and the Constitution, in relation to the Coles County
prisoners two years earlier.592

585. See Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, supra note 247, at 200.
586. Id.
587. President Andrew Johnson, Proclamation No. 153—Declaring the Insurrection in
Certain Southern States to Be at an End (Apr. 2, 1866), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=71987 [http://perma.cc/H4XC-EA86].
588. See id. (“[M]ilitary tribunals . . . are in time of peace dangerous to public liberty,
incompatible with the individual rights of the citizen, contrary to the genius and spirit of
our free institutions, and exhaustive of the national resources, and ought not, therefore,
to be sanctioned . . . except in cases of actual necessity . . . .”). Four weeks later, after the
Supreme Court issued its judgment in Milligan, the War Department issued a follow-up
order clarifying that “hereafter, whenever offenses committed by civilians are to be tried
where civil tribunals are in existence which can try them, their cases are not authorized to
be, and will not be, brought before military courts-martial or commissions, but will be
committed to the proper civil authorities.” Executive Order—General Orders: 26—Order
in Relation to Trials by Military Courts and Commissions (May 1, 1866), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=71996 [http://perma.cc/7ZXQ-L84C].
589. See supra section I.B.3.a (discussing the Act).
590. The Milligan Case, supra note 34, at 224.
591. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). The opinions were not published in
full until two weeks later, on January 1, 1867. See The Milligan Case, supra note 34, at 47.
592. See supra notes 548–552 and accompanying text (discussing the correspondence
between Lincoln and Davis regarding the legality of subjecting the Coles County prisoners
to military jurisdiction).
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Details of the Milligan briefs, the fascinating oral arguments, and the
Court’s resolution are well recounted elsewhere.593 For present purposes,
three aspects of the case are most salient.
First, the petitioners argued not only that the military commission
violated Article III and the Sixth Amendment but also that Milligan was
entitled to his freedom by virtue of section 2 of the 1863 Habeas Act.594
The government’s response to this statutory argument was simply to
repeat Joseph Holt’s unconvincing construction of the Act—that is, that
it did not cover the case of prisoners subject to military trial.595 The Court
unanimously rejected that construction; it held that Milligan and the
others were entitled to release under the 1863 Act.596 As Chief Justice
Chase explained, the statutory question wasn’t even close:
[T]he act seems to have been framed on purpose to secure the
trial of all offences of citizens by civil tribunals, in states where
these tribunals were not interrupted in the regular exercise of
their functions . . . . [Its] provisions obviously contemplate no
other trial or sentence than that of a civil court, and we could
not assert the legality of a trial and sentence by a military
commission, under the circumstances specified in the act and
described in the petition, without disregarding the plain
directions of Congress.597
Second, the government did not so much as mention the Lincoln
assassination commission, let alone rely upon it as relevant precedent,
although it must have been evident to all concerned that the Court’s
decision respecting the Milligan commission would likely be seen as a
judgment upon the legitimacy of the Lincoln tribunal, as well. The
government’s avoidance of the Lincoln case presumably reflected the
fact that David Dudley Field was right: Although that proceeding had
ended less than one year earlier and had gripped the nation, it had
already become something of an embarrassment, at least in legal
circles—a trial that was widely thought to be “of questionable legality.”598
593. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Waging War: The Clash Between Presidents and
Congress, 1776 to ISIS 161–69 (2016); Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, supra note
247, at 200–14; Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy
Combatants, and Congressional Authorization, in Presidential Power Stories 93, 93–132
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
594. See Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 59 (argument of James Garfield on behalf of the
petitioner); Brief for Petitioner at 8, Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (No. 350).
595. See Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 21 (argument for the United States); Brief for
the United States at 14, Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (No. 350) [hereinafter Brief for the
United States, Ex parte Milligan]; see also supra notes 302–305 (describing Holt’s
construction).
596. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 131 (majority opinion); id. at 133–36 (Chase, C.J.,
concurring).
597. Id. at 136 (Chase, C.J., concurring).
598. Letter from David Dudley Field to Andrew Johnson, supra note 387, at 201.
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Tellingly, at oral argument in Milligan, only former Attorney General
Jeremiah Black, representing Milligan, alluded to the case of the
assassination conspirators—and then only to viciously excoriate the
formal opinion that Attorney General Speed had issued in July 1865599
defending the constitutionality of the Lincoln tribunal.600 Black reserved
special contempt for Speed’s idea that the use of military commissions
was merciful, in comparison to the alternative601:
The Attorney General thinks that a proceeding which takes
away the lives of citizens without a constitutional trial is a most
merciful dispensation. His idea of humanity as well as law is
embodied in the bureau of military justice, with all its dark and
bloody machinery. For that strange opinion he gives this
curious reason: That the duty of the Commander in Chief is to
kill, and unless he has this bureau and these commissions he
must “butcher” indiscriminately, without mercy or justice. I
admit that if the Commander in Chief or any other officer of
the Government has the power of an Asiatic king, to butcher
the people at pleasure, he ought to have somebody to aid him
in selecting his victims, as well as to do the rough work of
strangling and shooting. But if my learned friend will only
condescend to cast an eye upon the Constitution, he will see at
once that all the executive and military officers are completely

599. See supra section II.B.6 (discussing Speed’s opinion).
600. See The Milligan Case, supra note 34, at 124. Black argued:
The truth is that no authority exists anywhere in the world for the
doctrine of the Attorney General. No judge or jurist, no statesman or
parliamentary orator, on this or the other side of the water, sustains him.
Every elementary writer from Coke to Wharton is against him. All
military authors who profess to know the duties of their profession admit
themselves to be under, not above, the laws. No book can be found in
any library to justify the assertion that military tribunals may try a citizen
at a place where the courts are open.
Id. at 132. Later, he continued:
You assert the right of the Executive Government, without the
intervention of the judiciary, to capture, imprison, and kill any person to
whom that Government or its paid dependents may choose to impute an
offence. This, in its very essence, is despotic and lawless. It is never
claimed or tolerated except by those governments which deny the
restraints of all law. It has been exercised by the great and small
oppressors of mankind ever since the days of Nimrod. It operates in
different ways; the tools it uses are not always the same; it hides its
hideous features under many disguises; it assumes every variety of form;
“It can change shapes with Proteus for advantages,
And set the murderous Machiavel to school.”
Id. at 143 (quoting William Shakespeare, The Third Part of King Henry the Sixth, act 3, sc.
2).
601. See supra notes 503–505 and accompanying text.
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relieved by the provision that the life of a citizen shall not be
taken at all until after legal conviction by a court and jury.602
Presumably, Black would not have been so bold as to call out, and to so
sharply condemn, the rationale supporting the Lincoln case—written by
the Attorney General sitting right there in the courtroom—were he not
fairly confident that the Justices themselves would be more inclined to
condemn that proceeding than to ratify it.
The Milligan Court proceeded to hold not only that the continued
detention of the accused violated the 1863 statute but also that the
military trial of Milligan and his codefendants violated both the Article
III guarantee of a trial superintended by independent judges “appointed
during good behavior” and the right, found in both Article III and the
Sixth Amendment, to be tried by a jury.603 This alternative holding, which
has become Milligan’s principal legacy (much more so than its statutory
holding), meant that such tribunals could not be used even if Congress
authorized them.604
The third noteworthy aspect of Milligan, for present purposes, was
the nature of the government’s arguments on this constitutional question.
Counsel for the United States relied predominantly on two contentions,
neither of which was Attorney General Speed’s argument that military
courts can try offenses against the law of war.605 Attorney General Speed
and Benjamin Butler first argued that the vast majority of the guarantees
of the Constitution (all but the Third Amendment, which expressly
applies to wartime), as well as “all other conventional and legislative laws
and enactments,” are simply “silent amidst arms” and that therefore
there are no constitutional limitations (other than the Third Amendment)
on the “war-making and war-conducting powers of Congress and the
602. The Milligan Case, supra note 34, at 146.
603. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 122–23 (1866); see also id. at 119 (stating
that the Article III jury guarantee for the “‘trial of all crimes’” is “too plain and direct, to
leave room for misconstruction or doubt of [its] true meaning”).
604. This constitutional conclusion technically was dicta, in the sense that the statutory
holding was sufficient to resolve the case. See generally Fairman, History of the Supreme
Court, supra note 247, at 224–29; Bradley, supra note 593, at 115 (“[T]he majority’s
unnecessary resolution of a constitutional issue . . . seems questionable by contemporary
standards.”). Nevertheless, the constitutional questions were fully briefed, and there is
little question that the Court’s constitutional analysis was a well-considered and deliberate
effort by a majority of Justices to condemn even some military trials that Congress had
arguably authorized during the late war.
605. Benjamin Butler, arguing for the United States on rebuttal, also relied upon
history, namely, an account of the military trials approved by General George Washington
during the Revolutionary War—especially the court-martial of Joshua Hett Smith for his
involvement in the treasonous plot of Benedict Arnold to sacrifice West Point to the
British. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 99–101 (Butler’s argument for the United States). I
discuss this argument in greater detail in Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra
note 67, at 1647–48. The Court in Milligan did not refer to this argument, or to
Washington’s practice during the Revolutionary War, in its opinions.
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President.”606 As Charles Fairman would later write, a “competent Attorney
General would never have permitted such an outlandish argument to be
made.”607 Not surprisingly, the Court disdainfully and summarily turned
aside this argument:
No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.
Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the
theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it,
which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been
happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its
just authority.608
The government’s second principal constitutional defense of the
military commission was the “martial law” argument of “necessity” that the
War Department had so prominently advanced throughout the war.609
The Court majority actually agreed with the government that necessity
might, in extreme circumstances, justify military justice:
If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed,
and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to
law, then, on the theatre of active military operations, where war
really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the
civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the
army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is
allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their
free course.610
The necessity, however, “must be actual and present; the invasion real,
such as effectively closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.”611 Remarkably, in Milligan the government made no effort to

606. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 20–21 (argument for the United States).
607. Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, supra note 247, at 201.
608. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121. In his rebuttal argument for the United States,
Benjamin Butler offered the somewhat more sophisticated argument (which had famously
been propounded by John Quincy Adams) that when the political branches are exercising
their war powers, municipal constraints, including the Constitution, are displaced by the
distinct limitations of the law and usages of nations. Id. at 104 (reply for the United
States). The Court did not accept that argument, either, because it assumed that the law of
war did not apply to the Peace Democrats, who were not part of an armed force. Id. at
121–22 (majority opinion). For a discussion of this common nineteenth-century
argument, see Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1579–82.
609. See supra section I.A.1.
610. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 127.
611. Id. Chief Justice Chase’s concurrence agreed that the political branches’ power to
authorize military trials against such civilians was limited by necessity, although he would
have allowed Congress more leeway to authorize military trials if and when the legislature
determined that the civil courts were “wholly incompetent to avert threatened danger, or
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explain why the condition of necessity was satisfied in Indiana—why
Milligan and the other defendants could not have been tried in civilian
courts there. The Court, therefore, firmly rejected this argument, too:
It is difficult to see how the safety of the country required
martial law in Indiana. If any of her citizens were plotting
treason, the power of arrest could secure them, until the
government was prepared for their trial, when the courts were
open and ready to try them. It was as easy to protect witnesses
before a civil as a military tribunal; and as there could be no
wish to convict, except on sufficient legal evidence, surely an
ordained and established court was better able to judge of this
than a military tribunal composed of gentlemen not trained to
the profession of the law.612
What the government did not argue was, in some respects, more
interesting than the arguments it made. As noted above, the final charge
against the Milligan defendants in the commission proceedings alleged a
(vaguely described) “violation of the laws of war.”613 One thus would
have expected the government to argue that the military commission had
jurisdiction at least to adjudicate that charge, based upon Attorney
General Speed’s opinion eight months earlier respecting the Lincoln
trial, which, as I have explained, was predicated crucially upon the
notion that military courts may adjudicate offenses against the law of
war.614 Yet not only did the government fail to rely upon the law-of-war
charge; Speed’s own brief actually abandoned—expressly repudiated—
his earlier argument: “Infractions of the Laws of War,” Speed wrote for
to punish, with adequate promptitude and certainty.” Id. at 140–41 (Chase, C.J.,
concurring). The Court more recently addressed this question in Duncan v. Kahanamoku:
There must be some overpowering factor that makes a recognition of
[the jury right and other constitutional trial rights] incompatible with
the public safety before we should consent to their temporary
suspension . . . . In other words, the civil courts must be utterly incapable
of trying criminals or of dispensing justice in their usual manner before
the Bill of Rights may be temporarily suspended.
327 U.S. 304, 330 (1946).
612. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 127. The Court explained that civilian courts were
fully operational at the time of Milligan’s trial:
[S]oon after this military tribunal was ended, the Circuit Court met,
peacefully transacted its business, and adjourned. It was held in a state,
eminently distinguished for patriotism, by judges commissioned during
the Rebellion, who were provided with juries, upright, intelligent, and
selected by a marshal appointed by the President. The government had
no right to conclude that Milligan, if guilty, would not receive in that
court merited punishment; for its records disclose that it was constantly
engaged in the trial of similar offences, and was never interrupted in its
administration of criminal justice.
Id. at 122.
613. See supra text accompanying note 556.
614. See supra section II.B.6.
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the United States, “can only be punished or remedied by retaliation,
negotiation, or an appeal to the opinion of nations,”615 and thus military
commissions are appropriate to adjudicate only acts that are the proper
subject of martial-law restraint, “not breaches of the common laws of war
by belligerents.”616
As far as I have been able to determine, there is no extant record of
why Speed thus waived off “what was probably [the government’s] strongest
argument for the use of the commission in this case.”617 Perhaps he
thought it would be difficult to persuade the Court that these defendants
had actually done anything to violate the laws of war, notwithstanding his
(mistaken) assumption, in the assassination trial opinion, that uniting
with “banditti, jayhawkers, guerillas, or any other unauthorized marauders is a high offense against the law of nations.”618 Or, perhaps, by
the time of the Milligan argument, the government’s principal concern
was not so much to sustain sentences issued by Civil War military
tribunals as it was to preserve the prospect of using military courts in the
South during the coming Reconstruction. A government victory in
Milligan on Speed’s “law of war offense” theory would hardly have
justified those anticipated trials in the South, because the charges in
those Reconstruction tribunals—especially for crimes of violence against
free blacks—would rarely, if ever, allege offenses against the law of
nations.619 Instead, the government apparently hoped that the Court
would pay great deference to executive assessments of the inadequacies
of civil courts and of the necessity of using military courts in lieu of civil
proceedings—because that was the only theory that might possibly justify
the coming military justice system throughout the former Confederacy.620

615. Brief for the United States, Ex parte Milligan, supra note 595, at 5; see also
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 14 (argument for the United States).
616. Brief for the United States, Ex parte Milligan, supra note 595, at 6; see also
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 15 (argument for the United States).
617. Bradley, supra note 593, at 110.
618. Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 312 (1865).
619. Even so, this would not fully explain why the government went so far as to
affirmatively disclaim the fount of jurisdiction of military commissions that Speed had
recognized the previous July—namely, to adjudicate alleged violations of the law of war.
620. See Witt, supra note 41, at 311. As Charles Fairman explained, the differences
between Justices Davis and Chase in Milligan, concerning Congress’s power to make
determinations of the inadequacy of civil courts, can perhaps best be understood—and
were widely understood—to be animated by a debate not about the completed wartime
commissions (which were not legislatively authorized) but instead about whether and how
Congress could authorize the use of military tribunals in the South if and when civil courts
there were deemed ineffective to quell violence outside the context of an ongoing war.
See Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, supra note 247, at 214–22. Davis, however,
insisted that his opinion did not resolve that question. See infra note 626.
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Congress’s Reaction to Milligan in Anticipation of Reconstruction

Today, Milligan is commonly considered “one of the great landmarks
in th[e] Court’s history,”621 primarily by virtue of Justice Davis’s rousing
confirmation that the Constitution does not go silent during a time of
war. When it was issued, however, the majority’s opinion in Milligan was
deeply controversial. As Charles Warren wrote, “This famous decision has
been so long recognized as one of the bulwarks of American liberty that
it is difficult to realize now the storm of invective and opprobrium which
burst upon the Court at the time when it was first made public.”622 The
critics of the decision were predominantly Radical Republicans who saw
Justice Davis’s paean to civilian courts as a profound threat to the future
prospects, and legality, of using military courts in Reconstruction, where
and when local courts were deemed inadequate to quell violence,
especially against freed blacks.623 On January 3, 1867, for example,
Representative Thaddeus Stevens excoriated Milligan on the House floor;
the decision, he warned sternly, “rendered immediate action by Congress
upon the question of the establishment of governments in the rebel
States absolutely indispensable.”624 The reasoning of the majority opinion, said Stevens, was “far more dangerous” than even the Dred Scott
decision “upon the lives and liberties of the loyal men of this country.”625
“That decision,” warned Stevens,
has unsheathed the dagger of the assassin, and places the knife
of the rebel at the throat of every man who dares proclaim
himself to be now, or to have been heretofore, a loyal Union
man. If the doctrine enunciated in that decision be true, never
were the people of any country anywhere, or at any time, in
such a terrible peril as are our loyal brethren at the South,
whether they be black or white, whether they go there from the
North or are natives of the rebel States.626
621. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 30 (1957) (plurality opinion); see also Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 567 n.1 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Covert, 354 U.S. at
30).
622. 3 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 149–50 (1922)
[hereinafter Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History].
623. See, e.g., id. at 150–56 (collecting many of the contemporaneous attacks on the
majority opinion).
624. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 251 (1867) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
625. Id.
626. Id. Justice Davis was stung by these characterizations of his handiwork. Writing to
his brother-in-law, Massachusetts Judge Julius Rockwell, in February 1867, he insisted that
“[n]ot a word said in the opinion about reconstruction . . . & yet the Republican press
every where has denounced the opinion as a second Dred Scott, when the Dred Scott
opinion was in the interest of Slavery, & the Milligan opinion in the interest of liberty.”
Letter from David Davis to Julius Rockwell 3 (Feb. 24, 1867), in David Davis Papers, 1815–
1964, Chicago History Museum, Research Center, ser. I, box 15. Notwithstanding Davis’s
good intentions, echoes of the contemporary criticisms of Milligan are still heard today.
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On the penultimate day of its term, the Thirty-Ninth Congress
enacted two measures in response to Milligan, both of which involved the
authorization of military tribunals outside the context of an active war.
First, early in 1867 Stevens introduced an aggressive Reconstruction
Act, which both houses of Congress approved in late February. Among
other things, the Act directed Army officers who were detailed to military
districts in the South to “protect all persons in their rights of person and
property, to suppress insurrection, disorder, and violence, and to punish,
or cause to be punished, all disturbers of the public peace and criminals,”
and authorized such officers “to this end” both to “allow local civil
tribunals to take jurisdiction of and to try offenders” and “to organize
military commissions or tribunals for that purpose” when, in the officer’s
judgment, “it may be necessary for the trial of offenders.”627 In his veto
statement, President Johnson—relying upon the Court’s recent decision
in Milligan—wrote that this section of the Reconstruction Act, if
implemented, would “deny a trial by the lawful courts and juries to
9,000,000 American citizens and to their posterity for an indefinite
period.” “It seems to be scarcely possible,” Johnson argued, “that anyone
should seriously believe this consistent with a Constitution which declares
in simple, plain, and unambiguous language that all persons shall have
that right and that no person shall ever in any case be deprived of it.”628
Congress overrode the veto, however, and the provision became law on
March 2.629
At the same time Congress was considering the Reconstruction Act,
which authorized military commissions prospectively, it was also consumed
with debate over how to deal with the impact of Milligan on past wartime
military proceedings. Members perceived at least two potential problems.
First, hundreds or thousands of private and public actions had been
brought against Union officers for false imprisonment, and Milligan had
the potential to be a very powerful tool in the hands of the plaintiffs and
prosecutors bringing such cases: The Court had, after all, essentially
declared that many military tribunal convictions and sentences were
Aziz Rana, for example, observes that the great civil libertarian passages in his opinion
masked a profoundly reactionary impact: “[T]he Milligan decision embodies a moment in
which the language of a shared constitutional tradition and the commitment to legal
continuity were employed to stymie a redemptive agenda.” Aziz Rana, Freedom Struggles
and the Limits of Constitutional Continuity, 71 Md. L. Rev. 1015, 1039 (2012).
627. As enacted, this provision appeared as section 3 of An Act to Provide for the
More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, ch. 153, § 3, 14 Stat. 428, 428 (1867).
628. Andrew Johnson, Veto Message to the House of Representatives (Mar. 2, 1867),
in 6 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897, at 498, 506
(James D. Richardson ed., 1900).
629. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1976. It is an irony, of sorts, that Reverdy
Johnson, Mary Surratt’s attorney who had offered such a strong objection to the
jurisdiction of the Lincoln commission, see supra notes 415–424 and accompanying text,
was the lone Democratic Senator to vote for the Act.
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unlawful—and the majority found that they were unconstitutional, too.630
Republicans in Congress wanted to protect the Union officers who had
tried and jailed the detainees—actions usually undertaken pursuant to
what, at the time, they understood to be lawful orders.631 Second, some
members of Congress were outraged that the Supreme Court would have
the gall to conclude that President Lincoln’s handiwork—and later, as in
the Lincoln assassination tribunal, President Johnson’s, too—was
unlawful and invalid.632
Congress’s response to these concerns was a so-called “Indemnity
Act,” introduced by none other than Lincoln trial prosecutor John
Bingham on December 10, 1866—after the Court announced its
judgment in Milligan but shortly before it released the opinions.633 Once
the Supreme Court revealed its reasoning, Congress was eager to enact
Bingham’s proposal—“to show its disapprobation to the decision of the
Supreme Court which has rendered this bill a necessity.”634 Some members
expressly acknowledged that they supported the legislation as both a
rebuke of, and a corrective to, the Court’s decision. Representative James
F. Wilson, for example, excoriated Davis’s majority opinion “holding”
regarding Congress’s constitutional power as dicta and “a piece of judicial
impertinence which we are not bound to respect.”635 The indemnity bill, he
happily conceded, “proposes to bring the legislative department of the
Government in conflict with the views of [the Supreme Court in the
Milligan case].”636
Congress overwhelmingly enacted the “indemnity” bill on March 2,
1867,637 the same day it approved the Reconstruction Act. In contrast to
the other bill, however, President Johnson did not veto this legislation
630. See Randall, supra note 137, at 194.
631. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1484 (statement of Rep. Wilson); id.
at 1961 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (“[W]e should go to the very extent of our power in
protecting parties for acts done in the suppression of the rebellion.”).
632. See, e.g., id. at 1484 (statement of Rep. Wilson). The Washington correspondent
for the Boston Daily Advertiser reported: “Good lawyers here give it as their opinion that the
[Milligan] decision renders the Secretary of War, the Judge Advocate General and all the
members of the Court which tried the assassins, liable to prosecution.” Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History, supra note 622, at 165 n.2 (quoting the Boston
Daily Advertiser, Dec. 27, 1866); see also, e.g., White, Life of Lyman Trumbull, supra note
233, at 289 (“[I]t follow[ed] logically [from Milligan] that the trial and execution of
Booth’s fellow conspirators, Payne, Atzerodt, Herold, and Mrs. Surratt, were, in
contemplation of law, no better than lynching . . . .”).
633. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 47.
634. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 646 (1867) (statement of Rep. Delano).
635. Id. at 1484 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
636. Id. at 646.
637. An Act to Declare Valid and Conclusive Certain Proclamations of the President,
and Acts Done in Pursuance Thereof, or of His Orders, in the Suppression of the Late
Rebellion Against the United States, ch. 155, 14 Stat. 432 (1867).
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(perhaps because it ratified his own earlier orders), and so no override
was necessary. The Act’s principal function was, indeed, to establish a
form of de facto indemnity, or immunity, for officers involved in wartime
detention and prosecutions undertaken pursuant to presidential proclamation between March 4, 1861, and July 1, 1866. The law purported to
accomplish this objective in two ways: First, it starkly declared that,
notwithstanding the 1863 Habeas Act and the Milligan decision, all such
actions undertaken pursuant to presidential proclamation or order, or
with his authority or approval, between March 4, 1861, and July 1, 1866,
were
approved in all respects, legalized and made valid, to the same
extent and with the same effect as if said orders and
proclamations had been issued and made, and said arrests,
imprisonments, proceedings, and acts had been done under the
previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the
United States, and in pursuance of a law thereof previously
enacted and expressly authorizing and directing the same to be
done.638
For good measure, it also directly provided that no person could be
“held to answer in . . . courts for any act done or omitted to be done in
pursuance or in aid of any of said proclamations or orders, or by authority or with the approval of the President within the period aforesaid.”639
This was, then, in effect the mirror image of the Henry Winter Davis
proposal that the House had overwhelmingly approved at the very end of
the preceding Congress, in March 1865.640 Instead of trying to correct
the excesses of the war by magnanimously acknowledging the Executive’s
overreach, this was an effort to ratify the legality of that legacy
wholesale—to whitewash, in effect, the excessive actions that appeared to
be necessary for victory during that fierce conflict, or at the very least to
absolve well-intentioned chief executives and officers of any transgressions
they might have made in good faith to vanquish a stubborn enemy.
Senator Lyman Trumbull went so far as to worry, on the Senate floor,
about what the decision in Milligan meant for the Lincoln assassination
proceedings: “Would you try and execute as a murderer a man who sat
upon the military commission here that tried the assassins of the
President?”641 And thus Trumbull—who had been the chief Senate
sponsor of the limitations in the 1863 Habeas Act and one of the
638. Id. at 432–33 (emphasis added).
639. Id. at 433. The Act went further still: It purported to establish a legal presumption that the acts of all officers and other persons in the service of the United States, or
who acted in aid of the United States, “shall be held prima facie to have been authorized
by the President” and thus indemnified. Id.
640. See supra section I.B.3.c.
641. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1962 (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see also
supra note 632.
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strongest advocates of the Henry Winter Davis proposal condemning
military tribunals in 1865642—appeared to speak for many when he
pleaded on behalf of the expiating feature of the “indemnity” bill: “Let
the waters of oblivion wash over and bury out of sight and out of
remembrance, if it were possible, all the acts connected with this terrible
war.”643
The 1867 Act, however, went further still, in a way that is even more
pertinent for present purposes: It not only purported to declare the
presidentially approved wartime commissions lawful, and to foreclose
officer liability, but also included a clause that would strip the courts,
federal and state alike, of all jurisdiction to adjudicate the legality of
those commissions and detentions:
And no civil court of the United States, or of any State, or of
the District of Columbia, or of any district or territory of the
United States, shall have or take jurisdiction of, or in any
manner reverse any of the proceedings had or acts done as
aforesaid . . . .644
The effect of this clause, read literally, would have been not only to
foreclose actions to hold Union officers liable (or criminally culpable)
but also to prevent courts—even state courts—from declaring continuing
detentions to be unlawful and ordering the release of prisoners
wrongfully held, including perhaps the Lincoln assassination defendants
who remained in custody. That is to say, it would have cut off all habeas
actions such as the one in Milligan itself. Some members of Congress,
642. See supra section I.B.3.a (describing the 1863 Habeas Act); supra note 339 and
accompanying text.
643. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1961 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
Interestingly, Thaddeus Stevens, one of the more vociferous proponents of the legislation,
candidly acknowledged that it might cover cases of dubious legality. Id. at 1487 (statement
of Rep. Stevens). Stevens’s remarks reflected an admirable candor about his doubts
whether Holt had extended commission jurisdiction too far, and might even be read as
sympathetic to Davis’s opinion in Milligan, at least as applied to certain sorts of domesticlaw offenses:
The law with regard to the power of military tribunals is one about which
there is not very great harmony among the legal fraternity. While I feel
disposed to support them all as far as possible, and while I believe that
nothing has been done by them which was not requisite for the country,
yet I am not quite prepared to believe that a mere civilian can commit
an offense except it be as a spy, which can be tried by a military tribunal.
Take, for instance, the case of Mr. Harris, of Maryland, who was tried by
a military tribunal, he never having been in the Army or Navy, or in any
way participating in military operations, but being simply charged with
giving a dollar to a confederate soldier to buy a night’s lodging. I have
not made up my mind yet, but I can hardly believe that an offense of
that kind is triable by a military tribunal.
Id.
644. 14 Stat. at 433.
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sympathetic to the indemnification aspects of the bill, could hardly
believe that the proponents meant to preclude any prospect of relief for
wrongfully held prisoners.645 The proponents, however, confirmed that
that was, indeed, precisely the intended effect of the clause: “to provide
against just such action as we had in the Milligan case.”646 Republican
Senator Daniel Norton of Minnesota proposed an amendment that
would have preserved such habeas actions—“to relieve the bill from any
doubt as to the jurisdiction of the courts to test the regularity of the
sentences as judgments of military commissions”647—but the Senate
rejected it by a vote of 29 to 9.648 Even so, the bill’s sponsors appeared to
realize that the jurisdiction-stripping clause raised a serious constitutional question of its own, one that would be left for the courts themselves to resolve.649
F.

Milligan’s Impact in the Executive Branch and the Courts

By contrast with Congress, the Court’s decision in Milligan had a
dramatic effect on the way in which the other two branches dealt with the
question of military adjudication relating to the late war—as illustrated
most dramatically after the government captured Booth’s primary
coconspirator, John Surratt, in late 1866.
1. The Fate of the March 2, 1867, Congressional Enactments. — In June
1867, the new Attorney General, Henry Stanbery (who had argued a
jurisdictional point for the government in Milligan), issued an opinion
expressing doubt about the constitutionality of section 3 of the March 2,
1867, Reconstruction Act, authorizing military commissions in the
former Confederate states.650 Even under the concurring rationale of Chief
Justice Chase in Milligan, Stanbery explained, the law’s constitutionality
was dubious because it allowed military officers, rather than Congress, to
assess the requisite “necessity” and to do so “in a time of peace, when all
the courts, State and federal, are in the undisturbed exercise of their
jurisdiction,” thereby giving such an officer discretion to try, condemn,
645. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1959 (statement of Sen. Reverdy
Johnson) (proposing that the clause be removed in whole because, under the proposed
act, a wrongfully held individual “can in no possible way bring his case for redress before
the courts of the United States”).
646. Id. at 1535 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (responding to Rep. Cooper); see also,
e.g., id. at 1487 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (responding to Rep. Eldridge); id. at 1962
(statement of Sen. Trumbull) (responding to Sen. Norton, although conceding that a
court might find such jurisdiction-stripping to be unconstitutional).
647. Id. at 1963 (statement of Sen. Norton).
648. Id. (recording vote).
649. See, e.g., id. at 1962 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (“I do not suppose that this
bill would prevent a court from acting if the court believed that the law forbidding it to act
was unconstitutional. That would be a question for the court to decide . . . .”).
650. See The Reconstruction Acts, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 182, 182, 198–99 (1867).
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and even execute a citizen.651 Stanbery reasoned that, at best, the
provision should be very narrowly construed, such that “nothing short of
an absolute or controlling necessity would give any color of authority for
arraigning a citizen before a military commission.”652 Despite Stanbery’s
opinion, pursuant to the authority conferred by section 3 of the
Reconstruction Act the Army proceeded to initiate approximately 1,400
military commissions throughout the South from 1867 to 1869.653
The constitutionality of such courts, in light of Milligan, was
challenged in Ex parte McCardle, which involved a newspaper publisher
convicted by military commission for publishing articles challenging the
legitimacy of Reconstruction and of black suffrage and urging Mississippi
residents to boycott an election to authorize a state constitutional
convention.654 A district judge denied McCardle’s habeas petition,
distinguishing Milligan on the ground that Mississippi lacked a “practical
state government” because Congress had refused to recognize the state
government.655 On appeal to the Supreme Court, Attorney General
Stanbery refused to represent the United States because he had already
called into question the constitutionality of the commissions in his June
1867 opinion; two Northern senators therefore stepped in to defend the
legislation.656 The case was briefed and argued, but then in April 1868
Congress repealed the Supreme Court’s statutory jurisdiction to hear the
case, after which the Court concluded that it had no choice but to
dismiss the appeal.657 There is no way to know for certain, of course, how
the Court would have resolved the merits of the constitutional challenge.
Chief Justice Chase later privately wrote, however, that “had the merits of
the McCardle case been decided the court would doubtless have held
that his imprisonment for trial before a military commission was
illegal.”658

651. Id. at 198–99.
652. Id. at 199.
653. See Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: The Forgotten Reconstruction
Chapter, 23 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 231, 257–69 (2008).
654. See 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). Much of the account in this paragraph is
derived from the rich description of the case in Daniel J. Meltzer, The Story of Ex parte
McCardle : The Power of Congress to Limit the Supreme Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction, in
Federal Courts Stories 57, 57–86 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010); see also
Witt, supra note 41, at 314–16; David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
Civil War and Reconstruction, 1865–1873, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 131, 154–58 (1984).
655. Meltzer, supra note 654, at 65.
656. Id. at 68.
657. McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515.
658. Letter from Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase to Judge Robert A. Hill (May 1, 1869),
in 5 The Salmon P. Chase Papers 302, 302 ( John Niven ed., 1998); see also Meltzer, supra
note 654, at 73–74.
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As for the backward-looking “Indemnity Act,” also enacted on
March 2, 1867,659 the Supreme Court never definitively resolved whether
the Constitution permitted Congress to “declare” in 1867 that the Civil
War detentions and commissions were lawful and/or to absolve Union
officers of liability. At least three members of the Court, however, opined
that those legislative efforts were unconstitutional. The courts appear to
have disregarded the clause of the Act that purported to strip them of
jurisdiction to hear habeas actions challenging ongoing detentions and
sentences decreed by commissions.
For example, Justice Miller, riding circuit, granted habeas relief to
William Murphy, who had been convicted by a military commission of
burning a steamboat and sentenced to confinement at hard labor for ten
years—a sentence that President Johnson approved just three days before
he declared the end of the war.660 Miller’s judgment was a bit reluctant—
he had joined Chief Justice Chase’s concurrence in Milligan—but he
conceded that Justice Davis’s majority opinion “must be binding upon
every member of that court, whatever be his individual opinion.”661 Thus,
reasoned Miller, the military commission that tried Murphy in St. Louis,
“where the process of the courts had never been interrupted,” was
invalid, especially as Murphy “was arrested at New Orleans in 1865, [and]
charged with offences committed at Memphis in 1864”—both places in
which “the courts of the United States were open, and perfectly
competent to the trial of any offences within their jurisdiction.”662 Miller
acknowledged, and quoted in full, the 1867 Indemnity Act, including its
jurisdiction-stripping clause,663 yet he ruled that Congress’s purported
after-the-fact authorization of the commission was unconstitutional,664
and he did not even address Congress’s command that he not take
jurisdiction over the case.665
2. Cases Involving the Alleged Lincoln Conspirators Themselves. —
Whatever Milligan might have portended for the constitutionality of the
legislatively approved Reconstruction Act military trials, there appeared
to be little question that the decision condemned the military trials and
659. See supra notes 633–649 and accompanying text (describing the enactment and
purpose of the 1867 Indemnity Act).
660. See In re Murphy, 17 F. Cas. 1030, 1032 (C.C.D. Mo. 1867) (No. 9,947).
661. Id. at 1031.
662. Id.
663. Id. at 1031–32.
664. Id. at 1032.
665. Moreover, in Beckwith v. Bean, Justice Field, joined by Justice Clifford, concluded
that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to authorize or approve the
conduct after the fact or to shield the perpetrators from responsibility. 98 U.S. 266, 292–98
(1879) (Field, J., dissenting). Field and Clifford had both joined Justice Davis’s majority
opinion in Milligan. See The Milligan Case, supra note 34, at 52. The majority in Beckwith
did not reach the question. See Beckwith, 98 U.S. at 284.
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judgments of conduct occurring during the Civil War itself—at least in
those cases that did not involve actual offenses against the international
law of war (which is one reason why Congress, in March 1867, tried
retroactively to secure the legality of those proceedings).666 So, for
example, Attorney General Stanbery opined that there could “be no
doubt,” in light of Milligan, that a military commission that had tried a
New York citizen (John Devlin) for forging enlistment papers and selling
them to draft evaders “had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the
party.”667
a. John Surratt. — Perhaps most tellingly, not only did the Johnson
Administration choose, before Milligan, not to try Jefferson Davis in a
military tribunal; it also declined, after Milligan, to use a commission to
try John Surratt, Mary’s son, who was alleged to have been Booth’s most
trusted confidant in the Lincoln assassination plot. Surratt had been in
Elmira, New York, on April 14, 1865; after the assassination, he fled to
Canada, and from there to Liverpool, London, and Rome, where he
served with the papal Zouaves, which is why he was not tried along with
his alleged coconspirators in the 1865 military commission.668 U.S. forces
finally apprehended Surratt in Alexandria, Egypt, in late 1866 and
brought him to the United States to face justice.669 Upon Surratt’s arrival
in Washington in February 1867, a federal judge issued a warrant to
remand him to the civilian authorities in the District, to be tried on an
indictment recently returned by a grand jury. That indictment alleged
that Surratt, “being moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil,”
had plotted with Booth and others to violate ordinary criminal statutes
proscribing murder and conspiracy.670
The Surratt trial lasted over two months.671 At the close of evidence,
Judge George Fisher instructed the jury that if they were convinced
Surratt was not guilty, their verdict would provide a “lesson of assurance
that a court of justice is the asylum of innocence.”672 On the other hand,
the judge explained, if the jury concluded that he was guilty, its verdict
666. See supra notes 633–649 and accompanying text (describing the 1867 Indemnity
Act).
667. Devlin’s Claim, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 128, 128 (1867); see also Leonard, Lincoln’s
Avengers, supra note 15, at 213–14 (recounting that shortly after Milligan, President
Johnson began to release military prisoners awaiting military commission trials).
668. On Surratt’s apprehension and trial, see the thorough account in Leonard,
Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 235–43, 252–63.
669. See id. at 237.
670. 2 Trial of John H. Surratt in the Criminal Court for the District of Columbia
1380–83 (Washington, D.C, French & Richardson 1867) [hereinafter Trial of John H.
Surratt].
671. See generally id. (recording the proceedings of the trial); see also David Miller
DeWitt, The Assassination of Abraham Lincoln and Its Expiation ch. VIII (1909).
672. Trial of John H. Surratt, supra note 670, at 1378.
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would be a “testimonial to the country and the world that the District of
Columbia . . . gives the judicial guarantees essential to the protection of
the persons of the public servants commissioned by the people of the
nation to do their work, safe and sacred from the presence of unpunished assassins within its borders.”673 The jury chose to offer the nation
neither of those lessons: It was “nearly equally divided” throughout its
more than seventy hours of deliberations and failed to reach a verdict.674
Surratt was eventually released on bail and was never retried.
b. Mudd, Arnold, and Spangler. — In his instruction to the jury in the
John Surratt trial, Judge Fisher asked a rhetorical question: If, as many
argued (including Surratt’s lawyers), the Court’s decision in Milligan
condemned the constitutionality of the 1865 Lincoln military commission, why hadn’t the military released the four prisoners from that trial—
Samuel Arnold, Michael O’Laughlen, Samuel Mudd, and Edman
Spangler—who were then serving terms of incarceration in the Dry
Tortugas, at the far western end of the Florida Keys?675
It was a good question—indeed, one that Mudd himself wondered
about. He wrote from prison to his wife that “[i]t is vexatious to see how
partial the laws are . . . administered . . . . If the trial of Milligan was
wrong, certainly ours was more so, and no necessity can be pleaded in
palliation.”676 Accordingly, just two days after the Court issued its
decision, Andrew Sterett Ridgely—Reverdy Johnson’s son-in-law—
submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to Chief Justice Chase,
seeking Mudd’s release.677 The Chief Justice denied the Mudd petition
without reaching the jurisdictional or merits questions, on the ground
that it had been filed in the wrong court. He advised Ridgely “that the

673. Id. Fisher was a close ally of Secretary of War Stanton and hardly a shining
exemplar of an Article III judge. His instruction to the jury was a fiery sermon inveighing
against the “most foul and wicked conspiracy the record of which has ever stained the
pages of history,” id. at 1369, in which he actually defended both the legitimacy and the
constitutionality of the military commission two years earlier, arguing that it was not called
into question by Milligan, id. at 1370–71. By the end of the trial, Surratt’s lawyer, Joseph H.
Bradley, Sr., had become so enraged by Judge Fisher’s conduct that he allegedly
“threatened the judge with personal chastisement.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
335, 344 (1872). Fisher responded by striking Bradley’s name from the roll of attorneys
authorized to practice in the court, which prompted Bradley to sue Fisher for damages.
See id. at 337–38. The Supreme Court eventually held that Fisher was entitled to judicial
immunity. See id. at 356–57.
674. Trial of John H. Surratt, supra note 670, at 1366, 1379.
675. Id. at 1370.
676. Letter from Samuel Mudd to Sarah Frances (“Frank”) Mudd ( Jan. 15, 1867), in
The Life of Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, supra note 59, at 219, 219.
677. See Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, supra note 247, at 238–39.
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petition should be addressed to a Court or Judge of the United States in
the District within which the prisoner is held.”678
More than a year later, in mid-1868, Mudd finally took up the Chief
Justice on his suggestion: Along with his codefendants Samuel Arnold
and Edman Spangler, he filed a habeas petition with Judge Thomas
Boynton of the Southern District of Florida, seeking release from the
prison in the Dry Tortugas.679 In September 1868, Judge Boynton denied
the petition.680 Boynton reasoned that in killing Lincoln, Booth had been
motivated not by “private animosity” but instead by a design to “impair
the effectiveness of military operations, and enable the rebellion to
establish itself into a government.”681 Because the offense was in this
sense (i.e., based upon its alleged motive) a “military one,” Judge
Boynton concluded that it was proper to try it in a military forum,
notwithstanding Milligan.682
Boynton’s opinion was unconvincing in virtually every respect: For
one thing, the military trial did not establish that Booth killed Lincoln in
order to “impair the effectiveness of military operations, and enable the
rebellion to establish itself into a government.”683 The assassination was
almost certainly far too late in the day to have any such expected effect.
More fundamentally, Milligan did not turn on any such test of whether
the offenders had a civil or a “military” motive; indeed, if that had been
the ground of decision, Milligan itself would have come out the other
way, because Milligan and his cohorts, unlike Booth, did plot to “impair
the effectiveness of [Union] military operations.” More broadly, the
Court in Milligan did not identify any vaguely defined category of socalled “military cases” that could be tried in military courts.
678. Letter from Chief Justice Chase to Andrew Sterrett Ridgely ( Jan. 3, 1867), in 6
Salmon P. Chase Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Manuscript Letterpress
Copies, Oct. 1865–1867, Doc. 467; see also Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730 (1867)
(statement of Sen. Johnson) (reporting Chase’s disposition).
679. The fourth prisoner from the Lincoln trial, Michael O’Laughlen, died of yellow
fever in the Fort Jefferson prison in the Dry Tortugas in September 1867. See Kat Long,
How Samuel Mudd Went from Lincoln Conspirator to Medical Savior, Smithsonian Mag.
(Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-samuel-mudd-went-lincolnconspirator-medical-savior-180954980/ [http://perma.cc/PA2X-734P].
680. Ex parte Mudd, 17 F. Cas. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1868) (No. 9,899). The text of Judge
Boynton’s opinion is not included in Federal Cases. It was published in full, however, in
Habeas Corpus: The Application in Behalf of Dr. Mudd, Arnold and Spangler—Opinion
of Judge Boynton, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1868, at 2 [hereinafter Judge Boynton’s Habeas
Corpus Opinion].
681. Id.
682. Id. Notably, Judge Boynton did not mention, let alone rely upon, the March 1867
congressional enactment that purported to strip all courts of jurisdiction over military
commission proceedings, or acts undertaken pursuant to such proceedings, initiated on
the President’s authority. See supra notes 633–649 and accompanying text (describing the
1867 Indemnity Act).
683. Judge Boynton’s Habeas Corpus Opinion, supra note 680, at 2.

454

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:323

Having failed to persuade Judge Boynton, counsel for the three
prisoners in the Dry Tortugas, Philip Phillips, then prepared habeas
petitions to be filed directly in the Supreme Court, asking the Court to
hold that the military commission lacked jurisdiction.684 On February 8,
1869, however, just before Phillips was to file the petitions, President
Johnson pardoned Mudd, citing both some “room for uncertainty as to
the true measure and nature of [his] complicity” with Booth and also the
fact that Mudd had “devoted himself to the care and cure” of those who
were ill with yellow fever at the Dry Tortugas and “saved many valuable
lives and earned the admiration and the gratitude of all who observed or
experienced his generous and faithful service to humanity.”685 The
pardon effectively mooted Mudd’s case in the Supreme Court.686 The
Court heard oral argument on Arnold and Spangler’s petitions on
February 26.687 The Court never had an opportunity to opine in these
cases, however: On March 1, 1869, one of his last days in office, President
Johnson pardoned Arnold and Spangler, too, and the Court therefore
dismissed their petitions.688
3. Military Trials for Violations of the Law of War. — As noted above, in
Milligan the government surprisingly chose not to argue that the
commission had jurisdiction, at a minimum, to try the one charge
alleging that the Indiana defendants had violated the law of war. Indeed,
the government appeared to disclaim any such possible fount of military
jurisdiction.689 The Milligan Court therefore did not have occasion to
684. See Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, supra note 247, at 488–89. Under
governing Supreme Court precedent, they could not appeal directly from Judge Boynton’s
denial of their petitions, which he had issued at chambers. See id. at 490 (citing In re
Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176 (1847)). In light of the Court’s holding in Milligan, the
petitions for Arnold and Spangler apparently, and unsurprisingly, emphasized the
commission’s absence of jurisdiction under the 1863 Habeas Act rather than the
Constitution. See The Assassination Conspirators. Petitions for Habeas Corpus in the
Cases of Spangler and Arnold, N.Y. Trib., Feb. 10, 1869 (byline of Feb. 9).
685. The Lincoln Assassination: The Evidence 752 (William C. Edwards & Edward
Steers eds., 2009).
686. Charles Fairman reported that Mudd’s petition was filed as No. 12, Original. See
Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, supra note 247, at 489 n.193. However, an
account in the New York Tribune from February 9—the day after the pardon—reported
that Phillips had prepared Mudd’s petition but did not present it to the Court in light of
the pardon. The Assassination Conspirators. Petitions for Habeas Corpus in the Cases of
Spangler and Arnold, supra note 684.
687. See Supreme Court Argument Calendar (Feb. 26, 1869) (reporting the
arguments on Nos. 13 and 14, Original); United States Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Mar.
1, 1869, at 2. The oral arguments focused upon complex jurisdictional issues. See United
States Supreme Court, supra; see also Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, supra note
247, at 489–91.
688. See Supreme Court Argument Calendar (Mar. 19, 1869) (reporting the pardons
and the Court’s dismissal).
689. See supra notes 613–620 and accompanying text.
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opine on whether Attorney General Speed had been right when he wrote
in his July 1865 opinion that military courts can try allegations of offenses
against the law of war committed by members of belligerent forces.690
The most famous case of this sort in the Civil War was a trial that
occurred just after the conclusion of the Lincoln assassination trial—the
military commission proceedings against Confederate Army Captain
Henry Wirz, who was commander of the Confederate camp for prisoners
of war in Andersonville, Georgia, where horrifying conditions of
confinement resulted in the deaths of over 12,000 Union soldiers.691 Like
the Lincoln conspirators, Wirz was charged with both a substantive
count—namely, murder of prisoners “in violation of the laws and
customs of war”—and a conspiracy “to injure the health and destroy the
lives of soldiers in the military service of the United States, then held and
being prisoners of war within the lines of the so-called Confederate States
and in the military prisons thereof.”692 The substantive charge certainly
alleged a violation of the law of war, which prohibits the abuse of, and
violence against, prisoners rendered hors de combat.693 Likewise, the
second charge, although characterized in terms of “conspiracy,” was in
effect an allegation that Wirz had failed to exercise his command to
prevent the prisoner abuse at Andersonville, a breach of duty that the
Supreme Court would later determine is itself a violation of the law of
war.694 Wirz was found guilty of the substantive offense and of most of the
690. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Davis did state, somewhat cryptically, that the
“laws and usages of war . . . can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld
the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process
unobstructed.” Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866). It appears, however, that
Davis was simply responding to the government’s argument that the laws and usages of war
permitted the use of military tribunals where martial law applied; he was not addressing
any argument that law-of-war offenses could be subject to military adjudication. In the
much later Quirin case, however, Chief Justice Stone read the Court in Milligan to have
held that the law of war itself does not regulate the conduct of persons in Milligan’s
situation, who act independently of any direction or control of an organized belligerent
force. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942).
691. See generally Trial of Henry Wirz, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 40-23 (1867).
692. Id. at 3–8.
693. This customary norm is today reflected in API, supra note 509, art. 41.
694. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13–18 (1946). In the recent Al Bahlul litigation,
the government cited the Wirz trial as a relevant precedent, see U.S. 2015 Al Bahlul Brief,
supra note 101, at 40–42, because the charge in that case described the alleged conspiracy
as being “in violation of the laws and customs of war.” H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 40-23, at 3. It is
not clear why the government views that characterization as important. If the conspiracy
count in the Wirz case did allege conduct in violation of the law of war, as Yamashita
suggests would have been appropriate, then the Wirz trial simply stands as an example of
the use of a military court to try law-of-war violations—something the Supreme Court later
approved in Quirin. And if, on the other hand, the evidence of agreement in the Wirz case
did not establish a violation of the law of war, that would simply mean that Wirz’s counsel
should have objected that the charge did not describe such an offense. His counsel did,
indeed, raise several objections to the legality of the commission, see H.R. Exec. Doc. No.
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specifications of the conspiracy charge695 and was hanged on November
10, 1865; his body was interred in the Old Arsenal grounds next to that
of George Atzerodt, who had suffered the same fate that July.696 The
Milligan decision neither confirmed nor called into question the constitutionality of the Wirz commission, which did involve genuine law-of-war
offenses.
An 1873 opinion of Attorney General George Williams concerning a
conflict between the Army and the Modoc Indian tribe is to similar
effect.697 After extended hostilities between United States troops and the
Modoc Indians, the parties arranged for peace negotiations under a socalled “flag of truce.” At the place designated for negotiations, the tribe
ambushed the U.S. forces and killed an Army general and two others in
the U.S. delegation.698 This violation of the flag of truce violated the
customary law of war.699 President Grant asked Attorney General Williams
whether a military tribunal could try the malefactors. Williams answered
40-23, at 10–11, but none of them was predicated on the notion that the court could not
adjudicate law-of-war violations or that the conspiracy charge did not describe such an
offense.
Similarly, the government has relied upon the conspiracy charges in the Civil War
commission trial of George St. Leger Grenfel and others, see U.S. 2015 Al Bahlul Brief,
supra note 101, at 40–42, which likewise characterized the unlawful agreements at issue
there as “in violation of the laws of war.” George St. Leger Grenfel, H.R. Exec. Doc. No.
39-50, at 21–22 (1867). The allegations in the Grenfel commission were that the
defendants—who, like Milligan, were not part of, or acting at the direction of, the
Confederate Army—had plotted to spring free some Rebel prisoners of war in Camp
Douglas, near Chicago, and then set fire to Chicago. Id. That plan, although certainly
unlawful, did not describe a violation of the law of war, notwithstanding that the charge
said otherwise. The accused raised jurisdictional objections, similar to those in the Milligan
case; but again, those objections were not predicated on the idea that the commission
could not adjudicate law-of-war violations or that the conspiracy charge did not describe
such an offense. More importantly, Judge Advocate Henry Burnett (who would assist
Joseph Holt the next year in prosecuting the Lincoln conspirators) did not defend the
commission’s jurisdiction there on the ground that the conduct described an offense
against the law of war. Instead, he made an argument based upon martial law and
“necessity” virtually identical to the government’s unsuccessful arguments in Milligan, see
id. at 576–79, and even cited the military commission’s jurisdictional decision in the
Milligan case (which was not yet before the Supreme Court) as precedential authority that
bound the commission on the jurisdictional question in the Grenfel case, see id. at 580. In
other words, Grenfel’s case appeared to be virtually on all fours with Milligan’s, and
therefore when the Court decided Milligan in 1866, it appeared to Grenfel and his counsel
as though he, too—like Milligan—was entitled to be released. See Stephen Z. Starr,
Colonel Grenfell’s Wars 288–90 (1971). “[F]or reasons which the surviving documents do
not reveal,” however, his counsel never filed a habeas petition, preferring instead to try to
persuade the War Department to release Grenfel. Id. at 291.
695. H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 40-23, at 807–08.
696. Id. at 815; see also Kauffman, Fort Lesley McNair, supra note 11, at 181.
697. The Modoc Indian Prisoners, 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 249 (1873).
698. Id. at 250.
699. Id. at 250–51.
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in the affirmative; he prominently cited the Wirz precedent and liberally
quoted from Speed’s 1865 opinion.700 The Modocs responsible for the
ambush were tried, and four of them were hanged.701
Military commission jurisdiction to try actual offenses against the
international law of war thus arguably survived Milligan—or, in any event,
the question remained open. Even so, there were few if any such trials
after the Modoc trial of 1873;702 the question was not renewed again until
the Second World War, in the case of the military trial of eight Nazi
saboteurs.703
IV. THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION COMMISSION LEGACY (OR LACK
THEREOF), 1886–1940
In 1886, Lieutenant Colonel William Winthrop, later known as the
“Blackstone of Military Law,”704 published the first edition of his
comprehensive treatise on military law.705 That landmark work—both the
first edition and the now-canonical second edition (published in
1920)706—cited the Lincoln assassination trial on a handful of occasions,
but almost always for a discrete, uncontroversial procedural proposition
or a point about the role of various military officers in trials.707 Winthrop
never once cited the Lincoln trial as affirmative authority for the
jurisdiction of wartime military tribunals or even as among the sources
700. Id. at 251–52. The only issue that gave Williams any pause was whether the Modoc
Indians were bound by the customary laws of war. He concluded that they were. Id. at 253.
Williams distinguished Milligan primarily on the ground that civilian courts lacked any
jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of the law of war. Id. at 252. Indeed, Williams,
following Speed, see supra note 505, assumed that civilian courts could not try such
offenses. He might have been wrong about that, but he was certainly correct that Milligan
had not decided whether law-of-war offenses can be tried in military commissions.
701. Witt, supra note 41, at 334–35. Professor Witt notes that the military commission
in this case was actually a humanitarian improvement; previously, it was common to
summarily execute Indian captives. Indeed, Witt suggests that the reason President Grant
put the question to Attorney General Williams was in order to stave off the summary
justice the Army was otherwise prepared to enforce. See id. at 329–35.
702. In the 1920 edition of his comprehensive treatise on military justice, William
Winthrop did not cite any cases after the Civil War in his litany of examples of military
tribunals being used to try offenses against the laws of war. See Winthrop, Military Law and
Precedents, supra note 61, at 839–40 & nn.7–17.
703. See infra section V.A.
704. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006) (plurality opinion) (quoting Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957) (plurality opinion)).
705. See 1 W. Winthrop, Military Law (1886) [hereinafter 1 Winthrop, Military Law]; 2
W. Winthrop, Military Law (1886) [hereinafter 2 Winthrop, Military Law].
706. See Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, supra note 61.
707. See, e.g., 1 Winthrop, Military Law, supra note 705, at 225, 249 n.1, 473 n.3
(discussing various procedural matters from the Lincoln trial, including the attendance of
a “special provost-marshal,” use of two additional officers to assist the judge advocate, and
admission of testimony by Confederate Army officers).
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supporting the treatise’s proposition that it is against the law of war to
employ assassins.708 Indeed, on at least two occasions Winthrop appeared
to go out of his way to suggest that the Lincoln trial is not a valid or
accepted precedent for any jurisdictional authority. First, in a footnote
Winthrop contrasted John Bingham’s jurisdictional argument during the
trial709 with what he referred to in the text as the holding of the “leading
case” of Milligan that a commission may not assume jurisdiction over
offenses committed in a locality “not involved in war nor subject to any
form of military dominion.”710 Second, Winthrop listed the Lincoln trial
as among those held during the Civil War to adjudicate ordinary crimes
or statutory offenses, cognizable in civilian courts, “which would properly
be tried by such courts if open and acting.”711
Winthrop was a trusted protégé of Judge Advocate General Holt.712
His treatise liberally cites Holt precedents from the war as honored
authority. Winthrop’s failure, therefore, to “say a single word about the
legality” of the Lincoln assassination commission (apart from his implied
critique of Bingham’s arguments) is, in the words of Frederick Bernays
Wiener (one of the premier judge advocates of the past century),
“positively deafening.”713 “The only inference possible,” concluded Wiener
in 1995, “is that Colonel Winthrop, like all contemporary military lawyers
a century later, deemed utterly illegal the trial of the Assassination
Conspirators by military commission.”714
Nor was Winthrop alone in this regard. Other leading treatises on
military law either disregarded the Lincoln trial altogether715 or cited it

708. See 2 Winthrop, Military Law, supra note 705, at 13 n.1; Winthrop, Military Law
and Precedents, supra note 61, at 785 & n.67 (explaining that a “resort to the employment
of assassins . . . is interdicted by civilized usage”).
709. See supra notes 428–431 and accompanying text.
710. 2 Winthrop, Military Law, supra note 705, at 66 & n.3 (“Compare, in this
connection, the argument of Hon. J.A. Bingham, on the Trial of the Assassins of President
Lincoln.”); Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, supra note 61, at 836 & n.90 (same).
711. 2 Winthrop, Military Law, supra note 705, at 70 & n.5 (providing examples of
such offenses); Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, supra note 61, 839 & n.5 (same).
712. Winthrop was unswervingly loyal to Holt when, years after the trial, a controversy
arose concerning whether Holt had failed to present President Johnson with the
commission’s recommendation to spare Mary Surratt from execution. See Joshua E.
Kastenberg, The Blackstone of Military Law: Colonel William Winthrop 205 n.41 (Martin
Gordon ed., 2009); Leonard, Lincoln’s Avengers, supra note 15, at 272–73; Elizabeth D.
Leonard, Lincoln’s Forgotten Ally: Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt of Kentucky 277
(2011).
713. Frederick Bernays Wiener, His Name Was Mudd, in Dr. Mudd and the Lincoln
Assassination: The Case Reopened 117, 162 ( John Paul Jones ed., 1995) [hereinafter
Wiener, His Name Was Mudd].
714. Id.
715. See, e.g., Birkhimer, supra note 444.
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only for discrete procedural points unrelated to military jurisdiction.716
The esteemed Judge Advocate General G. Norman Lieber, Francis’s son,
did not cite it in his pamphlet on martial law.717 Even the constitutional
law treatise that adopted the broadest view of the wartime jurisdiction of
military courts failed to cite the 1865 trial as authority.718 These authors
all knew, of course, that “the Lincoln conspirators’ trial was a matter of
paramount national importance and attracted intense public scrutiny.”719
Some of them had lived through it. Yet they chose not to rely upon it or,
in most cases, not to mention it at all.
During the First World War, there was an important, contentious
debate within the political branches about proposed legislation that
would have authorized military trials of “any person, whether citizen or
subject of the enemy country or otherwise,” who engaged in any conduct
or speech (including any publication opposing the U.S. war cause),
anywhere in the United States, that would “endanger or interfere with[]
the good discipline order, movements, health, safety, or successful
operations of the land or naval forces of the United States.”720 Notably,
the ghostwriter and intellectual progenitor of this legislation, Assistant
Attorney General Charles Warren—acting in his personal capacity,
without Department of Justice approval—aggressively invoked alleged
historical analogies in support of the legislation.721 Yet Warren said not a
word about the Lincoln tribunal. Nor did the congressional proponents
of the legislation, such as Senators Chamberlain, Lodge, and Overman.
Moreover, both President Wilson and Attorney General Thomas Gregory
concluded that such legislation would be unconstitutional; and Gregory
formally opined that even a member of enemy forces, captured in an
effort to commit sabotage in the United States, could not constitutionally
be tried by a military court for a domestic-law spying offense unless his
conduct fell within a very circumscribed historical exception for certain

716. See, e.g., George B. Davis, A Treatise on the Military Law of the United States 33
& n.3 (New York, John Wiley & Sons 1898) (citing the Lincoln trial as one of the last
occasions in which a civilian (Bingham) was appointed as a prosecuting judge advocate);
id. at 130–31 n.1 (identifying another procedural point).
717. See G. Norman Lieber, The Justification of Martial Law (Washington, Gov’t
Printing Office 1898) (1896).
718. See John Norton Pomeroy, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the
United States § 714, at 597–98 (Boston & New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 10th ed.,
rev. 1888).
719. Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
720. See Extending Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals: Hearings on S. 4364 Before the
S. Comm. on Military Affairs, 65th Cong. 3 (1918) (quoting legislation); see also 56 Cong.
Rec. 5,120 (1918) (noting Senator Chamberlain’s introduction of S. 4364); Lederman,
Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1657–66 (discussing the proposed legislation).
721. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1664–65.
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forms of spying that are not privileged by the international law of war.722
Nowhere in these important debates did anyone mention the Lincoln
assassination commission, as far as I have been able to determine.
The questions raised in the First World War also precipitated a
(relative) outpouring of scholarship on the constitutional parameters of
military jurisdiction, in addition to the Second Edition of Winthrop,
during and shortly after the war.723 That corpus of work did not even
bother to contend with the well-known Lincoln trial, let alone cite it as
relevant authority.724 Finally, in 1933, John W. Curran wrote a short
article devoted specifically to the constitutionality of the Lincoln
proceedings. His stark conclusion, however, was hardly that the Lincoln
commission was an important legal precedent: “As the trials of the
Lincoln conspirators have been relegated to the museum of legal
history,” Curran wrote, “the most charitable view is to consider them the
result of the hysteria of war.”725
The view within the military justice system itself, by all that appears,
was even more damning. For example, Frederick Bernays Wiener
recalled that in the very first training session he attended as a judge
advocate, in 1936, Lieutenant Colonel Henry A. Auer instructed the class
“that no one currently regarded the military tribunal of the Assassination
Conspirators as a precedent that would or should be followed.”726 In his
own manual on martial law, which he published in 1940, Wiener wrote
that “military men generally have hesitated to regard the occasion as a
sound precedent or, indeed, as anything more than an indication of the
intensity of popular feeling at the moment.”727 And Wiener even went so
722. See id. at 1663–64 (discussing the Wilson Administration’s constitutional
objections to the legislation); id. at 1666–68 (discussing Trial of Spies by Military
Tribunals, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 356 (1918)).
723. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule (1930) [hereinafter Fairman,
Law of Martial Rule]; Henry J. Fletcher, The Civilian and the War Power, 2 Minn. L. Rev.
110 (1918); Hayes McKinney, Spies and Traitors, 12 Ill. L. Rev. 591 (1918); Edmund M.
Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Non-Military Persons Under the Articles of War, 4
Minn. L. Rev. 79 (1920); L.K. Underhill, Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals in the United
States over Civilians, 12 Calif. L. Rev. 75 (1924); Charles Warren, Spies, and the Power of
Congress to Subject Certain Classes of Civilians to Trial by Military Tribunal, 53 Am. L.
Rev. 195 (1919).
724. A minor exception is that Charles Fairman made passing reference to Attorney
General Speed’s opinion in his 1930 volume on martial law. That citation, however, was
hardly favorable. Fairman himself wrote that “[c]ertainly in time of war a commander may
seize those who engage in operation against his forces.” Fairman, Law of Martial Rule,
supra note 723, at 166. In a footnote, Fairman then added that Speed “carried the
principle to the point of sustaining the trial by military commission of persons charged
with the assassination of President Lincoln.” Id. at 166 n.12.
725. Curran, supra note 121, at 46.
726. Wiener, His Name Was Mudd, supra note 713, at 179 n.273.
727. Wiener, Practical Manual, supra note 123, at 138; see also id. (“[T]he
assassination of the President was murder, pure and simple . . . .”).
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far as to tell Justice Frankfurter, in private correspondence following the
Quirin case in 1942, that the Lincoln commission was a precedent that
“no self-respecting military lawyer will look straight in the eye.”728
V. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS
The relevant historical narrative is much sparser in the past century,
if only because there were very few wartime military trials of persons
unconnected with the U.S. armed services between 1873 and 2002. There
were, however, at least three such trials during or just after World War II,
including the landmark trial of eight Nazi saboteurs. The Lincoln
assassination tribunal was barely mentioned in those proceedings, either.
In the early 1990s, however, the constitutionality of the Lincoln trial itself
actually became a live issue again, in a very unusual proceeding initiated
by a descendant of Samuel Mudd. And finally, after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, the Lincoln commission, and Attorney General
Speed’s opinion about its constitutionality, began to be cited—for the
first time ever—as pertinent legal authority, within both the executive
branch and the federal judiciary.
A.

The Nazi Saboteurs Case (Quirin)

In the summer of 1942, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
apprehended eight individuals who had been paid and directed by the
German Army to commit acts of sabotage against war industries and
facilities in the United States.729 Two of them claimed to be American
citizens, and the Court assumed for purposes of argument that at least
one of them was.730 The federal courts in the District of Columbia were
available for a trial of these men, presumably for conspiring to commit
sabotage against federal facilities. Attorney General Francis Biddle,
however, recommended to President Roosevelt that the detainees be
tried in a military commission, principally because it would be difficult to
prove attempted sabotage in an Article III court (as the prisoners had
not gotten very far in their activities—they were under instructions not to
728. Letter from Frederick Bernays Wiener to Felix Frankfurter, supra note 123, at 9.
Indeed, the Lincoln trial was such a legal anathema that Wiener suggested it should not
even be cited as authority for the modest proposition that the Judge Advocate General
could be employed as prosecutor of a commission case. Id.
729. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1942).
730. See id. at 20; David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 61, 62
(1996). There is now a rich and growing literature on the case of the saboteurs. See, e.g.,
Carlos M. Vázquez, “Not a Happy Precedent”: The Story of Ex parte Quirin, in Federal
Courts Stories, supra note 654, at 219, 219 n.1 (citing sources). The best accounts of the
legal proceedings and decision include Charles F. Barber, Trial of Unlawful Enemy
Belligerents, 29 Cornell L.Q. 53 (1943); Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to
War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 Mil. L. Rev. 59 (1980);
Danelski, supra; Vázquez, supra.
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commit any acts of sabotage for ninety days after their arrival). Although
it might have been easier to prove a conspiracy to commit sabotage, the
penalty for such an offense was modest—as little as three years.731 Biddle
thus assumed that the law of war offered a better opportunity for
“swifter” and “severer” penalties.732 He advised Roosevelt that the
defendants had committed a “major violation of the law of war [by]
crossing behind the lines of a belligerent to commit hostile acts without
being in uniform”—an alleged offense that could be prosecuted by a
military commission and for which death was the penalty.733 Biddle
further advised the President that because enemy forces (allegedly)
lacked any constitutional rights of access to courts in wartime, Roosevelt
should issue an order precluding state and federal courts from hearing
any claims by the prisoners.734
The President took Biddle’s advice, even though he recognized that
the two U.S. citizens were “guilty of high treason,” which would
ordinarily be tried in a federal civilian court.735 “This being wartime,”
Roosevelt wrote to Biddle, “it is my inclination to try them by court
martial.”736 On July 2, 1942, the President issued two documents. The first
was a proclamation establishing both the primacy of military tribunals
and the denial of access to civil courts for a defined group of offenders:
[A]ll persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any
nation at war with the United States or who give obedience to or
act under the direction of any such nation, and who during
time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States or any
territory or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary
defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or
preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike
acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of
war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals; and that such
persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain
any proceeding directly or indirectly, or to have any such
remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf, in the courts of
731. See Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority 328 (1962) [hereinafter Biddle, In Brief
Authority].
732. See Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Biddle to President Franklin Roosevelt on
German Saboteurs 1 ( June 30, 1942), in Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Official File 5036 [hereinafter Biddle
Memorandum to the President].
733. Id. In fact, the saboteurs had been in uniform when they stealthily “crossed” the
relevant military lines—the beach patrols along the coasts in Long Island and Florida. See
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22 n.1 (describing military patrols). It was only after they had evaded
the military patrols at night that they shed their uniforms and went off into the interior of
the country in civilian dress.
734. Biddle Memorandum to the President, supra note 732, at 2.
735. Biddle, In Brief Authority, supra note 731, at 330 (quoting Memorandum from
President Franklin Roosevelt to Attorney Gen. Francis Biddle (June 30, 1942)).
736. Id.
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the United States, or of its States, territories, and possessions,
except under such regulations as the Attorney General, with the
approval of the Secretary of War, may from time to time
prescribe.737
The second of Roosevelt’s directives was denominated an order of the
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.”738 In that order, the
President appointed an eight-member military commission to try the
eight prisoners “for offenses against the law of war and the Articles of
War.”739 Roosevelt authorized the commission to admit evidence if the
President of the commission deemed that it would “have probative value
to a reasonable man,” and he specified that “[t]he concurrence of at
least two-thirds of the members of the Commission present shall be
necessary for a conviction or sentence.”740
Note that the President’s Proclamation and Order authorized trial
not only for violations of (or “offenses against”) the law of war but also
for offenses under the (statutory) Articles of War and for “committing or
attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or
warlike acts.”741 Roosevelt therefore specifically contemplated that the
saboteurs might be tried for some domestic-law offenses. And that is what
happened. The Department of the Judge Advocate General presented
four charges to the commission. Charge I purported to allege a
“violation of the law of war,” described as secretly passing, and appearing
behind, military and naval lines and defenses, in civilian dress, for the
purpose of committing acts of sabotage and espionage on behalf of the
German Reich—in particular, the destruction of certain war industries,
utilities, and materials within the United States.742 The other three
charges did not purport to describe violations of the law of war. Charge
II alleged a violation of Article 81 of the Articles of War, in that the
saboteurs allegedly “relieved or attempted to relieve” the enemy with
arms, ammunition, supplies, money and other things and allegedly “gave
intelligence to the enemies.”743 Charge III alleged a violation of Article
737. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proclamation 2561, Denying Certain Enemies
Access to the Courts of the United States (July 2, 1942), 7 Fed. Reg. 5,101, 5,101 ( July 7,
1942).
738. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Appointment of a Military Commission (July 2,
1942), 7 Fed. Reg. 5,103, 5,103 ( July 7, 1942).
739. Id.
740. Id.
741. Denying Certain Enemies Access to the Courts of the United States, 7 Fed. Reg. at
5,101.
742. Brief in Support of Writs of Habeas Corpus at 5–6, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(Nos. 1-7), reprinted in 39 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Constitutional Law 306, 310–11 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1975) [hereinafter Landmark Briefs].
743. Id. at 6. The theory underlying this charge was a stretch of Article 81—it was not
so much that the eight prisoners were conveying goods or information back to Germany
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82, the age-old prohibition on wartime spying under certain circumstances.744 Finally, Charge IV alleged that the accused conspired with one
another and with the German Reich to commit the first three offenses.745
In the midst of the commission proceedings, the defendants filed
both a habeas petition and a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court. The Court entertained extensive briefing and argument on the
case in a special session at the end of July. On July 31, the Court granted
the petition for certiorari and, in a brief per curiam opinion, held that
the petitioners were not entitled to release and, in particular, that the
“charges preferred against petitioners on which they are being tried by
military commission appointed by the order of the President of July 2,
1942, allege an offense or offenses which the President is authorized to
order tried before a military commission.”746 A few days later, the military
commission convicted the individuals of all four charges; six of the
saboteurs were executed, the other two sentenced to prison terms of
thirty years and life, respectively.747
In the Supreme Court briefing, the Lincoln trial did not get very
much attention; Attorney General Biddle, however, did cite it or
Attorney General Speed’s opinion three times in his brief. First, he cited
the 1865 Attorney General opinion, among other authorities, for the
modest proposition that military commissions (as opposed to courtsmartial) had historically been recognized by the political branches.748
Next, in an Appendix, Biddle’s brief referred to the assassination trial
itself, along with the Milligan, Vallandigham, Grenfel, and other trials, as
examples of Civil War military commissions.749 Finally, and most notably,
in another Appendix the brief cited the Lincoln conspirators’ trial as a
“cf.” authority for the proposition that Charge IV against the saboteurs,
the charge of a conspiracy to commit the other three charges, was itself
“contrary to the law of war.”750 Biddle’s brief did not make any effort,
however, to demonstrate that such a conspiracy (especially with respect
to the two non-law-of-war charges) was in fact a violation of the law of
but that they planned to supply one another with such supplies and information in the
service of their sabotage plan. Id.
744. Id. at 7.
745. Id. at 7–8.
746. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18 n. (emphasis added).
747. See Statement from the White House on the Sentences of Eight Nazi Saboteurs
Landed by Submarine on the Long Island and Florida Shores on June 13 and 17, 1942
(Aug. 8, 1942), http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/1942-08-08a.html [http://perma.cc/
S7W9-3QH5]; see also Eugene Rachlis, They Came to Kill: The Story of Eight Nazi
Saboteurs in America 281–90 (1961).
748. Brief for the Respondent at 35, Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (Nos. 1-7), reprinted in
Landmark Briefs, supra note 742, at 402, 436.
749. Id. app. II at 73–76.
750. Id. app. III at 83.
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war, except to assert, without elaboration or citation of authority, that the
“principle” that a conspiracy to commit an offense is itself an offense “is
a part of the laws of war.”751

Military trial of the eight alleged Nazi "saboteurs," July 1942, in a
room on the Fifth Floor of the Department of Justice that, as
reconfigured, was the author's office when he served as a DOJ
officer from 2009 to 2010 (U.S. Army Signal Corps) (Source:
Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI
Collection, LC-USE623-D-OA-000144).

In an opinion filed several months after the executions, the Court
effectively rejected Roosevelt’s effort to deny the saboteurs’ right of
access to courts. “[N]either the [President’s] Proclamation nor the fact
that they are enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of
petitioners’ contentions that the Constitution and laws of the United
States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission.”752
On the merits, however, the Court held that it was constitutional for
Congress to have authorized such use of a military commission, even
where civilian courts were “open and functioning normally,”753 to try
persons who were part of, or directed by, enemy armed forces, for at least
some offenses against the international law of war.754 In other words, the
751.
752.
753.
754.

Id.
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25; accord In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1945).
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24.
See id. at 40. The Court explained:

466

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:323

Court affirmed Attorney General Speed’s basic theory of military
jurisdiction, from his July 1865 opinion, distinct from the theories of
“necessity” and martial law that the Milligan Court had rejected.755
As I have explained elsewhere, Chief Justice Stone could have
offered a functional argument in support of this new Article III
exception—namely, that there would be good reason for Congress to
prefer that military officers, rather than civilian juries, adjudicate
questions involving the customary international law of war by which all
forces, including U.S. forces, must abide.756 Instead, Stone rested his case
on an argument from historical authority. Notably, however, Stone did
not rely upon the Lincoln trial, or on any other Civil War trials, even
[W]e must conclude that § 2 of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments cannot be taken to have extended the right to demand a
jury to trials by military commission, or to have required that offenses
against the law of war not triable by jury at common law be tried only in
the civil courts.
Id; see also id. at 29. The Court indicated that this law-of-war-offense exception is not
absolute: Some violations of the laws of war, wrote the Chief Justice, might be in a “class of
offenses constitutionally triable only by a jury.” Id. Chief Justice Stone included this caveat
at the insistence of Justice Black, who had written Stone an internal note declaring his
reluctance to issue a categorical judgment:
I seriously question whether Congress could constitutionally confer
jurisdiction to try all such violations before military tribunals . . . . [T]o
subject every person in the United States to trial by military tribunals for
every violation of every rule of war which has been or may hereafter be
adopted between nations among themselves, might go far to destroy the
protections declared by the Milligan case.
Memorandum from Justice Hugo L. Black to Chief Justice Harlan Stone (Oct. 2, 1942), in
Papers of Hugo L. Black, Library of Congress, box 269. The Court did not offer any hint in
its opinion about which law-of-war offenses must be tried in an Article III court.
755. The Court reaffirmed its holding that military courts could try charges of
international law-of-war violations in Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7–8, 11, 14, and in Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313–14 n.8 (1946) (citing Quirin and Yamahshita for the
proposition that the military has jurisdiction to try “enemy belligerents, prisoners of war,
or others charged with violating the laws of war”).
756. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1584–85. Alexander
Hamilton argued in The Federalist that perhaps juries should not try any cases that turn on
international law:
[T]here are many cases in which the trial by jury is an ineligible one. I
think it so particularly in cases which concern the public peace with
foreign nations—that is, in most cases where the question turns wholly
on the laws of nations . . . . Juries cannot be supposed competent to
investigations that require a thorough knowledge of the laws and usages
of nations; and they will sometimes be under the influence of
impressions which will not suffer them to pay sufficient regard to those
considerations of public policy which ought to guide their inquiries.
There would of course be always danger that the rights of other nations
might be infringed by their decisions so as to afford occasions of reprisal
and war.
The Federalist No. 83, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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though Speed’s opinion would have been the most obvious, and famous,
citation of authority for an “offenses against the law of war” theory of
military jurisdiction. Instead, Stone relied exclusively on Revolutionary
War precedents that he thought demonstrated an early practice of trying
law-of-war offenses in military tribunals,757 together with an assumption
that the Framers did not intend “to bring within the sweep of the [Article
III and Sixth Amendment] guarant[ees] those cases in which it was [at
the Founding] well understood that a jury trial could not be demanded
as of right.”758
Stone then proceeded to apply his holding to affirm the commission’s
jurisdiction over a single specification of one of the four charges at hand:
Specification 1 of Charge I, which nominally alleged a violation of the
law of war. Stone assumed that “unprivileged” belligerency of the sort
described in that specification—crossing enemy lines in civilian dress
with aims to attack military targets—violated the law of war.759
In the recent Al Bahlul litigation, Judge Kavanaugh opined that the
Nazi saboteurs’ conspiracy conviction in Charge IV (together with the
conspiracy charge in the Lincoln case) is an historical example that
supports military jurisdiction over domestic-law conspiracy charges under
the Military Commissions Act, not only because it was personally prosecuted by the Attorney General (Francis Biddle) and approved by
President Franklin Roosevelt but also because “[t]he Supreme Court
757. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 41–44 n.14.
758. Id. at 39. I argue in my earlier article that Stone misunderstood the Founding-era
history. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1587–88.
Nevertheless, whether he described that history accurately is not germane to the questions
at issue in this Article.
759. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 36–37. As he was writing the opinion, Stone was chagrined to
discover that international law authorities did not support this assumption; as he wrote to
his law clerks, he had drafted the opinion to include the law “as I think it ought to be,”
hoping that he would find authority for it. Letter from Chief Justice Harlan Stone to
Bennett Boskey and James L. Morrison, Law Clerks, 1 (Aug. 14, 1942), in Papers of Harlan
Fiske Stone, Library of Congress, box 69, folder marked “July Special Term 1942 Ex Parte
Quirin et al.”; see also Danelski, supra note 730, at 72–73. As I explain elsewhere, Stone
could not locate such authorities because his assumption about the law of war was
mistaken. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1587–88. Like
some of the stray remarks in the Lieber Code, see supra notes 221–224 and accompanying
text, it reflected “a fundamental confusion between acts punishable under international
law and acts with respect to which international law affords no protection.” Baxter, supra
note 519, at 340. Stone was therefore wrong to assume that the conduct alleged against the
saboteurs in Charge I—going behind enemy lines in civilian dress with aims to attack
military targets—violated the law of war. Such conduct might not be privileged—i.e.,
international law may permit states to punish it under their domestic law—but
international law does not itself prohibit the conduct. For present purposes, however, what
is important is simply the nature of the Court’s holding—and its refusal to decide whether
the commission had jurisdiction over the other three charges, which plainly did not allege
offenses against the law of war—rather than whether the application of that holding to
Specification 1 of Charge I was correct.
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affirmed the legality of the trial, and in doing so, did not disturb the
conspiracy charge.”760
Contrary to Judge Kavanaugh’s account, however, the Court in
Quirin actually cast doubt on the constitutionality of using military
tribunals to try individuals unaffiliated with the armed forces for warrelated offenses (such as conspiracy) that are not violations of the law of
war. For one thing, Chief Justice Stone distinguished Milligan on precisely
that ground: He assumed that the law of war was “inapplicab[le]” to
Milligan’s conduct because he was not “part of or associated with the
armed forces of the enemy.”761 Of perhaps even greater significance,
Stone also stressed that the Court was not deciding whether the
Roosevelt-approved commission had constitutional jurisdiction to adjudicate any of the other charges in the case, apart from Specification 1 of
Charge I.762 Stone apparently settled upon this odd quasi-disposition in
Quirin because he recognized constitutional “difficulties” with military
adjudication of claims that did not clearly allege law-of-war offenses.763
Stone was not alone in failing to identify any legal authority for treating
the alleged conspiracy as a law-of-war offense: Just as Attorney General
Speed did not discuss whether the conspiracy charge in the Lincoln case
was constitutional in his comprehensive 1865 opinion defending that
military commission,764 likewise Attorney General Biddle made no effort
to argue that the conspiracy charge in Quirin was constitutional—apart
from his unconvincing, undefended statement in passing, in an appendix
to his brief, that such conspiracy was, in fact, a violation of the law of

760. Al Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 766–67 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017).
761. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45. Otherwise, of course, the charge against Milligan that
expressly alleged a violation of the law of war would have been constitutional, per Quirin.
762. Id. at 46; see also Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1674.
763. Letter from Chief Justice Harlan Stone to Bennett Boskey, Law Clerk, 1 (Aug. 20,
1942), in Papers of Harlan Fiske Stone, Library of Congress, box 69, folder marked “July
Special Term 1942 Ex Parte Quirin et al.” Stone was referring to the second and third
charges, for relieving the enemy and spying, which as alleged by the government did not
clearly make out law-of-war offenses. Stone did not specifically mention the conspiracy
charge at all, in his memo to his clerk or in his ultimate description, in his opinion, of
what the Court was and was not deciding. Presumably, if Stone had agreed with the
government that the conspiracy charge alleged a law-of-war offense, the Court would have
confirmed the constitutionality of that count, too, on the basis of Stone’s rationale for
upholding Specification 1 of Charge I. The fact that the Court did not do so suggests that
Stone was uncertain about the legal source of the conspiracy charge, as well as of Charges
II and III.
764. See supra notes 489–491 and accompanying text (highlighting Speed’s
characterization of the issue as whether persons charged “with the offence of having
assassinated the President” could be tried before a military tribunal (quoting Military
Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 297 (1865))).
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war765 (that is to say, his effort to bring that charge within the Court’s ultimate holding—an implied invitation that the Court carefully rebuffed).
B.

The Surprising Revival of the Case of Samuel Mudd

In the 1970s, Samuel Mudd’s grandson, Richard Mudd, began a
campaign to clear his grandfather’s name. When he petitioned President
Jimmy Carter to set aide the conviction, Carter responded that, in his
“personal opinion,” Andrew Johnson’s declarations in his formal pardon
of Mudd “substantially discredit the validity of the military commission’s
judgment,” and he hoped that this conclusion would “clear the Mudd
family name of any negative connotation or implied lack of honor.”766
Nevertheless, Carter informed Richard Mudd that he lacked any power
to set aside the conviction.767 Eight years later, Ronald Reagan likewise
informed Richard Mudd that although he had come to believe “that Dr.
Samuel Mudd was indeed innocent of any wrongdoing,” the power to
pardon “is all that is within a President’s prerogatives and that, of course,
was done by President Andrew Johnson.”768
Richard Mudd then tried another tactic: He applied to the Army
Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), seeking to correct
his grandfather’s military records by striking the 1865 military commission conviction.769 (The ABCMR is a civilian board that can recommend
correction of Army records to the Secretary of the Army.) Richard Mudd
cited two reasons for the requested correction: that his grandfather was
not guilty of the offense (primarily because there wasn’t sufficient
evidence that Mudd knew of Lincoln’s killing when he assisted Booth)
and that the military commission lacked jurisdiction to try Dr. Mudd.770
As to the jurisdictional claim, Mudd’s representatives stressed at an
ABCMR hearing that Mudd was not charged with violating the law of war
and that therefore he should have been afforded a civilian trial,771 just as
John Surratt received in 1867772 and just as the government had
prosecuted those accused of assisting German agents (including the
Quirin saboteurs) in World War II.773
765. See supra note 751 and accompanying text.
766. Letter from President Jimmy Carter to Dr. Richard Mudd ( July 24, 1979) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
767. Id.
768. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to Dr. Richard Mudd (Dec. 8, 1987) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
769. See Proceedings at 2–3, In re Mudd, No. AC91-05511 (Army Bd. for Corr. of
Military Records Jan. 22, 1992).
770. Transcript of Hearing at 7–8, Mudd, No. AC91-05511 (Index No. 101.01).
771. See id. at 46.
772. See supra section III.F.2.a.
773. See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 36 (1945); United States v. Haupt,
136 F.2d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 1943).
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The Army Board concluded that Mudd’s case was “analogous” to
Milligan’s and that Attorney General Speed’s opinion thus did not offer a
justification for military jurisdiction.774 It concluded that the commission
did not have jurisdiction to try Mudd and that the trial was “such a gross
infringement of his constitutionally protected rights, that his conviction
should be set aside.”775 Six months later, however, the Acting Assistant
Secretary of the Army, William D. Clark, denied the Board’s recommendation and Richard Mudd’s request, because he concluded it was
“inappropriate” for a nonjudicial body such as the ABCMR to secondguess the decisions of Attorney General Speed and Judge Boynton in the
1860s.776 Mudd’s grandson asked for reconsideration of the decision.777
Four years later, a new Assistant Secretary, Sara Lister, again denied the
request to vacate the conviction, on the ground, earlier decreed by
Speed, that the “assassination was an offense against the law of war.”778
Lister wrote that “[a]ny further Army action would be an ill-advised
attempt to alter legal history by nonjudicial means.”779
Richard Mudd then filed an action in federal district court,
challenging the Army’s refusal to expunge his grandfather’s record of
conviction.780 Judge Paul Friedman concluded that Lister’s action was
arbitrary and capricious because she had simply deferred to Attorney
General Speed’s and Judge Boynton’s judgments and had not independently addressed whether Mudd’s offense was, in fact, a violation of the
law of war.781 On remand to the Army, yet a third Assistant Secretary,
Patrick Henry, also rejected the petition. Henry concluded that the
commission had jurisdiction over Mudd because he was, in effect,
charged with aiding and abetting Booth, who had violated the law of
war.782 Henry did not explain, however, why Booth’s actions violated
international law. Nor did he examine whether aiding and abetting
another’s law-of-war offense is itself a law-of-war offense.783 The case then

774. Proceedings at 12, Mudd, No. AC91-05511.
775. Id.
776. Memorandum from William D. Clark, Acting Assistant Sec’y of the Army, to the
Exec. Sec’y, Army Bd. for Corr. of Military Records 2 ( July 22, 1992) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
777. See Letter from Sara E. Lister, Assistant Sec’y of the Army, to [redacted recipient]
1 (Feb. 2, 1996) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
778. Id. at 2.
779. Id. at 3.
780. Mudd v. Caldera, 26 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118 (D.D.C. 1998).
781. Id. at 123.
782. Decision at 2, In re Mudd, Patrick Henry, Assistant Sec’y of the Army for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs (Mar. 6, 2000).
783. Notably, even in the case of the Nazi saboteurs, when U.S. persons—including
the father of one of the accused—were alleged to have given aid and comfort to two of the
saboteurs, the government tried them for treason in Article III courts, rather than for a
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went back up to Judge Friedman. The judge did not decide whether
Mudd had committed an offense against the law of war, but he
concluded that he “[could not] say that [Assistant] Secretary Henry’s
decision was arbitrary, capricious or not in accordance with law.”784
Richard Mudd then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.785 Defending the Army’s decision, the
federal government’s entire explanation for why Mudd had committed a
law-of-war offense was to repeat Judge Boynton’s 1869 “reasoning” that
Lincoln was killed not in his capacity as President but as Commander in
Chief.786 Once again, however—as in 1869—Dr. Mudd’s case was
dismissed without an ultimate resolution of the merits: The court of
appeals concluded that Richard Mudd was not an heir of the sort of
“claimant” contemplated by the military record corrections statute
because Samuel Mudd had not been a member of the armed forces.787
Accordingly, the court held, Richard Mudd was not within the “zone of
interests” protected by the statute and thus lacked so-called “prudential”
standing.788
Mudd’s grandson’s belated effort to formally repudiate any constitutional legacy of the assassination trial thus ended with a whimper.
C.

After 2001: Resuscitating the Lincoln Case as Precedent

While Richard Mudd’s federal case was on appeal, the Department
of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) dusted off Attorney General
Speed’s opinion in the Lincoln case, citing it as authority for the
proposition that President George W. Bush had the power to establish
military commissions in wartime without statutory authorization.789 That
particular question is, of course, distinct from the question of Article III’s
limits, and it is unlikely to be relevant anytime in the near future because
such unilateral Presidential action is unlikely: In the wake of Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld 790 and the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2009,
it is almost certain that, going forward, military commissions will be
convened pursuant to a statutory regime, not as a matter of unilateral
executive command. Even so, the 2001 OLC opinion brought the Speed

law-of-war offense in a military court. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 36 (1945);
United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 1943).
784. Mudd v. Caldera, 134 F. Supp. 2d 138, 147 (D.D.C. 2001).
785. Mudd v. White, 309 F.3d 819, 820–21 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
786. Brief for Appellees at 20, Mudd, 309 F.3d 819 (No. 01-5103).
787. See Mudd, 309 F.3d at 824.
788. Id.
789. Legality of the Use of Military Commissions to Try Terrorists, 25 Op. O.L.C. 238,
248–49 (2001).
790. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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opinion out of the mothballs—it was the first time in well over a century
that a published Department of Justice opinion had cited it.
The Lincoln assassination commission then became an unexpected
flash point in the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan. The Court in
that case assumed, based upon Quirin, that congressionally authorized
military commissions could be used to adjudicate at least some offenses
against the international law of war.791 In dissent, Justice Thomas cited
the Lincoln commission, and the Speed opinion, as authority for the
proposition that conspiracy to commit a law-of-war offense is itself a
violation of the law of war: “[I]n the highest profile case to be tried
before a military commission relating to [the Civil War], namely, the trial
of the men [sic] involved in the assassination of President Lincoln, the
charge provided that those men had ‘combin[ed], confederat[ed], and
conspir[ed] . . . to kill and murder’ President Lincoln.”792 Further,
Justice Thomas argued that, even apart from conspiracy, the petitioner,
Salim Hamdan, could be tried in a military commission for merely
having cast his lot with al-Qaeda.793 In support of this notion, Thomas
relied upon the Speed opinion as having established such a proposition as
a matter of international law:
For well over a century it has been established that “to
unite with banditti, jayhawkers, guerillas, or any other
unauthorized marauders is a high offence against the laws of
war; the offence is complete when the band is organized or
joined. The atrocities committed by such a band do not
constitute the offence, but make the reasons, and sufficient
reasons they are, why such banditti are denounced by the laws
of war.794
Both of these citations were problematic, even on their own terms.795
Be that as it may, however, they served to revive the notion that the
791. See id. at 602 (plurality opinion).
792. Id. at 699 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting General Court-Martial Orders, No.
356 ( July 5, 1865), in Official Records, supra note 156, ser. II, vol. 8, at 696, 696).
793. Id. at 692–93.
794. Id. at 693–94 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y
Gen. 297, 312 (1865)). Thomas elaborated: “In other words, unlawful combatants, such as
Hamdan, violate the law of war merely by joining an organization, such as al-Qaeda, whose
principal purpose is the ‘killing [and] disabling . . . of peaceable citizens or soldiers.’” Id.
at 694 (citing, inter alia, Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. at 314 (“A bushwhacker,
a jayhawker, a bandit, a war rebel, an assassin, being public enemies, may be tried,
condemned, and executed as offenders against the laws of war.”)).
795. As the United States has recently acknowledged, a stand-alone conspiracy to
violate the law of war is not itself a law-of-war violation. See Brief for the United States in
Opposition, supra note 86, at 26 n.6. Moreover, the Lincoln case was not litigated on the
theory that conspiracy—let alone an inchoate, unrealized conspiracy, which was not at
issue there—is a violation of the international law of war. Nor did Attorney General Speed
opine on that question. Speed did opine that joining certain sorts of unprivileged
belligerent groups violates the law of war. See supra notes 514–518 and accompanying
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Speed opinion, and the Lincoln assassination trial, might serve as
possible sources of legal authority for the first time since 1865. And if the
Lincoln case could be cited as authority for propositions about the
content of international law, it stood to figure that it was only a matter of
time before it would also be cited as authority with respect to the more
fundamental constitutional question, too.
That time has now come. As I discussed at the outset,796 in his recent
opinion for three judges in Al Bahlul, Judge Kavanaugh relied heavily on
the Lincoln trial as a basis for rejecting the defendant’s Article III
objection to his conviction by military commission, reasoning that that
1865 trial (along with the Quirin case) allegedly lies “at the core” of
historical military practice, which “cannot be airbrushed out of the
picture.”797
VI. THE USE OF LANDMARK MILITARY TRIALS AS A SOURCE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
“Arguments based on historical practice are a mainstay of debates
about the constitutional separation of powers.”798 In two recent landmark
cases, the Supreme Court has confirmed that adage by resolving longstanding interbranch disputes primarily on the basis of the Court’s
reading of historical settlement within the political branches.799 Politicalbranch practice, the Court insists, can be “an important interpretive
factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to
dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding era.”800
text. But he was mistaken about that, see supra notes 519–521 and accompanying text,
and, in any event, the prosecution in the Lincoln commission did not allege that theory,
either.
796. See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text.
797. Al Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017).
798. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 134, at 412.
799. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091–94 (2015); NLRB v. Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–64 (2014).
800. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560. Noel Canning was not, of course, the first such
case in which the Court had relied heavily on such political-branch practice. For example,
in The Pocket Veto Case, the Court affirmed that a bill becomes law when it is submitted to
the President fewer than ten days before a congressional adjournment at the end of a
session and the President neither signs nor returns it before that adjournment. See 279
U.S. 655, 692 (1929). Pointing to 119 such examples over the course of about seventy
years, the Court explained:
The views which we have expressed as to the construction and effect of
the constitutional provision here in question are confirmed by the
practical construction that has been given to it by the Presidents through
a long course of years, in which Congress has acquiesced. Long settled
and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper
interpretation of constitutional provisions of this character.
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Not surprisingly, then, in the wake of Noel Canning and Zivotofsky, the government contends—and at least three judges of the D.C. Circuit agree—
that such deference to established practice is the key to unlocking the
question of whether there is, or should be, an Article III exception for
the military adjudication of domestic-law crimes that are in some way
related to the nation’s prosecution of war.
A.

The Problems with Reliance on Political-Branch Practice in This Context

It is noteworthy, however, that in its long series of cases dealing with
possible exceptions to Article III’s guarantees, in both the civil and
criminal contexts, the Supreme Court has rarely, if ever, looked to the
practices of the political branches for guidance.801 Indeed, on at least one
such occasion it brushed aside Civil War statutory precedents as worthy of
no more than summary dismissal in a footnote.802
There are at least two reasons why the Court might be reluctant to
defer to political-branch practice in this context. First, the Court typically
has credited such practice when the constitutional text is vague or
ambiguous—to “give meaning to the words of a text,” such as by treating
practice “as a gloss” on the undefined term “executive Power” in Article
II,803 or to effectively “supply” words when the Constitution is silent on a
question of one branch’s power.804 Here, however, the words of Article

Id. at 688–89. Likewise, in Ex parte Grossman, the Court reasoned that a “long practice” of
presidential pardons of convictions for criminal contempt of court—twenty-seven
instances over the course of eighty-five years—with virtually no congressional pushback,
“sustain[ed]” a construction of the Pardon Clause to encompass such offenses. 267 U.S.
87, 118–19 (1925); see also, e.g., The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 416 (1885) (holding that a
statute giving the Secretary of Treasury, rather than the President, the power to remit
penalties relating to steam vessels was constitutional in light of a long tradition of such
remissions by the Secretary pursuant to such statutes).
801. But cf. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 504–05 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[I]n my view an Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless there is a
firmly established historical practice to the contrary.”). It is unclear whether Justice Scalia
here was referring to a preconstitutional “historical practice” or to a practice that might
have crystallized after the Constitution was ratified.
802. See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 n.8 (1955). In at least one case—Quirin—the
Court’s decision did rest upon a very different sort of historical argument, namely, that the
Constitution was not designed to eliminate a practice that (allegedly) was commonly
employed during the Revolutionary War, and that the early Congresses confirmed the
legitimacy of that practice. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at
1585–87. That decision did not, however, invoke postconstitutional wartime practices as
precedent.
803. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
804. Id. at 610; see also Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 135,
at 450 (“It . . . was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and
differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms & phrases necessarily
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III and the Sixth Amendment arguably are “too plain and direct, to leave
room for misconstruction or doubt of their true meaning.”805 Exceptions
to that plain text, at least in theory, should thus be recognized only
reluctantly, and only for fairly compelling reasons.806
Second, the Article III question at issue here is not—as in Noel
Canning, Zivotofsky, and similar cases—simply about the powers of the
Executive and the relationship of authorities between the two political
branches. In cases such as those, it arguably makes some sense to inquire
whether there has been “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the
Constitution.”807 If the two political branches have, in effect, settled upon
an equilibrium in allocating authority between themselves, perhaps there
is good reason to credit that settlement. Here, however, the guarantees
in question, especially the jury right, are widely understood to be
fundamental protections of individual liberty.808 Moreover, insofar as
Article III is also seen as a structural protection to “safeguard[] the role of
the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system by barring congressional
attempts ‘to transfer jurisdiction to non-Article III tribunals for the
purpose of emasculating’ constitutional courts,”809 then the military’s
exercise of Article I adjudicatory power diminishes the authority of the
very branch to which the Constitution assigns the “judicial power” of the
United States. Accordingly, the fact that the two political branches might
have “settled” upon a practice that weakens the otherwise exclusive
authority of the judiciary should not be accepted as a reasonable gloss on
used in such a charter . . . and that it might require a regular course of practice to
liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them.”).
805. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119–20 (1866); see also Transcript in En
Banc Oral Argument at 21–22, Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No.
11-1324) (Kavanaugh, J.) [hereinafter Al Bahlul Transcript] (“[B]ecause Article III . . .
does not have an exception for Military Commissions . . . . under the plain language of
Article III you [al Bahlul’s counsel] have a great case.”).
806. See Al Bahlul Transcript at 66 (Kavanaugh, J.) (“The baseline, arguably, should
be the text of Article III which contains no exception for Military Commissions, and then
the argument would go [that] Quirin carved out an atextual exception to Article III, but
we should narrowly construe it because it is an atextual exception.”); see also INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–52 (1983) (rejecting the authority of a frequent practice of the
political branches that the Court thought was flatly inconsistent with the textual
commands of bicameralism and presentment in Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3).
807. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
808. To be sure, the Court has often understood the balance of powers between the
President and Congress also to be a guarantee of individual liberty, in the sense that
checks on the exercise of unilateral power help to prevent tyranny. The jury right, however, is a more direct protection of individual rights.
809. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) (quoting Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co.,
337 U.S. 582, 664 (1949) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting)); accord Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v.
Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015).
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“the judicial power of the United States” unless the judiciary itself has
also acquiesced in its own “emasculati[on].”810
B.

Views from the Three Branches on the Article III Question

It is, therefore, necessary—at a minimum—to consider carefully the
historical perspectives of all three branches in order to discern whether
there has been the sort of “systematic, unbroken, executive practice”811
that might at least inform the question of whether to now recognize yet
another Article III criminal trial exception. And when we look to
whether and how the three branches have historically treated military
trials of domestic-law offenses, it turns out there is not much ratification
to be found there, even accounting for “the two most well-known U.S.
military commission precedents, the landmark Lincoln assassin and Nazi
saboteur cases.”812
1. The Executive. — Perhaps the single most revealing historical fact
bearing on the Article III question is how infrequently the military has
actually tried individuals for domestic-law offenses in the wars fought
since Article III was ratified in 1789. Almost all such cases occurred
during the Civil War, as part of an aggressive undertaking by Edwin
810. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850. In this respect, the juxtaposition of Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803), is
instructive. In Marbury, the Court paid no deference at all to Congress’s—and George
Washington’s—(purported) judgment, reflected in section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80, that Article III empowered Congress to afford the Court
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to federal officers. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 176. Six days later, however, in Stuart, the Court held that Article III did not
prohibit Congress from requiring the Justices to ride circuit, reasoning that the “practice
and acquiescence” by the Justices themselves “for a period of several years, commencing
with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed
fixed the construction.” Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 309. To similar effect, in Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), the Court affirmed its authority to
entertain appeals from state court decisions on questions of federal law, in part because of
the historical practice:
[T]he supreme court of the United States have, from time to time,
sustained this appellate jurisdiction in a great variety of cases, brought
from the tribunals of many of the most important states in the union,
and . . . no state tribunal has ever breathed a judicial doubt on the
subject, or declined to obey the mandate of the supreme court, until the
present occasion.”
Id. at 352. “[T]hese judicial decisions of the supreme court through so long a period,”
wrote Justice Story, together with “contemporaneous exposition by all parties [at the time
of ratification], [and] acquiescence of enlightened state courts, . . . place the doctrine
upon a foundation of authority which cannot be shaken, without delivering over the
subject to perpetual and irremediable doubts.” Id.
811. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
812. Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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Stanton’s War Department.813 And the War Department defended the
constitutionality of those trials predominantly on two grounds—martial
law “necessity” and the inapplicability of the Constitution in war—that
did not survive the Milligan decision and that, in any event, would not be
viable arguments today with respect to trials pursuant to the Military
Commissions Act. Not surprisingly, then, since the Civil War the
executive branch has increasingly turned to civilian court trials to
prosecute war-related, domestic-law offenses such as “support” for the
enemy, especially during the current armed conflict against al-Qaeda, in
which Article III trials have become ubiquitous.814
The two major exceptions to this historical norm are those on which
the government and Judge Kavanaugh would place so much reliance: the
1865 Lincoln assassination commission and the 1942 Nazi saboteur trial.
Indeed, those trials stand out not only due to the notoriety of the
defendants and their offenses but precisely because those military
proceedings are such anomalies in our constitutional history.815 They are
aberrant cases, noteworthy in large measure because they deviated so
dramatically from the norm. Just as significantly, both cases have also
been viewed with deep suspicion over time. Various aspects of the
Court’s decision (and process) in Quirin have been regularly, and
sharply, criticized. Justice Scalia, for example, referred to it as “not this
Court’s finest hour.”816 As for the Lincoln assassination trial, its
constitutionality was a deeply contested question even as it was being
813. See supra notes 137–148 and accompanying text.
814. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1567–68.
815. Three other less famous cases do not materially affect the basic thrust of the
historical narrative. First, in the War of 1812, General Andrew Jackson convened a courtmartial to try a Louisiana state senator for having written a letter to the editor of a
newspaper. See id. at 1632 n.557. That court-martial resulted in a quick acquittal; it was
not authorized by President Madison (to the contrary, Madison indicated doubts about
the legitimacy of such trials, see id. at 1632), and it was predicated on a very aggressive
understanding of martial law, of the sort the Court in Milligan rejected. See id. Second, in
the First World War, the military tried a German agent, Lieutenant Lothar Witzke, who
was apprehended after crossing the Mexican border in disguise with plans to conduct acts
of sabotage in the United States. See id. at 1666–68. The government defended that
prosecution on the ground that it came within the traditional exception for spying within
enemy encampments, unprivileged by the laws of war. See id. Notably, however, Attorney
General Gregory concluded that that trial would not be constitutional if the facts did not
bring the case within that traditional, very circumscribed exception. See id. at 1667. Third,
in the Colepaugh case—one that closely resembled the Quirin saboteurs case—a military
commission tried two German agents for both a law-of-war offense and domestic-law
offenses. See id. at 1674–75. In asking the Supreme Court not to review the convictions,
however, the government specifically argued that the (alleged) law-of-war offense was
sufficient to sustain the judgment and that the Court did not need to consider the other
counts. See id.
816. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by
Stevens, J.).
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conducted. Members of Congress questioned it,817 as did officers in
Lincoln’s own cabinet,818 at least one member of the military commission
itself,819 and much of the press sympathetic to the Union.820 An esteemed
New York judge, noting “grave” constitutional doubts, went so far as to
invite a grand jury to issue a “presentment” expressing the unlawfulness
of the Lincoln commission.821 By 1867, that trial was under such a dark
constitutional shadow that when Booth’s primary accomplice, John
Surratt, was extradited to the United States several months after the
Milligan decision, the government did not use a military commission but
instead tried him in the local Article III court.822 Thus, even taken
together, these two very unusual military trials hardly establish the sort of
“systematic” and “unbroken” practice that is ordinarily thought adequate
to “liquidate” the meaning or proper application of a constitutional provision by virtue of a longstanding consensus regarding their legitimacy.823
Nor is there a robust, pre-2001 history of Presidents or Attorneys
General approving of the constitutionality of such military tribunals. To
be sure, Franklin Roosevelt and Francis Biddle approved of the trial of
the Nazi saboteurs, and Roosevelt even expressed an interest (in internal
correspondence) in having a military tribunal try the U.S. citizens among
them for treason.824 But FDR was the exception, not the rule. President
Madison hinted at doubts in the War of 1812.825 President Wilson and his
817. See, e.g., supra notes 385–386 and accompanying text (describing Representative
Davis’s letter to President Johnson arguing against trying the conspirators in a military
commission).
818. See supra note 359 and accompanying text (noting Secretaries Welles’s and
McCulloch’s preference for a trial in the local Article III court).
819. See supra notes 393–397 and accompanying text (discussing Brevet BrigadierGeneral Cyrus Comstock’s doubts about the constitutionality of the military commission).
820. See, e.g., supra notes 389–391 and accompanying text (recounting criticism of
the decision to use a military commission in the New York Times).
821. See supra notes 423–424 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Rufus
Peckham’s charge to a grand jury on the use of a military commission to try the Lincoln
conspirators).
822. See supra section III.F.2.a.
823. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546–47 (1969) (“That an
unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not render that same action any
less unconstitutional at a later date.”); Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in
Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 130–31 (1984) (explaining
that the Court has usually credited political-branch custom only when it has been exercised
repeatedly, not merely on occasion).
824. See supra note 735–747 and accompanying text (quoting Roosevelt’s
memorandum to Biddle).
825. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1632. Although the
constitutional question there was not directly at issue, by virtue of an absence of statutory
authority Madison overturned the military conviction of a U.S. citizen who had spied upon
U.S. Army camps on behalf of the British, directing that the spy be tried instead in state
court or released. See id.
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Attorney General, Thomas Gregory, flatly rejected the constitutionality of
proposed legislation (drafted by Assistant Attorney General Charles
Warren) that would have authorized military courts to adjudicate a wide
swath of conduct because of its impact on military objectives.826 And, of
greatest importance here, Attorney General Speed eventually defended
the Lincoln conspirators’ prosecutions only on the theory that they had
been convicted of offenses against the international law of war—a view
that the Court eventually ratified in Quirin, but one that does not begin
to justify the use of such military courts for the trial of domestic-law
offenses.827
That leaves the fascinating, complicated, and perhaps inscrutable
example of Abraham Lincoln himself. It is true, of course, that Lincoln
formally authorized, and participated in, his War Department’s elaborate
system of military trials, including many cases that did not allege
violations of the law of war. Lincoln apparently expressed doubts about
the constitutionality of at least some such trials when speaking to trusted
colleagues, however, and in at least one case—involving the Coles County
rioters—Lincoln appeared to heed the advice of Justice David Davis, who
had advised him that a military trial would be unconstitutional and
unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny: Lincoln directed that the prisoners
be released or turned over to civilian authorities before the military trial
commenced.828 Perhaps most revealingly, when a group of Ohio
Democrats called out Lincoln specifically on the question of the tribunals’
constitutionality, in the context of the Vallandigham case, Lincoln was
unable to offer any response other than to mischaracterize the military
commissions as only a means of wartime incapacitation rather than as
criminal tribunals designed to assess guilt and impose punishment,
which they plainly were.829 The paucity of Lincoln’s legal response is
especially revealing about whether he had resolved that the military
826. See id. at 1659–64; see also id. at 1666–68 (discussing Gregory’s “repudiation of
the Warren view” in a spying case involving a captured German agent).
827. See supra section II.B.6. As I have explained, Speed was probably wrong about
whether the accused did, in fact, violate the law of war and in suggesting that they were
convicted of any such offense; but the important point is that Speed’s opinion hinged,
critically, on the idea that they had, in fact, violated the law of war. It is true, as Judge
Kavanaugh noted in Al Bahlul, that President Johnson personally approved military
adjudication of the case of the Lincoln assassination defendants. See Al Bahlul v. United
States, 840 F.3d 757, 766 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017). Johnson did so, however, based upon a conclusory, onesentence opinion of Attorney General Speed, see supra note 382 and accompanying text
(quoting Speed’s one-sentence opinion); and there is no way of knowing whether
Johnson, like Speed, thought the military trial was permissible only because the charges
(allegedly) described offenses against the international law of war.
828. See supra section III.A (discussing the Coles County Riot).
829. See supra notes 276–286 (discussing Lincoln’s response in the Birchard Letter to
criticism from Ohio Democrats).
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commissions were constitutionally defensible: He obscured the issue in
order to avoid it.830 Lincoln was famously willing and eager to offer
robust, albeit contested, justifications of the constitutionality of many of
his most controversial wartime actions, including the suspension of
habeas, detention of dissidents, and emancipation.831 There were, however, rare cases in which Lincoln acted with full knowledge that what he
was doing was unlawful, or at least dubious—cases in which he conspicuously declined to offer his usual legal defenses.832 By all that
appears, his involvement in, and approval of, certain military tribunal
trials was one such instance.
It is tempting to speculate how Lincoln would have treated the
legacy, and continued operation, of military trials, had he lived to
superintend the cessation of the war and the subsequent Reconstruction.
There is, for example, no evidence that he attempted to disclaim, or
hamper, Henry Winter Davis’s efforts, in the hours just before the
Second Inaugural, to have Congress effectively repudiate the system of
commissions and bring it to a halt.833 Perhaps he would have welcomed
such an erasure of the constitutional slate. (But then again, there is no
evidence that Lincoln encouraged that legislative initiative, either.) It is
difficult to imagine he would have countenanced the dramatic and
highly irregular proceedings that occurred in the Old Arsenal in May
and June of 1865, or his successor’s use of habeas suspension to prevent
the judiciary from adjudicating the constitutional question in the case of
Mary Surratt just hours before she went to the gallows. There is, however,
no way to know for certain: Booth’s bullet ensured that the nation would
never learn how Lincoln would have negotiated questions such as these
in his second term, just as we are left to speculate precisely whether and
how he would have made good on the conciliatory path he began to
carve in his inaugural address less than six weeks before his untimely
death.
2. Congress. — The Civil War Congress was, at best, deeply
ambivalent about the War Department’s military commissions. The legislature never expressly authorized them and, in the 1863 Habeas Act,
830. See supra notes 280–288 and accompanying text (offering contextual evidence to
show Lincoln’s awareness that military commissions were, at least in part, punitive in
nature).
831. See generally Farber, supra note 289; Randall, supra note 137.
832. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2383 (1862) (confessing in a message
to the Senate and House that he had in one instance expended funds for the raising of
troops “without any authority of law” in order to ensure that “the Government was saved
from overthrow”). For discussion of this extraordinary episode, see David J. Barron &
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional
History, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 1001–03 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History].
833. See supra section I.B.3.c.
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Congress took steps to effectively prevent such commissions except in
cases in which civil courts were genuinely unavailable.834 On the other
hand, Congress did little to ensure enforcement of the 1863 Act for two
years, as Holt and the War Department circumvented it via an
interpretive sleight-of-hand;835 and in 1864 Congress passed a statute
drafted by Holt that expressly assumed the commissions’ continued
operation (albeit only after a chief sponsor reassured skeptical members
that it would not authorize any such trials).836 In 1865, many members of
Congress inveighed against the War Department’s trials and complained
about the Executive’s noncompliance with the 1863 Act. Indeed, only
minutes before Lincoln’s second term began, the legislature—led by
staunch supporters of the President, who thought that the blight of
commissions would tarnish his legacy—came within a hair’s breadth of
proscribing military commissions altogether, with the House even
refusing to approve a government-wide appropriations bill because the
anticommission provision was not included in the version the Senate
approved. On the other hand, however, the Senate would not accede to
that legislation, at least not as an appropriations rider mere hours before
Congress’s adjournment.837 Like President Lincoln, then, the Civil War
Congress appeared to be deeply concerned about the constitutionality of
the military commissions, but not concerned enough (or perhaps too
concerned about practical or political ramifications) to take the steps
necessary to bring them to a halt. To be sure, in 1867 Congress enacted a
law that purported to retroactively authorize most of the Civil War
military trials and, in effect, to statutorily rebuke Milligan. That enactment was primarily motivated, however, by a desire to foreclose liability
against Union officers for their conduct during the war and did not
accomplish its apparent objective: The judiciary continued to adjudicate
the legality of Civil War commission sentences, notwithstanding a provision of the 1867 law that purported to strip the courts of jurisdiction.
From Reconstruction until 2006, Congress did not authorize the use
of military tribunals for domestic-law offenses by persons who were not a
part of, or employed by, the armed forces, with one possible, minor
exception—a statute the Executive virtually never used except in the case
of the 1942 saboteurs.838 Senator George Chamberlain’s initiative in
834. See supra section I.B.3.a.
835. See supra notes 302–305 and accompanying text (discussing Holt’s strict
interpretation of the 1863 Habeas Act).
836. See supra notes 306–314 and accompanying text (discussing the 1864 guerrillasentencing provision).
837. See supra section I.B.3.c (recounting Representative Davis’s eleventh-hour
initiative in March 1865 to prohibit commission trials in places where civil courts were open).
838. As I explain in Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, in its
reorganization of the Articles of War in 1916, Congress reenacted a provision of the
Articles of War (redesignated as Article 81) that had long authorized military trials of
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World War I, which would have given military tribunals much broader
authority to try war-related offenses, was stopped in its tracks as soon as the
President and Attorney General opined that it was unconstitutional.839
3. The Court. — Finally, we come to the branch of the federal
government whose authority would be usurped by the claimed military
jurisdiction. That department certainly has not acquiesced in its own
disempowerment. The Supreme Court in Milligan turned aside most, if
not quite all, of the constitutional justifications offered for wartime
military trials.840 Earlier, there were at least two contemporary opportunities for the courts to opine on the constitutionality of the Lincoln
conspirators’ trial itself, but President Johnson foreclosed those possibilities on both occasions—first with his remarkable habeas suspension
on the morning of Mary Surratt’s execution841 and then again when he
pardoned Mudd, Arnold, and Spangler just before the Supreme Court
might rule on their habeas petitions early in 1869.842

persons who provided particular sorts of aid to the enemy. Id. at 1654–57. Although the
better reading of that law, before the 1916 reenactment, was that it did not cover persons
who were not within or connected with the armed forces, the Judge Advocate General at
the time characterized it as covering other persons, as well, and thus it might be fair to
attribute that broader understanding to the 1916 Congress. Id.
In that same 1916 reenactment, Article 15 provided:
The provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courtsmartial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of
offenders or offenses that by the law of war may be lawfully triable by
such military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.
Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 619, 653. In the Al Bahlul litigation, Judge
Kavanaugh suggested that the enactment of Article 15 amounted to a legislative
ratification of the Lincoln assassination trial, because Congress “was aware of” that
“significant precedent[],” and “[b]y stating that [Article 15] did not ‘deprive’ military
commissions of their traditional authority, Congress necessarily incorporated the Lincoln
assassins precedent for conspiracy.” Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 70 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Kavanaugh is undoubtedly right that the 1916 Congress was “aware of” the
Lincoln case—who wasn’t? It was probably “aware of” the Milligan trial, too, and perhaps
even the military trial of a state senator for having sent a letter to a newspaper editor in the
War of 1812, see supra note 815, and plenty of other legally dubious military trials
throughout history, as well. But surely the 1916 Congress, in clarifying that its conferral of
courts-martial jurisdiction did not “deprive” other military tribunals of “jurisdiction in
respect of offenders or offenses that by the law of war may be lawfully triable by such
[tribunals],” § 3, 39 Stat. at 653, did not mean to ratify, let alone express a view on the
constitutionality of, every single military trial that had ever occurred in the nation’s
history.
839. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1659–64.
840. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 118–31 (1866).
841. See supra notes 472–485 and accompanying text.
842. See supra notes 685, 688 and accompanying text.
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To be sure, the Court in Quirin did finally ratify Speed’s argument
that military courts can adjudicate at least some offenses against the
international law of war.843 That Court thus affirmed the judgment of a
single specification of a single charge in the saboteurs’ case—one that
Chief Justice Stone thought clearly described a law-of-war violation. The
Quirin Court specifically declined, however, to address the constitutionality of the other counts in the case—for alleged spying, aiding the
enemy, and conspiracy, all of which were not, in fact, offenses against the
law of war—in part, apparently, because Stone recognized constitutional
“difficulties” with military adjudication of claims that did not clearly
allege law-of-war offenses.844 Therefore, the Supreme Court has never
resolved the question at hand. Nor, until the recent Al Bahlul case, had
any other Article III court, either.
C.

An Alternative Lesson?

This summary survey of the three branches’ historical treatment of
military tribunals appears to point decisively against using them to try
wartime domestic-law offenses—or, at he very least, to belie any
argument that the three branches have acquiesced in, or ratified, the
purported constitutionality of such a practice. As for the Lincoln
assassination trial, in particular, Justice Jackson’s conclusion in 1951 that
Thomas Ewing and Reverdy Johnson’s jurisdictional objection during the
trial “was certainly one of substance” in light of “later decisions” (presumably including, most significantly, Milligan)845 undoubtedly reflects
the dominant view over the past century and a half.
It is not difficult, however, to imagine some observers reading this
same body of evidence, particularly in the Civil War, to illustrate a very
different, commonly heard account of war powers—namely, that during
the pendency of the war itself, not only is it appropriate for the President
to aggressively construe executive powers, but the other two branches
should also generally defer to such aggressive constructions, lest they risk
unduly hamstringing the military’s efforts to shape the Constitution to a
felt need to effectively address enemy threats. According to Professors
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for example, “When national
emergencies strike, the executive acts, Congress acquiesces, and courts
defer. When emergencies decay, judges become bolder, and soul
searching begins.”846 This “traditional practice of judicial and legislative
deference” during wartime, they argue, “has served Americans well, and

843. See supra notes 753–758 and accompanying text.
844. See supra notes 760–763 and accompanying text.
845. Jackson, supra note 66, at 111.
846. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and
the Courts 3 (2007).
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there is no reason to change it.”847 Indeed, in light of the American
“tradition” of judicial deference in times of emergency, “we think the
burden of factual uncertainty should be on those who urge courts to
abandon this historical posture and assume strict scrutiny.”848
So, for example, the self-described “realist” might emphasize that
even when the Civil War Congress suspected the War Department was
disregarding the tempering provisions of the 1863 Act, it turned a blind
eye to the problem until peace was virtually at hand. Lincoln, too,
confronted with constitutional challenges that he knew to be formidable,
took many ameliorative steps to keep the doubts at bay, but declined to
order a clean halt to Stanton’s and Holt’s excesses. Likewise, one might
see the judiciary’s approach during the war to be a form of capitulation,
such as when the Supreme Court rejected Vallandigham’s appeal on
jurisdictional grounds, and when Judge Wylie felt powerless to resist
President Johnson when the latter purported to suspend habeas in Mary
Surratt’s case, recognizing to his chagrin that Johnson and his Army
would likely hang Surratt, anyway, in disregard of any judicial decree. To
be sure, the Court eventually condemned the War Department’s system
of military trials—in Milligan—but only after the rifles had gone (almost)
silent. And even then, Mudd and his cohorts languished for another two
years in prison, freed only by the stroke of Johnson’s pen rather than by
the expected precedential effect of the Milligan ruling.849
847. Id. at 5.
848. Id. at 122; id. at 12 (“[J]udges deciding constitutional claims during times of
emergency should defer to government action so long as there is any rational basis for the
government’s position, which in effect means that the judges should almost always defer,
as in fact they have when emergencies are in full flower.”); see also Stephen Breyer, The
Court and the World 78–79 (2015) (noting, without approval, the oft-heard view that “the
Court should restore constitutionality only after, perhaps long after, the war is over”);
William Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil War: The Indianapolis Treason Trials, 72
Ind. L.J. 927, 927 (1997) (“Perhaps it may be best that the courts reserve their serious
consideration of questions of civil liberties which arise during wartime until after the war is
over. . . . Peacetime offers an opportunity for detached reflection on these important
governmental questions which are not so calmly discussed in the midst of a war.”).
849. For many years after Milligan, the majority’s constitutional holding was
condemned in some circles as an example of empty judicial grandstanding—a precedent
that would (or should) be honored only in the breach when tested in the crucible of an
actual trial of dangerous enemies in future wars. Political scientist John Burgess’s
assessment in 1891 was typical: “It is devoutly to be hoped that the decision of the court
may never be subject to the strain of actual war. If, however, it should be, we may safely
predict that it will be necessarily disregarded.” 1 John W. Burgess, Political Science and
Comparative Constitutional Law 251 (Boston & London, Ginn & Co. 1891); see also, e.g.,
The Milligan Case, supra note 34, at 3 (“[B]etween Sumter and Appomattox, one is apt to
infer, the opinion would simply have been irrelevant.”); Neely, supra note 137, at 184
(“[T]he real legacy of Ex parte Milligan is confined between the covers of the
constitutional history books. The decision itself had little effect on history.”).
A fair assessment of Milligan’s actual impact in subsequent wars is complicated and
uncertain. On the one hand, the Court in Quirin appeared to rely upon some fairly hazy
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A more tempered version of this skeptical perspective, commonly
associated with Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu, is that whether or
not such judicial cowering is desirable or warranted in wartime, it is
virtually inevitable. On this view, courts will be inclined, “whether
consciously or not,” to “distort the Constitution to approve all that the
military may deem expedient.”850 Therefore, thought Jackson, the
judiciary should, when possible, avoid any pronouncements until after
the fighting has ceased—such as by invoking jurisdictional barriers to
review—so as not to establish any dubious precedents that might persist
as a “loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring
forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”851 The unhappy result of
such a course is that military officers will be effectively free to issue decrees
that “may have a certain authority as military commands, although they
may be very bad as constitutional law,”852 although the courts will then
have an opportunity for a course correction once the emergency ebbs.853
and tenuous distinctions in affirming the conviction of the Nazi saboteurs (including at
least one U.S. citizen). See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1588–
89. On the other hand, Milligan’s shadow limited the scope of the Court’s rationale in
Quirin, so much so that Chief Justice Stone declined to opine on the legality of most of the
charges in that case. See id. at 1673–75. And the Milligan precedent played a prominent
role in the First World War, as a basis for President Wilson’s and Attorney General
Gregory’s repudiation of a rogue official’s effort to have Congress codify a vastly expanded
military commission jurisdiction and Gregory’s subsequent rejection of a proposal to use a
military tribunal for trial of a German saboteur captured just after entering the United
States. See id. at 1657–68.
850. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244–45 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
851. Jackson famously wrote:
Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for deporting and detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial
construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far
more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. A
military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than
the military emergency. Even during that period a succeeding commander
may revoke it all. But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order
to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the
Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the
Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in
criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The
principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.
Id. at 245–46.
852. Id. at 244.
853. Jackson was unwilling to countenance this posture of deference when, as in
Korematsu itself, the Executive had compelled the Article III courts to be complicit in the
constitutionally dubious endeavor, such as by securing a criminal conviction in a civilian
court for violation of the internment order. See id. at 247 (“I should hold that a civil court
cannot be made to enforce an order which violates constitutional limitations even if it is a
reasonable exercise of military authority. The courts can exercise only the judicial power,
can apply only law, and must abide by the Constitution, or they cease to be civil courts and
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The judiciary’s failure to limit military adjudications during and (in part)
after the Civil War might be viewed as an important example of Jackson’s
prescription. Indeed, the Court in Milligan itself candidly conceded that
such a dynamic described the Court’s posture there:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did
not allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so
necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial question.
Then, considerations of safety were mingled with the exercise of
power; and feelings and interests prevailed which are happily
terminated. Now that the public safety is assured, this question,
as well as all others, can be discussed and decided without
passion or the admixture of any element not required to form a
legal judgment.854
There are several reasons to be dubious about these alternative
accounts and, especially, concerning their relevance to the development
of contemporary constitutional understandings of possible wartime
exceptions to Article III’s guarantees.
First, both of these variants of wartime constitutional skepticism or
“realism” depend upon the assumption that the war emergency—and
thus the undisturbed military discretion at the heart of it—is only a
temporary, aberrant state of affairs, and that constitutional correction
will be forthcoming (as in Milligan) after a short period, when the
exigency that justifies military deference has passed. The current armed
conflict, however, is now almost two decades old and is unlikely to end
anytime soon. We are, for better or worse, on a perpetual, somewhat indefinite war footing; therefore any “wartime” resolution of a constitutional question, if only by way of deference to the Executive, becomes,
in effect, an establishment of the new normal state of affairs.855 Not
surprisingly, then, in this long-running conflict the current Supreme Court
arguably has been more willing than in some past conflicts to impose
become instruments of military policy.”). That is not an issue, however, when the
Executive uses a military tribunal.
854. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 109 (1866).
855. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Foreword: A Judge on
Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 16, 149 (2002)
(remarking that where “[t]he line between war and peace is thin,” he must not, as a
Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, “make do with the mistaken belief that, at the end of
the conflict, I can turn back the clock”); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections
on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 273, 279 (“To say that law is silent during a
more-or-less permanent condition is quite different from saying that law is silent during
wartime.”). Such a consideration was one of the principal reasons Justice Jackson himself
was unwilling to extend the Court’s deference in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943), involving a race-based, temporary curfew, to the context of indefinite detention.
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 247 (Jackson, J. dissenting) (“[In Hirabayashi] we did validate a
discrimination of the basis of ancestry for mild and temporary deprivation of liberty. Now
the principle of racial discrimination is pushed from support of mild measures to very
harsh ones, and from temporary deprivations to indeterminate ones.”).
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constitutional limits on the decisions of the political branches about how
to treat the enemy.856 In any event, the Executive does not invoke any
exigency or emergency for military commission trials at Guantánamo—
because there isn’t any.857 Practice has demonstrated that Article III trials
are much more efficient and timely for the prosecution of enemy forces
and those who afford them support.858
Second, the constitutional question at issue here not only implicates
civil liberties but also whether and to what extent the political branches
may transfer authority away from the Article III courts themselves: The
choice is not, for example, between detaining dangerous individuals and
setting them free; it is, instead, merely about which tribunal will host a
criminal trial. Unless and until the Supreme Court itself has reason to
question the adequacy of federal trial courts and lay juries—a prospect
that is currently hard to imagine—there is no particular normative
reason to defer to the decision of the political branches to strip the
judiciary of its constitutional role in hosting trials of federal domestic
offenses.
Finally, Justice Jackson’s posture in Koramatsu appears to have been
predicated on the notion that “as long as the judiciary withholds its
formal approval of [military] excesses, the Constitution will remain
intact.”859 The question at hand, however, is precisely whether the
historical practice of the political branches, standing alone—particularly
Executive practice in high-profile trials such as the Lincoln assassination
commission—should serve to “liquidate” the meaning and scope of
Article III, in cases where the text of the Constitution and judicial
precedents are insufficient to justify exceptions to the Article III norm
(indeed, where the text cuts plainly in the other direction). Where that is
856. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are
entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war,
th[e] understanding [that Congress’ grant of authority for the President to use ‘necessary
and appropriate force’ includes the authority to detain enemy forces ‘for the duration of
the relevant conflict’] may unravel.”); see also Breyer, supra note 848, at 81 (noting that it
is no coincidence that the Court issued the Steel Seizure and Boumediene decisions in times
when the threats, and thus the challenged state conduct, “seemed likely to persist
indefinitely”). This might not be a new phenomenon, however. Assertive judicial
superintendence of the Executive’s conduct of war is not as historically anomalous as
many often assume. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander-in-Chief
at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121
Harv. L. Rev. 689, 718–19 (2008).
857. See Lederman, Wartime Military Tribunals, supra note 67, at 1567–70.
858. See id. at 1568 & nn. 204–205; see also Robert Chesney, Military Commissions
Compared to Civilian Prosecution in Federal Court: A Revealing Snapshot, Lawfare (Feb.
26, 2018), http://lawfareblog.com/military-commissions-compared-civilian-prosecution-federalcourt-revealing-snapshot [http://perma.cc/5K7U-4WAJ].
859. Dennis J. Hutchinson, “The Achilles Heel” of the Constitution: Justice Jackson
and the Japanese Exclusion Cases, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 455, 493.
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the question, “judicial abstention may popularly and even formally be
understood as tacit approval,”860 or, at the very least, as a deliberate
failure to staunch the generative legal force of the executive practice
itself.
CONCLUSION
There are compelling reasons to think that history can, and should,
significantly inform our understandings of how constitutional authority
may be distributed in wartime.861 Even so, the historical treatment of any
constitutional question worth asking is likely to be messy, ambiguous,
and multivalent. History does not often yield easy-to-identify or pellucid
answers to the hardest questions: “[N]o simple, algorithmic formula
dictates how pertinent kinds of history fit together to yield determinate
conclusions in many cases that provoke constitutional controversy.”862
Professor Alison LaCroix is thus surely right to caution against assuming
“an artificial degree of unity and coherence within institutions, and from
one action to another. Whose historical practice matters, and which
moment encompasses the relevant distillation of that practice, are
complex questions. Messiness, unspoken accommodation, and explicit
disagreement abound.”863
That is especially true when it comes to practices developed in the
proverbial fog—and intense pressures and anxieties—of war. And it is
true, in particular, with respect to the use of wartime military courts: The
history I have recounted here does not run in a straight line, nor has
there been a firm and unbroken consensus of constitutional limits within
or among the branches. Although the narrative certainly tends to point
in a particular direction—a direction quite different from the one
described by the government and its judicial defenders—there are
undoubtedly anomalies and thus plenty of room for continued contestation.
The Lincoln assassination commission is the most striking, and the
most famous, of those historical anomalies: It is, indeed, “the highestprofile and most important U.S. military commission precedent in
American history.”864 Its prominence in our national narrative, however,
is hardly reason to accord it a special pride of place in establishing the
860. Id.
861. See See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, supra note
832, at 1099–101. But see id. at 1100 (“[W]e do not mean to suggest that history is
dispositive . . . . Past practice does not, in our view, freeze constitutional meaning. Even
(and perhaps especially) as to the separation of powers, our constitutional tradition has
always been much more tolerant of dynamism.”).
862. Fallon, supra note 134, at 1758.
863. LaCroix, supra note 134, at 78.
864. Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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constitutional breadth of military jurisdiction, as some judges and the
Executive would have it. To the contrary, the fact that Johnson, Stanton,
and Holt convened the tribunal at a moment of heightened public
passions and anxiety, and for the conceded purpose of putting on a show
trial of sorts, designed to smoke out the alleged nefarious schemes of the
leaders of a just-vanquished foe, makes it an especially poor place to look
for measured constitutional judgment or evidence of a constitutional
settlement of a more lasting, and more generally applicable, kind. The
assassination trial, in other words, might be a singular example of how
landmark cases can make bad law.
It is no accident that “military men generally have hesitated to
regard the occasion as a sound precedent or, indeed, as anything more
than an indication of the intensity of popular feeling at the moment.”865
For that is exactly what it was. And thus, until very recently, not only for
“military men” but for lawyers and historians, too, to cite the Lincoln
tribunal as constitutional authority would have been akin to invoking
Korematsu, Dred Scott, or Buck v. Bell as authoritative precedent: Like those
cases, the Lincoln assassination tribunal has long been firmly ensconced
in the constitutional “anticanon.”866
Of course, there is nothing inherently illegitimate about an effort to
transform once discredited constitutional ideas or examples into tomorrow’s
orthodoxy.867 The burden, however, is on those who would resuscitate
the Lincoln assassination trial—and use it to justify a deviation from
Article III norms in a very different historical context and in a starkly
different armed conflict—to offer compelling reasons why that singular
proceeding should, all of a sudden, emerge from its century and a half of
constitutional exile.

865. Wiener, Practical Manual, supra note 123, at 138.
866. See generally Greene, supra note 136.
867. See Balkin, supra note 136, at 12 (“Through acts of persuasion, norm contestation,
and social movement activism, people can eventually move ideas and positions from offthe-wall to on-the-wall.”); see also id. at 68–70, 177–83.
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